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# Anglican Theological Review



EDITED BY

SHERMAN E. JOHNSON AND ALDEN D. KELLEY

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VOLUME XXXVIII      JANUARY 1956      NUMBER 1

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FOUNDED IN 1918 BY SAMUEL A. B. MERCER

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## SOREN KIERKEGAARD

On November 11, 1955, the one hundredth anniversary of the death of Soren Kierkegaard was observed in many places throughout the world. In this country, a "Kierkegaard Colloquim" was held at the Cathedral House, on the grounds of the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York, with papers from outstanding American interpreters of the great Dane's thought—these papers are published in this issue of *THE REVIEW*. And following the day's meeting, the fifty scholars and literary men who were present went to the cathedral, where a brief service of thanksgiving was held, to give praise to God for "the wonderful grace and virtue declared in all his saints" and on this occasion chiefly for his gift of Kierkegaard, that devout and troubled Christian disciple, who only in this century has come into his own as "the troubler of our peace" and the teacher of thousands in "how to become a Christian."

It is not so much Kierkegaard the "systematic thinker" that we honor, although (despite his attack on "The System") there is a deep sense in which he is indeed a "systematic thinker". His analysis of the meaning of human existence—not just man's "being there", but more profoundly man's being "that existing individual"—is a systematic portrayal, albeit in poetical forms, of the nature of man as he really is. His treatment of the process by which man becomes a Christian, a "contemporary" of God in time, is likewise systematic. So also are his analyses of the aesthetic and the ethical life, and of the human religion

of inwardness. But the "system" in his writings is simply the development, through rigorous thinking, of each of these areas and each of these "stages." It is not a "system" in the sense that he imposes upon the rich, troubled, varied, bewildering complex of human life, and of human life in the world under God, a rigid scheme derived from elsewhere. For him "life is greater than logic", if the logic be a logic derived not from living experience but from abstraction and idealistic speculation. Yet it is not for this that we honor him, although we have all of us profited greatly from what he has written.

What, then, is Kierkegaard's lasting significance? and why do we thank God for him? The answer to these questions may be put under three heads.

It is, first of all, his own life. It has been said that "nothing happened *to* Kierkegaard, but everything happened *in* him that could happen to a man." He plunged to the depths of human despair; he rose, more particularly after the "second conversion", to the heights of human life lived in faith under God and by his grace. In a sense different from that which the Fourth Evangelist meant when he wrote the words of Jesus, Kierkegaard "knew what was in man"; he knew it because he had been *there*. In the *Journals*, above all, we see this; and seeing it, we see too that SK talks "to our condition."

Secondly, we honor Kierkegaard because he was honest enough to say that he was not, nor could ever be, a Christian in the truest sense of the word; at best, and always, he was "attempting to be a Christian." So are we all! But how infrequently are we ready and willing to confess the truth? Yet the confession of it, the confession too that our "attempting" is so imperfect, so broken, so damaged by our self-will as well as by our "inherited sin" (as the Danes call it), is the first condition of our beginning to "imitate the Pattern." When Coleridge wrote that he was tired of all attempts to "prove" Christianity, for (as he said) Christianity is not a theory but a life, he was speaking as did SK. Further, when he added that the only "proof" is in the "trying", he spoke again like SK. The solitary Danish thinker has helped to deliver us from the notion that our Christian faith must wait upon our intellectual approbation—although he would have been the last to say (despite those who try to make him out an "irrationalist") that there is no way at all in which it does have our intellectual approbation. He knew that there is some "ocean of meaning", shall we say, which is *there*, concrete facts in history (the life of Jesus Christ) which are

there; he also knew, and told us, that we must none the less swim over the "50,000 fathoms," which constitutes the "risk" we take in "attempting to be a Christian."

Finally, we honor Kierkegaard for his realistic piety, if one may phrase it so. His Christian discourses, as indeed also his "edifying" discourses, show that he had no "stuff" about him. This is the *real* goods; this is Christian devotion based on the facts about man in all of his finitude, his "being-in-the-world", his inability to construct neat schemes which will save him, his incapacity to know all the answers. A preacher in one of our seminary chapels, a few years ago, spoke of the danger of a "deep-freeze" religion. There was none of that in SK. And because he went every step of the way, realistically and honestly, we know that we can trust his devotion when it comes.

There is much in the detail of Kierkegaard's thought that we may not like, much which we may think unbalanced, much that we may think plain wrong. But he himself would have said that this matters not at all. He wanted no disciples who would take his word for the "absolute truth." For him there was but one "absolute truth", God himself; truth, for man, is "subjective pathos"—holding on, in faith, to God and to God coming "into existence in time." It is not disciples that SK wanted; he wanted only those who might understand, as he said so beautifully in *Point of View*, what he was trying to do. He was trying to teach us, by indirection, by "the maieutic method", what it means to be a Christian, "an attempting Christian." And that is what all of us, whatever our denominational allegiance, our theological preference, our philosophical liking, can learn from him.

Thank God, then, for this man, raised up by God to speak to us one hundred years after his death. For he is of those who being dead, yet speaketh.

W. NORMAN PITTENGER

## THANKSGIVING AS A SYNTHESIS OF THE TEMPORAL AND THE ETERNAL

By PAUL S. MINEAR

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The centennial of Soren Kierkegaard's death brings into conjunction two things which are incommensurable. On the one hand, it evokes our personal and corporate gratitude for this man, a gratitude which is nonetheless real for all its intangible subjectivity. On the other hand, it marks an exact measurement of temporal succession, which is nonetheless significant for all its impersonal objectivity. Apart from our indebtedness it would not occur to us to number the years. Apart from chronological transience we would not be reminded of time-transcending indebtedness.

This conjunction of two incommensurable and yet inseparable factors has reminded me that on both sides we stand at some distance from the thought of S. K. himself. The contour of his thanksgiving is quite different from ours, as is also his appraisal of the significance of temporal succession and measurement. It may therefore be worth our energy to explore together his understanding of gratitude and its relation to time. The justification of such an enquiry depends primarily, of course, on whether thanksgiving was in fact of decisive importance to S. K. himself. That it was is a firm conviction of mine.

Another conviction is this: that the interpretation of S. K. has suffered from a neglect of such categories as gratitude. Often the historian of ideas goes astray most radically when he ignores what was actually the inner passion of a particular thinker. And this is what has usually happened in studies of S. K. Nothing is more constitutive of Kierkegaard's self-awareness than his thankfulness, yet few things are treated so seldom in books about him. His thought was in constant motion away from and back toward this magnetic pole. The very center of his thought was the awareness of God-relatedness as constitutive of the self. And to him no activity was more creative or revealing of the self than the act of gratitude. I am convinced that a more discerning appraisal of this act leads to an enhanced appreciation of his mind and spirit.

Let us begin by paying heed to his own testimony:

"I have had more joy in the relation of obedience to God than in thoughts that I produced. . . . My relationship to God is a reflection-relationship, is inwardness in reflection, . . . so that even in prayer my *forte* is thanksgiving." (PV 68f)

Why should S. K. have had more joy in his relation to God than in anything else? Surely because to him life itself is constituted by God-relatedness. Existence as a person is impossible apart from this relationship. Nothing is more native to true selfhood, therefore, than prayer. If life is God-relatedness, then nothing creates and sustains life more directly than prayer and in nothing is life more fully embodied than in prayer. The man who reflects about this life until his relationship to God becomes "a reflection-relationship" will naturally move in the direction of giving thanks.

To S. K., therefore, thanksgiving was not the minimal act, the introductory step, the glib opening of a conversation which immediately gives place to more pressing concerns of petition, confession, absolution or intercession. It was the end as much as the beginning, the saturating medium of petitions and confessions, the deepest fountain of forgiveness and intercession. As in his praying, so too in his living and thinking, the external visible actions were but the outward side of this inward relationship to God, a relationship dominated by gratitude.

But some will protest, "Have you forgotten the constant tension, the bitter controversy, the unrelenting melancholy in his story? Are these the marks of a man whose consciousness was oriented inwardly by gratitude?" The apparent incongruity here may stem from differing ideas of what thanksgiving really is. To S. K. giving thanks is not an easy response of the heart, but one of its most difficult movements. Prayer springs not from an unreflective self but from the self concentrated in intense reflection and double-reflection. To be empowered to give thanks at all times and for every circumstance is a seal of redemption which lies on both sides of strenuous effort and profound suffering. The enemies of gratitude are most implacable, devious and deceptive, and these enemies already hold a beachhead in man's own mind. The ingratitude of Adam can be named and exorcized only by the gratitude of Christ. Only by the strength which is made perfect in weakness can a person become victor in a subtle struggle with Satan wherein the ultimate decisiveness of victory is completely hidden by the unobtrusive silence and the misleading triviality of the battlefield. In short, the *telos* and consummation of God's entire "training in

Christianity" is nothing less than the full release of praise to God for his inexhaustible bounty.

It is easy for us to treat gratitude as a response of men to men, which only for the religious man and at his option is gradually extended to include God as its object. This makes it all too natural for us to treat thankfulness as relatively non-essential in defining man's selfhood. But for S. K. thanksgiving is authentic only when it expresses man's total being, i.e., his God-relatedness. God is never the third party in an act of giving thanks (CUP 61). From Him alone comes every good and perfect gift. From him come *nothing* but good and perfect gifts. It is quite impossible to grasp in any paragraph the wealth of S. K.'s discourses on this theme. This wealth lies nearest to the surface, perhaps, in his expositions of the Bible, whether he is dealing with Job (R 110ff; ED II 7ff) or with James (ED I 35ff; II 27, 45ff; FSE 228ff), whether he is meditating on the apostle Paul (ED I 139ff; III 95ff; GS 125ff) or the disciple Judas (CD II 284ff), whether he is analyzing the sin of Adam (ED II 27ff; GS 59; CoD 81) or the obedience of Christ (GS 44ff; CD 228ff).

The overwhelming and inexhaustible wealth of God's gifts surely lies behind the choice of a motto for *Point of View*:

"What shall I say? My words alone  
Do not express my duty.  
O God, how great thy wisdom is,  
Thy goodness, might and beauty." (Brorson)

To S. K., however, God does much more than place man in his debt and then wait for him to return thanks. God is the subject as well as the object of thanksgiving. It is He who is active in the movement of the grateful heart. His Spirit is vocal in the *Abba*, in inexpressible deep yearnings, and in the whole process of reflective inwardness. Gratitude articulates simultaneously the nothingness of man and the sufficiency of God, who is at work in man to create something out of nothing. To give thanks is an expression of inwardness, and inwardness is "the determinant of the eternal in man" (CoD 134). "If every man does not essentially participate in the absolute, then the whole game's up" (CoD 102).

This participation in the absolute, however, preserves the qualitative distinction between the thankful man and his God. Kierkegaard recognized that the apostle's rhetorical questions must be answered in the negative:



"Who has known the mind of the Lord?  
 Who has been his counselor?  
 Who has given a gift to him that he might be repaid?"  
 (Rom. 11:34 . . . cp. CUP 124f; J 369)

On the other hand, S. K. realized that although we cannot repay God's gift, we can respond to God's gift of himself in his gift. Man can stand in fear and trembling, in trust and surrender, in repentance and reverence. These responses to God are forms of gratitude, forms in which the God who is active in the giving of thanks is one and the same God as the God to whom thanks are given.

Man can never act, even in the giving of thanks, without dependence on God who has given him not only the gifts but also the power to thank God. This is why S. K. found a childish delight in offering his whole work as a spy in gratitude to God. He handed his entire authorship back to God "with more diffidence than a child when it gives as a present to the parents an object which the parents had presented to the child". He was diffident, but he was joyful because he knew that God would not be so cruel as to take the gift back and to say "This is my property" (PV 88-90 note). Man's thanks are genuine only if he makes "an honest effort . . . to do something by way of compensation, without shunning any sacrifice or labour in the service of truth" (PV 7, 8). To be thankful is to be faithful, but this faithfulness will always fuse together inward seriousness which glorifies God with an inward jesting which destroys any self-importance (CUP 124f). The more earnest a man's response, the more must he appropriate humor to protect the God-relationship.

This welding of earnestness and humor is imperative if the grateful man is to avoid the twin traps of absolutizing the relative and of relativizing the absolute. Genuine gratitude relates a person simultaneously to the absolute and the relative, to the universal and the particular, to God and to the men he meets on the street. Without seriousness and humor, gratitude easily becomes the occasion for getting lost either in the infinite or in the finite. These were very real dangers for S. K., dangers which made genuine gratitude one true antidote to "the sickness unto death". He overcame despair by an activity of thankful faith, in which every particular gift was the expression of the one incalculable gift, every discrete happenstance was related to divine governance, and the relationship to every person was a particular instance of relationship of both persons to God.

Although Kierkegaard never allows us to forget that gratitude is



God-relationship, neither does he forget that this relationship embraces all of man's other relationships. In teaching a man to be grateful God employs not only the lilies of the field but also the cup of water and the neighbor. And there was one neighbor for whom S. K. was especially grateful: "that individual whom with joy and gratitude I call my reader" (ED I 5). We recall that S. K. addressed many of his discourses to this individual. We recall, too, that his Danish public found these discourses neither witty, clever, nor of great theological or philosophical significance. They took with great excitement what he held out with his left hand, but scorned his right. We must concede that in New York as much as in Copenhagen, in 1955 as much as in 1855, these discourses in his right hand are still virtually ignored. Yet S. K.'s word remains true. He is grateful for anyone who takes gratefully what he holds out with his right hand. S. K. insisted that this *reader* contributes more than the *author*. Now I am sure that among us there should be at least one who qualifies as "that single individual". This individual would say: "No, the author contributes more than I do. I am indebted to him." Both of these statements, of course, can be true at once—in fact, both are always true where gratitude works its miracle of abundance. Each person is convinced that the other's contribution is the greater. Thanksgiving celebrates a relationship which destroys *quid pro quo* logic and creates a qualitative increment of debt in some sort of infinite proportion to the reality of gratitude. By thanksgiving for one another, men participate in the infinite beneficence of God and in the mysterious process by which the prodigal Father imparts everything to sons who have nothing.

Gratitude, then, is a miraculous event wherein God's abundance becomes available for all and human cups run over in glorifying God. This event demonstrates how intrinsic is the interplay of subjective and objective factors. The act of thanksgiving is genuine only to the degree that it is fully subjective, only when it is the act of the real self, at the very roots of its selfhood. Any retreat from subjectivity is as destructive of gratitude as it is of the self. Only as it is my deepest embodiment of deepest indebtedness is it gratitude at all.

But the more fully subjective I become in recognizing this debt, the more fully I recognize that it is a debt owed to Another. Thanksgiving at its deepest level turns the most reflective self outward toward its source and its sustaining power. The pervasive joy of the grateful heart is joy over Another's amazing grace and unwearied faithfulness. The subjective act breaks the bonds of self-centeredness and frees the

self to obey the first commandment. Both the reflection and the double-reflection become inherently dialectical, so long as they spring from gratitude and produce gratitude. It is before God that *an* individual becomes *the* individual, and *the* individual before God is most fully himself, most fully realizes the divine image, most fully appropriates his vocation and his destiny, when he gives thanks to God.

It is my conviction that we are in the habit of undervaluing the ontological weight of this gratitude. We assume that a man has the option of giving or refusing to give thanks, and that whichever option he chooses he remains the same person. His choice has little to do with his existence, with the issue: to be or not to be. But Kierkegaard recognized a genuine ontological reality in gratitude. A man does not exist and then become thankful. Rather, in and through his thankfulness he becomes a man. In gratitude, his God-relationship gives birth to a self-awareness and a neighbor-awareness which together constitute him as a self.

Between man and God there is at once an infinite qualitative distinction and an unbreakable bond. The prayer of gratitude appropriates and preserves both the relationship and the distinction. The acknowledgment of total indebtedness is a simultaneous recognition of dependence and distinction. The grateful self discovers that the synthesis of relationship and distinction is the source not of confusion and of disorientation but of order and reorientation, the very substance of selfhood. Gratitude discovers that the relation to the God who is qualitatively different is a relation which constitutes the self as a self. Prayer discloses the spirit as the bond which unites the temporal and the eternal in man, because the prayer of thanksgiving is the act of this spirit (CUP 145).

Existence is bifrontal. To be as bifrontal as existence requires an existing spirit. Always giving thanks to God means that a person is becoming this existing infinite spirit. Reflective prayer is the supreme activity of "the subjective existing thinker" (CUP 75, 83).

An alternate way of stating this is to recall S. K.'s definition of the self as a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal. By his gifts to man God participates in temporal things. The gifts are temporal, but God gives himself wholly in all of his gifts. The incarnation and the atonement constitute the measure in which he is present in all of his gifts. Between each of his temporal gifts and his eternal life there is an infinite qualitative difference and yet an unbreakable intimate relationship. His creative works glorify Him as their Creator. None of these

works is more fully qualified to glorify Him than is the creature made in his image. Man, shaped in his image, "becomes himself" by the gratitude expressed in praise and obedience. His gratitude signals the fusion in the spirit of infinite poverty and infinite riches. The cry of thanks is the birth-cry of a person who is created out of nothing. At this moment he becomes conscious of his own mysterious, miraculous existence as a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal. The act of acknowledging his dependence on God is the initial act of self-recognition.

By its intrinsic nature, therefore, the act of thanksgiving defeats various tendencies in the self to escape its rootage in either the eternal or the temporal (CUP 239). On the one hand is the tendency to treat the temporal as insignificant and to desire "in time to be merely eternal". But if a cup of cold water is a divine gift, if a moment of suffering yields an eternal weight of glory, then it is sinful for a man to make himself temporally as light as possible so that the weight of his eternal self may be heavier. This is a movement away from gratitude, away from selfhood, and toward a fantastic existence (CUP 54). Gratitude makes it impossible to equate the temporal with the sinful, for everything temporal becomes good when it is received with thankfulness (ED I 47; I Tim. 4:4). In a similar fashion the act of gratitude destroys all despairing views of time as the infinitely vanishing succession of present moments into the oblivion of the past.

On the other hand, the grateful heart will reject every temptation to escape the eternal by obsession with the temporal. It will not tolerate a worldliness which defines man wholly by temporal categories or limits man's horizons to temporal process. Nor will it accept the removal of the eternal to an abstract, distant boundary which impinges at no point on daily decisions or on the progress of universal history. Thanksgiving celebrates the presence of the eternal within the confines of the temporal (CoD 135). It relates man immediately to the eternal (CoD 102). It articulates the truth that there is more joy in heaven over one individual who relates himself inwardly to God than over a universal history which is related only externally to the eternal (CUP 116). Thus is man freed from enchantment either with the temporal or with the eternal because he knows himself to be a synthesis of the two.

Although gratitude thus prevents any destruction of the synthesis, it does not permit man to determine precisely the boundary between the separate elements. The act of thanksgiving so unites the temporal

and the eternal in man that only God is in a position to determine precisely the points where they meet. When a person tries to dissolve the synthesis he is destroying himself. He is seeking to form a conception of God in his own likeness rather than allowing God to re-form him in God's likeness. This is why a man can never trust his own ability to separate good gifts from bad, his infinite indebtedness from his immediate debts. The measure of gratitude is whether man thanks God at all times and for everything. To be thankful in these terms requires a teleological suspension of the finite understanding. This, at least, was S. K.'s experience

"In my God-relationship I have to learn to give up my finite understanding, and therewith the custom of discrimination which is natural to me, that I may be able with divine *madness* to give thanks always" (CUP 159).

This madness, however, is a *divine* madness, because it is a mark of man's willingness to live in the only element which provides the proper air for his lungs. It marks the transition of the self into "the true liberation from finitude". This liberation is so amazing that the freed heart will forget its desire to dissolve the synthesis. Because the synthesis is realized through the giving of thanks, it will be preserved better by respecting the dialectical boundaries of earnestness and humor than by curious efforts of the speculative mind to assign to the two elements in the synthesis a quantitative weight.

The truth of this may become more apparent if we think for a moment of the links between thanksgiving and love. Both love and gratitude are finite expressions of an infinite indebtedness. Both are expressions of the self as a synthesis. Neither can be etherialized into the eternal or smothered in the temporal. Both recognize that "God has the first priority" and that "everything which a man owns is pledged as security for this claim" (WL 121). To both "the pure heart is first and last a bound heart . . . bound illimitably to God" (WL 120). The infinitely bound heart is the infinitely free heart. It is bound and free to give itself away. He who loves is in debt to the beloved. By loving he comes into the relation of infinite debt (WL 143). Christianity begins with what every man must become:—the free indebted lover. Love grounds man's selfhood in God's eternal *telos*. Listen to the parable:

"When a fisherman has caught a fish and wishes to keep it alive, what must he do? He must at once place it in water. . . . Why? . . .

Because water is the natural element of fish. . . . The natural element of love is infinity, inexhaustible, immeasurable. If therefore you wish to preserve your love then you must take care that by the aid of infinite indebtedness, ensnared by liberty and life, it remains in its element" (WL 146).

Gratitude, love, freedom—these have an ontological density as constituting the very being of those who participate in the eternal history. Where the self remains in this native element of indebtedness, liberty and love, there takes place the teleological suspension of the historical. For the historical restricts life to the life-span, restricts love to one's immediate neighbors, restricts human freedom and human gratitude to temporal categories alone. But when by thanksgiving and love the heart is bound to God, it shares in an "eternal history" which does not end with the grave. The span of earthly love constitutes only "a very little section within that eternal history" (WL 121). The debt binds the debtor into a teleological history which includes the temporal and simultaneously transcends it. One measure of the teleological suspension of the historical is the transformation in the meaning of the past, the present, and the future. Let us consider the *tense* which was so central in Kierkegaard's own experience: the future. . . . To him, the future is the mode by which the eternal has chosen to have dealings with the temporal (CoD 80; CUP 271).

Apart from its relation to the eternal, the future does not really exist. Yet this non-existent future confronts man as the realm of the possible, the inscrutable, the manifold, the indeterminate. This future generates anxiety and dread. This dread, in turn, creates a false self, a self which considers itself dependent upon the contingent. Obsessed by the future, the self restlessly seeks "to force or to coax from the mystery its explanation" but in vain (ED I 8). It becomes more and more enslaved to the temporal, less and less capable of gratitude to the eternal for the temporal. The self moves farther and farther away from itself, i.e. from the synthesis of the eternal and the temporal.

But when in faith the self accepts itself as God's creature, the future is overcome. This victory over the future is the source of freedom and love. It is celebrated by the act of giving thanks. The recognition of total gratitude transforms the self and the self's relation to the future. One's coming days remain crammed with manifold possibilities, but these contingencies are subordinated to the reality of God's promise. Expectation of the future becomes the point where the eternal meets the self in redemptive creation. The self is reconstituted and liberated.

Its preoccupation with the future is replaced by the freedom of gratitude. Thankful to God for His future, the self becomes itself in the present act of obedience and love.

How this happens may be seen if we recall that gratitude recognizes that the gift of life always moves in one direction only—from God toward man, the man who faces forward. The future owes nothing to the self; rather the self owes everything to the eternal (i.e. the future). Man has no claim on God; God's claim on man is absolutely prior and total. To the grateful man, therefore, the future is not the occasion of sin-producing dread, but the point where God's gift prompts man's gratitude. The door through which the eternal seeks to enter is not the nameless, boundless future, but the very real tomorrow. This tomorrow condenses the spatialized conception of the future into one Day, which is near enough to demand urgency and distant enough to demand patience. The eternal future (which embraces the whole of time) thus produces a teleological suspension of all temporal futures. God's *tomorrow* subordinates the temporal and redeems it by filling the time with its proper content: "the eternal history of love". By gratitude man lives out of the resources of this eternal history where time is filled by eternity. By gratitude man "enters eternity forwards", and this is what S.K. means by repetition (CoD 80). Repetition is to give thanks always.

By disclosing a new future, the activity of thanksgiving discloses as well a new present and a new past. Having conquered the future, the grateful self comes to understand how that vanishing atom of time—the present—can become as well an atom of eternity, and how the past is preserved, not in the present but in the eternal.

Perhaps the best example of how thanksgiving sublimates past, present and future into the eternal is offered by Kierkegaard himself. Every day, according to the Point of View, he "ascertained and convinced (himself) anew that a God exists". Every day was repeated, "my prayer of thanksgiving for the indescribable things He has done for me, so infinitely much more than ever I could have expected." By his grateful prayer he voiced his amazement "at God, at His love and at what a man's impotence is capable of with His aid." S. K. had no fear that eternity might be tiresome, "since it is exactly the situation I need so as to have nothing else to do but to give thanks" (PV 66, 67),

And at the end, as he looked back over his personal story, with its offences against God, its travail and its fruit, he wrote,



"... one thing concerns me absolutely, is more important to me than the whole authorship, and lies closer to my heart, namely, to express, as sincerely and as strongly as possible, what I can never be sufficiently grateful for, and what, when once I have forgotten the whole authorship, I shall unalterably and forever remember—how infinitely much more Providence has done for me than I ever had expected, could have expected, or might have dared to expect." (PV 154)

We must bring to an end a task which is endless because its theme is endless. My study has strengthened my conviction that thanksgiving was so central to Kierkegaard that no one is qualified to interpret him who does not enter into his understanding of gratitude. The study has increased my indebtedness to him by making me especially thankful for his depth-analysis of thanksgiving. It has made me realize more deeply how the present commemoration of his life and death, as a temporal item in our own God-relationship, may also contribute to that synthesis of the eternal and the temporal which is the substance of our very being.

#### ABBREVIATIONS OF WORKS IN ORDER OF CITATION

- PV—The Point of View for My Work as an Author (Trans. by W. Lowrie, Oxford, 1939).  
 R—Repetition (Trans. by W. Lowrie, Princeton, 1941).  
 ED—Edifying Discourses (Trans. by D. F. and L. M. Swenson, Augsburg, 1943-46).  
 FSE—For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourself (Trans. by W. Lowrie, Oxford, 1941).  
 GS—The Gospel of Suffering (Trans. by D. F. and L. M. Swenson Augsburg, 1948).  
 CD—Christian Discourses (Trans. by W. Lowrie, Oxford, 1939).  
 CoD—Concept of Dread (Trans. by W. Lowrie, Princeton, 1944).  
 CUP—Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Trans. by D. F. Swenson and W. Lowrie, Princeton, 1941).  
 J—Journals (Trans. by A. Dru, Oxford, 1938).  
 WL—Works of Love (Trans. by D. F. and L. M. Swenson, Princeton, 1946.)



## KIERKEGAARD AND CONTEMPORARY EXISTENTIALIST PHILOSOPHY

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Existentialist thought began more than one hundred years ago with Kierkegaard's scorching attack on Hegel, the ruling modern philosopher of that time. While ignored by his contemporaries and forgotten for a lifetime, he was then rediscovered in Europe after the First World War. His works have now been translated into almost every important language, and his thought has been criticized and developed by many able, philosophical successors, including Heidegger, Jaspers, Berdiaef, Marcel, and Sartre. Much as he would deplore such a comparison, it is certainly true that his influence is now much more extensive and pervasive in the West than that of his great opponent. In the light of these developments it is clear that existentialism is something more than a reaction against Hegel. It is far deeper than this. It must rather be understood as a movement of profound criticism and rebellion against a basic failure of analysis which pervades the whole history of post-Cartesian philosophy. This is a neglect of that obscure region of being to which we still refer by such terms as the "subjective."

For modern thought whatever is actual is an object present *there* before me. The *me*, before whom it is brought, is either treated as a peculiar subjective object, or else denied. Thus Hume, trying to find that object or impression which is responsible for the personal pronoun, has to give up in despair.<sup>1</sup> There is no subjective object. Hence the self must be denied. For Kant, the most existential of modern philosophers, the subjective self is not denied. It really exists. But it is "noumenal", that is, unknowable by any of the standard objective modes of human knowledge. By introducing dialectic, or motion, into his conceptual objects Hegel thought that he could do full justice to subjective existence, and claimed that he had taken it up into his sweeping panoramas of world history.

At this point Kierkegaard intervened with deadly penetration. Full justice is not being done to subjective existence. There may be some

<sup>1</sup>*Treatise of Human Nature* Book 1, Part IV, Sect. VI.

sense in which Hegel as an existing person can be "taken up" into a conceptual system of his own construction. But surely something is omitted, not only by Hegel but by other "objective" philosophers of the modern tradition. "All the profounder thinkers," he says in his *Journals*, "are agreed in placing evil in isolated subjectivity—objectivity being the saving factor. Oh depths of confusion. No—the whole concept of objectivity which has been made into our salvation is merely the food of sickness. . . ." He realizes the extent to which this detached objectivity has penetrated into our common sense, and is amused at those who become so objective that they seem to achieve an almost permanent detachment from themselves. In conversation he sometimes felt that he was talking not to the man himself but rather to some distant relative, a second cousin, or perhaps an uncle.

He notes the striking contrast between the great ascetic system of Schopenhauer and the actual categories by which he lived. "Usually," he says, "the philosophers (Hegel as well as the rest) like the majority of men, exist in quite different categories for everyday purposes from those in which they speculate, and console themselves with categories very different from those which they solemnly discuss. That is the origin of the mendacity and confusion which has invaded scientific thinking."<sup>2</sup> Kierkegaard called this a lack of reduplication, and found it exemplified in Hegel's attempt to absorb Christian Faith as a mythical step in his great objective system. But authentic Faith is not an object from which one can become detached to gaze at from a distance. It is rather a way of thought which must be duplicated in personal existence. How different it is to talk about Christianity, even to admire it from an objective point of view, and really to exist as a Christian.

This is the origin of the term existentialism. Modern philosophy has failed to come to grips with the human subject as lived from within. It has tried to deny it, to evade it, to detach it from the world. But nevertheless this subject exists. It cannot be denied, and hangs over the whole succession of objective systems like a threatening cloud, breaking in at unexpected moments with shattering gusts of storm. It is inescapable, and yet unresponsive to all the prevailing modes of approach. How is it to be identified and grasped? Here, I think, is Kierkegaard's fundamental philosophic insight. It is not a peculiar kind of property or thing, nor any set of properties. It is rather a mode of existing. In

<sup>2</sup>*Journals of S. Kierkegaard* (Dru). Oxford, 1938, 1042, p. 366.

<sup>3</sup>*Journals of Søren Kierkegaard* (Dru). Oxford 582, p. 156.

evading the "subjective," modern thought has been evading the act of existing, and this is no small evasion. To be right about everything but existence, is very far from being right. As Kierkegaard puts it in his *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*: "The way of objective reflection makes the subject accidental, and thereby transforms existence into something indifferent, something vanishing. . . . It leads to abstract thought, to mathematics, to historical knowledge of different kinds; and always it leads away from the subject whose existence or non-existence, and from the objective point of view quite rightly, become infinitely indifferent. Quite rightly, since as Hamlet says, existence and non-existence have only subjective significance."<sup>4</sup>

By ignoring the "subjective" we have been ignoring existence. This lived existence cannot be squeezed into a "private corner" of some vast objective framework nor into a momentary *now* in time. It is far too basic and pervasive for this, and is bound to explode with devastating consequences. We cannot escape from subjectivism by evading the so-called subject. We must rather go into this "subject" and find out what and how it really is. The whole confused notion needs to be rethought in the light of the given data. Kierkegaard initiated this process of re-examination and reformulation, and glimpsed many of those revolutionary consequences which have been confirmed and deepened by the studies of such authors as Jaspers, Marcel, and more especially by Heidegger in his great book, *Sein und Zeit*. In this disciplined and painstaking work of phenomenological description, the confused terms *subject* and *object* are scrupulously avoided for the sake of clarity, and many of Kierkegaard's brilliant insights into the structure of lived existence are developed and analyzed with painstaking accuracy.

These insights are best understood in the light of four further trends of post-Cartesian philosophy: 1) the restricted view of immediate empirical data associated with British empiricism and especially with Hume; 2) an emphasis on human nature in general, the essence of man abstracted from its temporal act of existing; 3) a view of the mind as a substantial container divorced from the world of changing things and persons; and 4) a radical separation of value from fact.

#### 1. The Restricted Empiricism of Hume.

By turning his attention to the forbidden regions of the so-called subjective, Kierkegaard succeeded in focusing certain obscure and neglected data of lived existence such as mood and feeling, choice and re-  
pe-

<sup>4</sup>Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, Princeton, 1944, p. 173.

tition, human temporality, anxiety, despair, and death. In many cases he was able to shed additional light upon them and to show that prevailing modes of interpretation were oversimplified or definitely distorted. Because of the accepted view of these data as contained within a "subjective" mind and the terminology associated with this view which he never completely outgrew, Kierkegaard's penetrating analyses of these data have often been called "subjective" and irrational. He is supposed to have concentrated on peculiar experiences of his own, and to have indulged them by the construction of fantastic interpretations. This is far from the truth.

It is true that he is analyzing phenomena of inner existence long considered to be "subjective," and readily fitted into influential frames of reference. But his method of dealing with these data is eminently objective and rational. He is simply trying to describe them without distortion, precisely as they are given. "The majority of men," he says, "are subjective towards themselves and objective towards all others, terribly objective sometimes—but the real task is to be objective towards oneself, and subjective towards all others."<sup>5</sup> He is a great phenomenologist, analyzing confused regions of personal existence with penetrating clarity, and revealing their necessary connections with one another. Far from being a lapse into subjective bias and irrationalism, his philosophical work is a triumph of rational description and analysis, an original penetration of reason into depths of experience long languishing in the dark obscurity of the obvious. These investigations have led to a fundamental questioning of traditional views of the human "subject", and to such a radically novel view of human existence as we find in Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*.

## 2. The Human Essence in Act and a New View of Time.

Classical treatises on man like the *De Anima* and Aquinas' *Tractatus de Homine* have given us penetrating analyses of human nature in general, the universal essence of man, abstracted from its act of existing. This essence has been carefully divided into its component characteristics. Each faculty has been separated from the rest and exactly described. The human mind may have to proceed in this way, by chopping a thing into its formal parts and examining them one by one. But it is not these conceptual fragments that exist. We are never confronted with such universal fragments of man. We are confronted with an individual person in the act of becoming, with all his faculties in

<sup>5</sup>Kierkegaard, *Journals*, Oxford, 1938 No. 676 pp. 212-13.

operation all at once. Kierkegaard is an empiricist, interested in what is actually given. Hence we find him sharply attacking the abstract essentialism of traditional philosophy which has concentrated on abstract essences or structures, and has often confused them with being.

"What confuses the whole doctrine about being in logic," he says in his *Journals*, "is that people do not notice that they are always operating with the *concept* of existence. But the concept of existence is an ideality, and the difficulty is of course whether existence can be reduced to a concept. . . . Kant is right that with existence no new essence is added to the concept. He is evidently thinking honestly of existence as irreducible to a concept, empirical existence."<sup>9</sup>

Kierkegaard is not interested in the abstract essence alone by itself, which never exists. He is concerned rather with the essence as it really is in the empirical act of existing, with all its faculties in operation. He is trying to describe this act, and the different ways in which the operations are integrally held together within it. Such an analysis had never been persistently attempted before and an adequate vocabulary was lacking. Kierkegaard's importance as a philosopher and phenomenologist lies in the fact that he inaugurated a disciplined effort to perform this task. As a result of his labors and those of his followers, a technical vocabulary has been devised, and results of epoch-making importance have been achieved. We have no time, of course, to give an exhaustive review of these results. We shall select the problem of human time in the attempt to show how certain suggestions of Kierkegaard have finally led to Heidegger's recent formulation of a radically novel theory of existential time.

In dealing with the phenomenon of time the western philosophical tradition on the whole has followed Aristotle in emphasizing the present rather than the past and future. Time is then regarded as a succession of *nows*, one after the other. This has had a profound and lasting influence on common sense in the West. Thus we think of time as a stream in which what we now call the past comes first, then the present, and finally the future. At any given moment, however, only the present is actual. The past, when actual, was a *now*, but at this instant it is only a *no-longer-now*. When actual, the future will also be a present *now*, but at this instant it is only a *not-yet-now*. We think of this now-succession as going on and on indefinitely, and containing

<sup>9</sup>*Journals* No. 1027, pp. 357-8.

within itself, as a measure, all the events that ever have been, are, or will be, including our own existence.

As Heidegger has pointed out, this view, when carefully considered, is open to serious questions.<sup>7</sup> Events in time succeed one another. But time does not come after itself. It involves a constant factor, always real. What is this constant factor? *time itself* as distinguished from *processes in time*? The classical theory is not clear. We speak of the phases or *ecstasies*<sup>8</sup> of time as Heidegger calls them, as if one could exist by itself, and be succeeded by another. But does this really make sense? What is a past without present and future, or a present without future and past? This leads to another question concerning the classical emphasis on the present as *alone actual*.

If the past and future are wholly unreal what then do we mean by them? Surely we refer to something with some kind of being of its own. Do we do justice to this distinctive character of the future by calling it a *now* that is not-yet? What is this not-yetness? If neither this nor the past has being, then again—what meaning can be attached to the present? What is left of the present when future and past are subtracted? Finally, if time goes on indefinitely, why do we speak of it as always passing? Why do we not say rather that more and more is coming? These questions are not fully answered by the classical theory.

Kierkegaard began struggling with the problem of time which he referred to as "the life principle of history"<sup>9</sup> in his early work, *Either/Or* (1843). He noted how the objective, aesthetic attitude, which also dominates much of what we now call common sense, tends to concentrate on what is *now* here before me as the essence of time, and how time itself comes to be viewed as a mere succession of *nows*, each different from the one before. He criticized this as ignoring the actual process of existing which cannot be thus squeezed into a *now*, as well as the phenomenon of repetition, as he called it, which characterizes the higher levels of human life.

"If I would represent a hero who conquers kingdoms and lands," he says, "he can very well be represented in the now, but a cross-bearer who every day takes up his cross cannot be represented either in poetry or in art, because the point is that he does it every day. If I would imagine a hero who stakes his life, it can very well be concentrated in

<sup>7</sup>Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 3rd. ed. Max Niemeyer, Halle, 1931 pp. 424ff.

<sup>8</sup>From the Greek ἐξιστάσθαι.—outstretchings.

<sup>9</sup>*Either/Or* II. Princeton, 1944. p. 113.



the now, but not the business of dying daily, for here the principal point is that it happens every day. Courage can very well be concentrated in the now, but not patience, precisely for the reason that patience strives with time."<sup>10</sup>

He is beginning to see that the lived time of human existence cannot be reduced to a succession of nows running off in time. The past cannot be dismissed as a now-no-longer, nor the future as a now-not-yet. Each of these has a distinctive being of its own, quite different from the present. But no one of these can exist alone without the rest. Thus in the *Concept of Dread* (1844) he criticizes the Greek view for attempting to understand the past "without defining this by its relation to the present and the future."<sup>11</sup> Each phase of time requires the others. But the future enjoys a certain priority, because it is towards this guiding future that authentic existence is moving.

"In making this division (between present, past and future)," he says, "attention is at once drawn to the fact that in a certain sense the future signifies more than the present and the past; for the future is in a sense the whole of which the past is a part, and in a sense the future may signify the whole."<sup>12</sup> Novelty of course is always emerging and replacing what preceded it. But Kierkegaard never attached any great value to novelty as such. This is constantly occurring both in human history and in sub-human nature. Nothing is so old as the new. The most distinctive phase of history is man's capacity to withstand this all-consuming flux of novelty, to stand firm in a final choice, and to repeat it up to the end.

As Kierkegaard puts it: "he who would only hope is cowardly, he who would only recollect is a voluptuary, but he who wills repetition is a man, and the more expressly he knows how to make his purpose clear, the deeper he is a man. But he who does not comprehend that life is a repetition, and that this is the beauty of life has condemned himself and deserves nothing better than what is sure to befall him, namely to perish."<sup>13</sup> It is only through the repetition of a final choice up to the very end, that the past, present, and future phases of existential time may be held together, and human integrity achieved. Otherwise these phases disintegrate, and life becomes a series of sepa-

<sup>10</sup>*Either/Or* II p. 114.

<sup>11</sup>*Concept of Dread*, Princeton, 1944, p. 80.

<sup>12</sup>*Concept of Dread* p. 80.

<sup>13</sup>*Kierkegaard. Repetition* Princeton, 1941 p. 5.



rate chunks which succeed one another like a physical process running off in time.

Kierkegaard never worked out these ideas in any detail. They remain undeveloped suggestions. But some of his later followers have worked them out with patience and care. The most important study of this kind is the new theory of time with which *Sein und Zeit* concludes.<sup>14</sup> This theory owes more to Kierkegaard than is commonly recognized by recent commentators, as I hope may be suggested by the following summary.

Time is a structure of human existence which is always stretched out into the ecstasies, as Heidegger calls them, of future, past, and present. Particular events in time are variable, and succeed one another, but this ecstatic structure of time itself remains constant as long as we exist. The ecstasies may be held together by a final decision that takes over the whole of life in full responsibility, or they may be allowed to drift apart by indecision and postponement. The common sense view is an indication of such irresponsibility. But in either case, they are interdependent and form an integral whole. No single ecstasy can exist without the others.

The past which I have been has a distinctive reality of its own. My projected future exists in a mode of possibility quite distinct from presents. Neither one, in fact, can be reduced to the present. Each makes a necessary and irreducible contribution to the temporal being of man. This human time will not go on indefinitely. It is limited by the final boundary of death. This is why we know that time is ever passing. My life does not unroll itself in successive parts like other events in time. It is rather true that I *am* this time. To waste or lose time is to waste myself. To gain time is to gain an opportunity for existing.

As an exhaustive account of the complex phenomena of time, Heidegger's theory is open to serious objections. One may certainly question whether what he has described is the only time there is.<sup>15</sup> But there is little doubt that he has shed much needed light on the phenomenon of *human* time. He has filled in an important gap in traditional theory, and his revolutionary approach, foreshadowed by brilliant suggestions of Kierkegaard, deserves the attention of all serious thinkers.

<sup>14</sup>cf. Heidegger, *op. cit.* Part II. Ch. 4 and 6.

<sup>15</sup>Cf. Wild, *The New Empiricism and Human Time*, *Rev. of Meta.* June, 1954.

### 3. The Mind as a Substantial Container and the Field Conception of Man.

Throughout the course of modern philosophy, the human self has been identified primarily with the mind or cognitive subject. Since Descartes, this mind has been regarded as a thinking thing, dwelling in lonely isolation, and divorced from the external world of extended objects. The only data immediately available to it are its own private states or impressions. In the intricate and devious discussions of modern epistemology it has become increasingly obscure how any sort of inference to independent objects could be justified. Hence the so-called problem of the external world has become ever more pressing and confused. From this epistemological point of view, knowing the world is the most basic way in which we can become related to it. Thus if doubt is cast, as it certainly has been cast, on whether we can know the world, it is more and more dubious as to whether we can be related to it at all. Solipsism looms up as a formidable skeleton in this closet of modern philosophy, and the so-called "problem of the external world," which Kant called a scandal, grows ever more pressing and more confused.

Kierkegaard felt that this so-called "problem" was wholly artificial, and that it arose from an unnecessary neglect of the datum of human existence. There are many passages which could be quoted in this connection, but a few selections from the *Postscript* should suffice. Descartes was wrong in thinking that *cogito ergo sum* is a genuine inference. It is not an inference at all, but a sheer tautology. As he says "if *I am thinking* what wonder that *I am*"; the assertion has already been made, and the first proposition says even more than the second. . . . There is no conclusion here, for the proposition is a tautology."<sup>16</sup> Thinking is always given as an existent thinking, belonging to an existent person. Descartes' worst mistake was to hypostatize this thinking as a separate *thing*, and to neglect the act of existing and its complex structure.

"The real subject," as Kierkegaard says, "is not the cognitive subject, since, in knowing, he moves in the sphere of the possible; the real subject is the ethically existing subject."<sup>17</sup> This existing subject is related to the world in myriad ways besides the knowing relation. Knowing, however, is a necessary phase of his existing, and as such he is

<sup>16</sup>*Concl. Unsci. Post.* p. 281.

<sup>17</sup>*Concl. Unsci. Postscript* p. 281.

necessarily in the world. There can be no isolated, cognitive subject without a world. This is a fantastic construction based on crucial ontological mistakes. This insight of Kierkegaard's has now become a commonplace of disciplined phenomenology.

Thus in his interesting intellectual autobiography Marcel says that to him, many of the epistemological problems of modern philosophy are "of merely academic interest." Among these, he underscores "the problem of the reality of the outward world as it is stated in philosophical textbooks. None of the extremist forms of idealism which deny this reality ever seemed to me convincing; for to what more certain or more intimate experience could this reality be opposed."<sup>18</sup>

As Kierkegaard put it, thought is included as an essential phase of personal existence. But existence cannot be included within thought, and derived from it. This insight into the entitative foundations of cognition led him to make several brilliant suggestions which have since been confirmed and developed by painstaking research. One of the most important of these concerns mood and feeling. In the post-Cartesian tradition of philosophy these phenomena have been interpreted as subjective passions or physiological disturbances occurring within the human organism, having psychic correlates, but possessing little or no cognitive significance. Kierkegaard questioned this influential dogma. In his careful studies of the feeling of anxiety and the allied feelings of boredom, melancholy, and despair (to which he devoted a whole volume), he showed their profound cognitive significance, and the manifold phases of existence, both internal and external, to which we have access only through their primordial revealing power.

By sense and feeling, I am aware of the concrete being that I already am, and of the factual situation into which I have been thrown. In addition to these, there is the clearer revealing power of intellectual cognition which manifests itself in many ways. Kierkegaard sharply distinguishes the *abstract thought* of science and humane discourse, which focuses the essences and possibilities of things, from the *pure thought* of Hegel, which is supposed to construct and constitute its objects. Against the latter he carried on a persistent and bitter polemic which has often been interpreted as an attack on reason itself. But this is a serious misunderstanding. The *pure thought* of Hegel is not reason itself but a misconception of reason. Kierkegaard never questioned the capacity of abstract "science" to grasp the structure of sub-

<sup>18</sup>*The Philosophy of Existence*, p. 87.

human objects and to predict abstract possibilities. He did question its capacity to understand human existence and its claim of providing us with an all-comprehensive philosophy. He saw that this kind of scientism was already having a disastrous effect on ethics and religion. This is clearly expressed in the following passage from his *Journals*.

"I always say: all honor to the sciences, etc. But the thing is that bit by bit people have tried to popularize the scientific spirit, it has forced its way down amongst the people—true religiousness has gone to pot, and existential respect is lost."<sup>19</sup> Abstract science has its place. It becomes dangerous only when, as in the pure thought of Hegel, it tries to identify itself with being as such. "Abstract thought," he says in the *Postscript*, "embraces the possible, either the preceding or the subsequent possibility; pure thought is a phantom."<sup>20</sup> In addition to these, there is the method of phenomenological description which Kierkegaard himself is using in attempting to clarify the structures of human existence in act.

Understanding is not the product of a mind-thing isolated from the world. It is rather a guiding phase of actual existence. Feeling and understanding are not locked up within a substantial container. They are rather outstretchings of the human subject, ways of being in the world. They are not separated from, but an essential phase of my existence. Life and awareness vary together in mutual interdependence. Kierkegaard's attack on the mind-thing theory of Descartes, and his penetrating studies of mood, feeling, and thought as they actually operate in the act of human existing have now been developed by his followers, the existential phenomenologists, into a radically novel *field conception* of man. Human existence is not enclosed within the limits of a static I-thing. It is rather stretched out temporally into the past which I have been, and the future which I project ahead of me, and stretched out spatially into the regions of care which are ordered into my world. This world is not something out there remote from me. It is rather an essential phase of my existence. Without a world there can be no person.

Both Jaspers and Sartre have recognized this with unmistakable clarity. But the most exact and disciplined description of the world structure is to be found in Heidegger's epochmaking *Sein und Zeit*. In our last and final section, we shall briefly consider this new field conception of human existence and its ethical implications.

<sup>19</sup>Kierkegaard, *Journals*, 1169, p. 422.

<sup>20</sup>*Concl. Unsci, Postscript* p. 281: cf. p. 271.

#### 4. Kierkegaard and Existential Ethics.

When we ask about the ethical implications of existentialism we are confronted with noteworthy paradoxes. On the one hand, it seems to be pervaded by a profound moral feeling which has brought forth cogent criticisms of modern and contemporary culture. Yet on the other hand, the literature is singularly lacking in specific prescriptions, and has often been accused with real reason of unmitigated moral relativism. This paradox, I think, is to be explained by the new light that has been shed on the human act of existing. If value is the fulfillment of being, new light on being must lead to the discovery of new values. This in fact is what has happened. Just as the human essence points to *what* should be done, so the act of existing, when properly analyzed, points to *how* it should be done. As classical ethics has clarified certain *essential* values, so existentialist ethics has clarified certain *existential* values, as we may call them.

These existential values are not so much concerned with *what* should be chosen as *how* the choice should be made. They are not virtues or *kinds* of act, but rather *ways* of acting that pervade all the so-called virtues, as the first act of being pervades every formal phase of the essence it realizes. As Kierkegaard puts it in *Either/Or*: "in making a choice it is not so much a question of choosing the right as of the energy, the earnestness, the pathos with which one chooses. Thereby the personality announces its inner infinity, and thereby in turn the personality is consolidated. Therefore even if a man were to choose the wrong, he will nevertheless discover precisely by reason of the energy with which he chose, that he has chosen the wrong."<sup>21</sup> It is important to note that the essential difference between right and wrong is not denied. Our attention is called to another type of *existential value* that consolidates the personality, that permeates and underlies right acts so far as they are actually performed, and is therefore even more important.

Freedom, for example, is such a value. It is not a kind of act or virtue. Hence it was never sharply focused by classical moral theory. It is rather a pervasive existential structure, a way of existing that must pervade the whole hierarchy of virtues, if they are to be realized in the fragile and contingent life of man. Unlike recent moral theorists in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, Kierkegaard was deeply concerned with this existential value. As he says in one place "The most tremendous thing

<sup>21</sup>Kierkegaard, *Either/Or*, Part II, p. 141.

which has been granted to man is: the choice, freedom,"<sup>22</sup> and he devoted all his powers of description to the task of clarifying this obscure phenomenon. But its complex nature led him far afield. He found that freedom could not be understood without an analysis of the strange feeling of anxiety (to which he devoted a whole volume), of what we call conscience and understanding, of human time, of death, and human integrity.

We have already commented on some of the results of these novel investigations. Dying just one hundred years ago at the age of forty-two, he was never able to organize these brilliant suggestions together into a single coherent pattern. But in 1927 this task was achieved by Heidegger in a disciplined and profoundly original manner. *Sein und Zeit* has many novel features of its own. Kierkegaard's insights have often been deepened and clarified. The synthesis is original. But the basic concepts have been taken from the Danish author, as we shall try to suggest in the following summary.

As Kierkegaard first pointed out, the strange feeling of anxiety is the gateway to human freedom.<sup>23</sup> As the new phenomenology has conclusively shown, feeling in general cannot be properly understood as a mere subjective disturbance within the human substance. It is rather a primary mode of revealing which necessarily belongs to human being. Other types of feeling, like fear, are directed towards specific objects. Thus I am afraid of the visual sickness which threatens a research project in which I am engaged.

What then does anxiety reveal to me? What is its specific object?

If someone asks us in a really anxious moment *what* it is, we are apt to say: *it is nothing*. And in a sense this answer is true, for there is no specific object that can be identified as threatening a definite region of care. It is no-thing but rather everything. This is a pervasive or, we may say, a philosophic feeling which reveals to myself alone the desolation of my whole being-in-the-world just as I am. What is it then that threatens me? It must be something external and beyond me as I am already. But not beyond myself and my world, for this includes everything I am and know. What non-specific being lies beyond me and yet within me? Heidegger's precise analysis of the evidence<sup>24</sup> points clearly to the answer. It is my own real possibilities looming up before

<sup>22</sup>Kierkegaard *Journals* 1051, p. 372.

<sup>23</sup>Cf. *The Concept of Dread*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1944, p. 55; cf. p. 139.

<sup>24</sup>Cf. *Sein und Zeit*, sec. 40.



me, my total being-in-the-world as it *might be*, if I really became what I am .

We may stifle this strange feeling and try to escape from it by busy distractions, or we may freely face it. But in either case, it is a constant threat to that masterful complacency which makes us at home in the world as it already is. If we turn to it and face it, we become silent and we hear the call of conscience.

Like anxiety, conscience seems to involve a peculiar union of personal immanence with transcendence. On the one hand, my conscience is certainly my own, and yet it seems beyond my management and control. I cannot argue with my conscience or arrange it. Hence some have interpreted it as the communication from a supernatural source, others as the expression of induced cultural attitudes. Since Kant, we tend to picture conscience as a courtroom scene in which deficient acts, already performed, are subjected to a cold judicial review in terms of fixed, normative principles. As Heidegger's careful analysis has shown, none of these interpretations fits squarely with the evidence.<sup>25</sup>

Supernatural transcendence is not required to explain this phenomenon. The human person always transcends himself in the sense that he is those real possibilities which he projects ahead of himself, and of which he is always at least dimly aware. The voice of conscience is a call from this real self of mine, so remote from what I already am. This calls to me from beyond myself, and yet from the future depths of myself to take over my lapsed being, to act with real decision, to become *what* I really am. We speak of the *spurs* of conscience. This shows that it is no mere *ex post facto* review, but a summons to authentic action. It cannot be exclusively identified with any set of fixed principles for these also, like all phases of my being, may be threatened by the pervasive voice of conscience. It is concerned not only with *what* I do, but also with *how* I do it, not only with abstract static form but with concrete form flowing into being. I may listen to its distant call, or suppress it by busy talk and argument. In either case, it belongs to me as an existential challenge which pervades the whole of my being in the world. If I listen, I hear it calling me to final decision.

Classical ethics was constantly concerned with moral wholeness or integrity. It carefully studied the different, qualitative components of this ideal whole, and the systematic order into which they must be fitted. Much light was shed upon this ideal essence. But little attention

<sup>25</sup>*Sein und Zeit*, sec. 54-60.



was paid to those fragile and less obtrusive modes of existence by which this ideal structure may be sometimes approximated, and in some degree at least brought into being. How is human integrity, the wholeness of human existence, to be achieved in the concrete? A moment's reflection on this question will show that we are faced with a peculiar difficulty.

If, as we still think, human life is to be conceived as a successive process running off in time like the orbital revolution of a planet or the growth of a plant, it exists in a piecemeal manner, and can never exist with all its parts together at once. At any given moment in my life, I am not all *there*. There is still more to come. At the moment of my death, I am indeed finished, but then I am not *there* at all. With such a view of being as *being there* in the present, it is no wonder that the ancients were unable to work out a cogent answer. But the recent studies of human time, mentioned above, have at last shed some light on this troublesome problem.<sup>26</sup>

Death is indeed the end of human life. But *my* death, which is of most importance to me, is not something which I shall be able to gaze at from a detached, objective point of view as something *there* before me. It is something I must evade or face right now. I may evade it by living in the present moment, forgetting my past, and "choosing" only temporary courses of action which are not seriously thought through, and do not commit me up to the very end. When one of these is ended, I may then try something new. Thus I live through my life in successive chunks, like a process in time which is never all there, and achieves no genuine integrity.

Another alternative, however, is open to me.

I may face the thought of my death, and in the light of this appraise the whole of my being *now*. This must include a full recollection of the past which I already am, and an intensive projection of my last possibilities,—the most I can do with the whole of my being as it already is. In the light of such an appraisal, I may then choose to act at this moment in an integral way, no longer postponing an ultimate choice, but committing myself with the whole of my being up to the very end. Heidegger calls this kind of philosophic reflection and the life it elicits being-unto-death (*Sein-zum-Tode*).<sup>27</sup> It is the only way to human integrity, which is not an event nor a set of events, but a way of existing now and at every moment. To all of us it is open,—at this moment.

<sup>26</sup>Cf. Heidegger, *op. cit.* sec. 61-2.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.* p. 308.

Such is the structure of authentic human existence as it is presented to us in *Sein und Zeit*. This authentic existence is ever threatened by that mode of impersonal, unanxious oneness which Heidegger has described in his famous account of *das Man*.<sup>28</sup> But this also was anticipated by fertile hints and suggestions of his Danish predecessor.

Kierkegaard was keenly aware of the tendencies which were already beginning in his time to streamline personal thought and action into fixed mass patterns. He saw the danger of these tendencies, and bitterly attacked such Hegelian conceptions as that of *objectiver Geist* which provide them with a philosophical foundation. The person no longer understands and expresses himself from within. He rather regards himself from a detached point of view, and levels himself down to the sort of thing that anyone can understand.

"For a time," Kierkegaard says, "committee after committee is formed, so long, that is to say, as there are still people who passionately want to be what they ought to be; but in the end the whole age becomes a committee. A father no longer curses his son in anger, using all his parental authority, nor does a son defy his father, a conflict which might end in the inwardness of forgiveness; on the contrary, their relationship is irreproachable, for it is really in process of ceasing to exist, since they are no longer related to each other within the relationship. In fact it has become a problem in which the two partners observe each other as in a game instead of having any real relation, and they note down each other's remarks instead of showing firm devotion."<sup>29</sup>

Truth is accessible to the individual intellect alone. Authentic existence results from personal choice and from personal zeal in following it through. But modern society is dominated by leveling forces which water down the undiluted truth to the sort of thing that anyone can understand and tone down the pattern of life to what anyone can approve. As a result of his own experience, Kierkegaard sees the Press as one of the most potent of these standardizing forces. In a well-known passage of the *Journals* he writes:

"The demoralization that comes from the Press can be seen from this fact. There are not ten men in every generation who socratically speaking are afraid of having a wrong opinion; but there are thousands and millions who are more frightened of standing alone even with an

<sup>28</sup>*Sein und Zeit*, Sec. 27.

<sup>29</sup>Kierkegaard, *Present Age*, Oxford, 1940, pp. 17-18.

opinion which is quite right than of anything else. When something is in the papers it is *eo ipso* certain that there is always a good number of people having the opinion or about to express it.<sup>290</sup>

Kierkegaard also noted the strange toneless anonymity which seems to pervade the public Press where the authentic ring of personality has been drowned out by an even monotone. We are not presented here with what any definite person really thinks, sees, believes, or really chooses but rather with what *one* sees, *one* thinks, or *one* prefers. "Indeed," we are told, "if the Press were to hang out a sign like every other trade it would have to read: Here men are demoralized in the shortest possible time, on the largest possible scale, for the smallest possible price."<sup>291</sup>

Kierkegaard had a deep sense of social responsibility, and believed that it was the duty of a philosopher to take a stand on issues and to act as a cultural critic for his time. Hence he devoted a small volume, *The Present Age*, to an analysis of those levelling tendencies, as he called them, which were in his opinion the greatest threat to the survival of personal existence. When one reads it at the present time one has to constantly remind himself that it was written not yesterday but more than a hundred years ago, so clearly does he reveal the nature of those demonic mass phenomena with which we are now so tragically familiar. In this short work we can find not only the germinal concepts underlying Heidegger's well-known analysis of *das Man* but of many other existentialist essays in cultural criticism. The best known of these are Jasper's *Man and the Modern Age*, written just before the Nazi revolution in Germany, and Marcel's recent work *Man Against Mass Humanity*.

As Kierkegaard was well aware, his own thought was finite and imperfect. His attack upon mass standardization and his passionate concern for the individual person often led him towards an existential solipsism which seemed to deny the possibility of inter-subjective communication. He sometimes confused his attack on Hegelian rationalism with an attack on human reason itself. In this vein he occasionally seems to reject objective reflection as such, and thus to deny the very method that he himself uses with such penetration. Unfortunately both of these strains in his thought have been taken over and given exaggerated emphasis by many of his successors. But in him they are only aberrant strains for which he himself has suggested the correctives.

<sup>290</sup>Kierkegaard, *Journals*. No. 1293, p. 489.

<sup>291</sup>*Ibid.* p. 490.

We have been exclusively concerned with Kierkegaard's *philosophical* ideas. But we must here remind ourselves that he is first and foremost a religious thinker. His own most original conceptions come from classical and Christian, especially Augustinian, sources. In developing these notions, he came to see the radical inadequacy of the prevailing essentialist view of man, and was led on to serious investigations of his own into the unexplored regions of personal existence. These soon produced results of striking novelty and radical importance. Far from being a quixotic leap into the irrational, they are, as a matter of fact, a triumph of empirical insight, which have been confirmed and further developed by qualified observers.

These insights bear on the ultimate structure of being. On the continent of Europe, they have inaugurated what is for modern thought a new kind of ontological discussion. This discussion is still in flux. Whether it will bring forth a radically new ontology is not yet clear. But that it has brought forth a radically new approach to the being of man can no longer be called in question. It is founded on the seminal insights and fertile suggestions of the lonely Danish thinker whom we are honoring today.

### KIERKEGAARD AND POLITICS\*

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No one who is interested in Søren Kierkegaard—or in politics—can fail to be interested in the year 1848, for that is the year, said Kierkegaard, whose “actual events, almighty as they are, have cast light on my thesis.”<sup>1</sup>

The events in question were Germany's war with Denmark and the whole rash of revolutions in Europe that year, including Denmark's bloodless revolution by which its absolute monarchy became a constitutional one. And Kierkegaard's thesis was that “the crowd, regarded as a judge over ethical and religious matters, is untruth.”<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>From “‘That Individual’—Two ‘Notes’ concerning my Work as an Author” in *The Point of View*, p. 122. (Cp. the “Supplement” bound up in same book, pp. 159-164.)

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*; cf. also p. 116.

Kierkegaard suffered in some respects from an astonishing political myopia, but coupled with it was an even more astonishing political far-sightedness. If the positive values enshrined in constitutional monarchy and in democracy were hidden from him, he was fully clairvoyant of the harm the human race would suffer from that whole movement which bore the proud device "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity." The Kierkegaardian forecast was this: When men have liberated themselves from God, their struggle for equality produces only equality in mediocrity, and instead of fraternity we end with convention-ridden collectivism. Unless re-won for Christianity, man cannot escape the descending logic which reads: from monarchy, to democracy, to communism—i.e., the abdication of selfhood and the monstrous standardization and regimentation of life.<sup>3</sup>

As Kierkegaard saw his century, everything seemed to converge in a grand conspiracy against the individual human being. "Each age has its own characteristic depravity. Ours is perhaps not pleasure or indulgence or sensuality, but rather a dissolute pantheistic contempt for the individual man."<sup>4</sup>

Behind this puzzling declaration lies Kierkegaard's distrust of the French Revolution, the machine, and Hegel. We examine each of these in turn.

Kierkegaard was no advocate of evil kings, and he knew that abuse of power brings upon itself the Nemesis of revolution; but he detected that the real evil of his time was its desire to be quit not simply of kings but also of God.<sup>5</sup> What takes the place of God is "a superstitious belief in the saving and beatifying power of the understanding," conjoined with a trust in the future—with a trust, that is, in the power of man, given time, to achieve, by the exercise of his unaided reason, a socio-political Utopia. This, declared Kierkegaard, is "the pretense

<sup>3</sup>This *motif* occurs many times—sometimes explicitly, sometimes by inference. Cf., e.g., Preface No. 3 and the Postscript to *On Authority and Revelation*, which is the title Walter Lowrie has invented for his translation of "The Book on Adler." With the publication of this book this year, the Kierkegaardian canon in English is at last complete—exactly one hundred years after his death.

<sup>4</sup>*Unscientific Postscript*, p. 317.

<sup>5</sup>"The misfortune of our age—in the political as well as in the religious sphere, and in all things—is disobedience, unwillingness to obey. And one deceives oneself and others by wishing to make us imagine that it is doubt. No, it is insubordination: it is not doubt of religious truth but insubordination against religious authority which is the fault in our misfortune and the cause of it." (*On Authority and Revelation*, p. xviii.)

that the temporal will explain in time what in time must remain a riddle, which only Christianity can solve."<sup>9</sup>

"In these times," he wrote, "policy is everything. Between this and the religious view the difference is heaven-wide (*toto caelo*), as also the point of departure and the ultimate aim differ from it *toto caelo*, since policy begins on earth and remains on earth, whereas religion, deriving its beginning from above, aims to transcend the earth and thereby exalt earth to heaven."<sup>10</sup> In this passage Kierkegaard contrasts the Christian outlook with an outlook we have learned to call "secular." Secularism, as the Dean of New York puts it, is *this-age-ism, this-age-is-all-there-is-ism*. It regards man—his origin, his duty, and his destiny—as completely earth-bound. Reducing man to the single dimension of his social value, it eliminates the supernatural altogether. Instead of the ancient and orthodox trilogy "Nature, Man and God," we are left only with man and nature. But this man, because he has brains, can harness nature and here on earth build "heaven." "Eternity is done away with, and the stage for the perfection of all is transferred to the temporal"<sup>11</sup>; this is Kierkegaard's accurate description of secularism in its optimistic-humanistic form. He makes the same point more devastatingly when he remarks that in our era "committees are pretty nearly everything." Since there is no God, no revealed moral law, no absolute, men are left in sole possession, and it is up to them, in parliament assembled, to determine the truth by balloting.<sup>12</sup> This entire conception rests on "the proposition that the race is the truth and that this generation is the court of last resort, that the public is the discoverer of the truth and its judge."<sup>13</sup> For "race," however, we must write "crowd" or the "multitude" or the "masses." For the majority

<sup>9</sup>*Op.cit.*, p. xxi.

<sup>10</sup>*Point of View*, p. 109.

<sup>11</sup>*Training in Christianity*, p. 218.

<sup>12</sup>*Point of View*, p. 133; cp. *The Present Age*, p. 17.

<sup>13</sup>In 1848 (*Papirer*, IX A 4) S.K. wrote: "Balloting (which is essentially the principle in government by the people; the numerical) is the destruction of everything great and noble and holy and lovable and, above all, of Christianity, since it is a deifying of worldliness and an infatuation with this world. Christianity is the exact opposite. (1) Purely formally. For Christianity is eternal truth, and this abolishes balloting altogether. As eternal truth, Christianity is entirely indifferent as to whether something has the majority behind it or not. But in the abracadabra of balloting, the majority is proof of truth; whatever lacks it is not truth, and whatever has it is truth. Frightful spiritlessness! (2) *Realiter* Christianity is directly opposed. For Christianity, as militant truth, assumes that here in this wretched world truth is always in the minority. Consequently: from the Christian point of view, truth is in the minority; according to balloting, the majority is truth. Indeed!"

<sup>14</sup>*Point of View*, p. 89.



rules, and *vox populi* is *vox dei*. This "accounts for the fact that nowadays this absurdity finds a place in the State: 'the multitude,' an absurd monster or a monstrous absurdity, which nevertheless is physically in possession of power, and besides that has an extraordinary virtuosity in making everything commensurable for the decision of the hands upraised to vote or the fists upraised to fight."<sup>12</sup>

It was the *absolute* modern man wanted to abolish. Or rather, he found his absolute in Reason. But "Reason"—though spelled with a capital "R" as if it were a god or goddess—turned out, on closer inspection, to be the autonomous reason of men met together in general assembly to determine the truth by ballot . . . or by bayonet.<sup>13</sup> Kierkegaard's opinion was that if this is allowed to have its way, we may expect sinister results. "To establish man-made ethical absolutes must end in the complete denial of absolutes."<sup>14</sup> For if men acknowledge no law higher than that of their own creation, and if, out of fear of majority rule, no one dares to be "angular" enough or "primitive" enough to rise above "the parrot-wisdom of trivial experience"<sup>15</sup> (for it always involves a species of martyrdom to break with the majority), then we have the situation in which a man finds it "too venturesome a thing to be himself, far easier and safer to be like the others, to become an imitation, a number, a cipher in the crowd."<sup>16</sup> But thus the whole of

<sup>12</sup>*On Authority and Revelation*, p. 195. Lest Kierkegaard sound more conservative than actually he is, let me hasten to note (1) that he fully acknowledges the competence of parliaments and people in all purely material and temporal matters (cf. *Point of View*, p. 112) and (2) that by "crowd" Kierkegaard does not imply an invidious distinction between aristocracy and rabble. "Good God! How could a religious man hit upon such an inhuman inequality! No, 'crowd' stands for number, the numerical, a number of noblemen, millionaires, high dignitaries, etc.—as soon as the numerical is involved it is 'crowd,' 'the crowd.'" (p. 114)

<sup>13</sup>S.K. would have agreed entirely with Gordon Keith Chalmers (in *The Republic and the Person*) when he says that we were right in wanting liberty but wrong in forgetting that "what has really made possible the liberty of the individual has been not only its root in truth but the constancy of human agreement about the relation of man to God, right and wrong, good and evil." But in "the era of the abolished absolute" (Chalmers) we are "emancipated from all restraint (so to call it," for now there is nothing which "unconditionally stands fast" (S.K.). "Require the navigator to sail without ballast—he capsizes. Let the race, let each individual, make the experiment of doing without the unconditional—it is a whirlpool and remains such." (*Point of View*, p. 163)

<sup>14</sup>Peter F. Drucker in a brilliant article on "The Unfashionable Kierkegaard" in *The Sewanee Review* for Autumn 1949. "The ethical position is bound to degenerate into relativism."

<sup>15</sup>*The Sickness unto Death*, p. 64.

<sup>16</sup>*Op. cit.*, p. 51. In this way the ground is prepared for men to take refuge in "the collective idea" and "the principle of association," whose logic is: Individually we are nothing, but by the strength of united effort we shall attain the goal. Cf. *The Present Age* (= *An literair Anmeldelse*). Especially worthy of study is the analysis of envy as "the negative uniting principle."

existence is in danger of sinking down into a gray mass of "average behavior." "In Paris," said Kierkegaard, "they believe in the saving power of mutiny."<sup>17</sup> If enough people do a thing, it's right! And so it comes about that ethical standards are derived simply by computing the tabulated statistics of what people generally do. Public opinion and public conduct—influenced as they are in the twentieth century by the professional polls, surveys, and reports—afford fearful confirmation of Kierkegaard's prediction: Statistics will replace ethics.<sup>18</sup>

Perhaps now we understand Kierkegaard when he says of his age: "This is what it aspires to: it would build up the established order, abolish God, and through fear of men cow the individual into a mouse's hole. . . . When the established order has come to the point of deifying itself, then in the end use and wont become articles of faith, everything becomes about equally important, or custom, use, and wont become the important things. The individual no longer feels and recognizes that he along with every individual has a God-relationship which for him must possess absolute significance. No, the God-relationship is done away with; use and wont, custom and suchlike are deified. But this sort of God-fear is just contempt for God; it does not in fact fear God, it fears man."<sup>19</sup> Quite in the spirit of Kierkegaard, Hutchins remarks that the Battle Cry of the Republic now is "What will people say?" Kierkegaard's detestation of "the others," the majority, the crowd, is due to the fact that "it renders the individual completely impenitent and irresponsible, or at least weakens his sense of responsibility by reducing it to a fraction."<sup>20</sup>

All of this, thinks Kierkegaard, is a legacy of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, and what we can expect of the Industrial Revolution is a drastic acceleration of the whole process. Although he stood only at the beginning of the machine age, Kierkegaard feared the coming mechanization of life with its inevitable concomitants: the

<sup>17</sup>*Stages on Life's Way*, p. 433; cp. *Sickness unto Death*, p. 201.

<sup>18</sup>*Papirer*, VII A 15 and B 213.

<sup>19</sup>*Training in Christianity*, p. 91 and p. 93. Cf. the whole of *Papirer*, VIII A 598, from which I translate only the following: "The communists here at home and abroad fight for human rights. Good; so do I. Precisely for this reason I fight with might and main against the tyranny which is fear of man. Communism leads at best to the tyranny of fearing men (only see how France at this moment suffers from it); precisely at this point Christianity begins. The thing communism makes such a fuss about is what Christianity assumes as something which follows of itself, that all men are equal before God, i.e. *essentially* equal. But then Christianity shudders at this abomination which would abolish God and in His place install fear of the masses, of the majority, of the people, of the public."

<sup>20</sup>*Point of View*, p. 114.

tedium of assembly-line existence, the anonymity of big cities, the threat of still further depersonalization. In his many scorching denunciations of "Philistinism" or the bourgeois spirit (which today we know as *suburbiana*)<sup>21</sup> we have the principles of criticism which already Kierkegaard had begun to apply to the great urban and industrial masses, although it was left to later men like Ortega y Gasset, Huxley, Orwell, Gheorghiu, and Heidegger to spell them out in detail. The desire of the French Revolution, laudable as it was, that all men might be equal succeeded only in launching what Kierkegaard called "the leveling process." But this effort did not level up; it only leveled down. Kierkegaard gave humorous vent to his fear of the leveling process in a machine age when he scribbled in his Journal an entry under the heading, "*A double leveling down, or a method of leveling down which double-crosses itself*: With the daguerreotype [which had just been invented] everyone will be able to have their portrait taken—formerly it was only the prominent; and at the same time everything is being done to make us all look exactly the same—so that we shall only need one portrait."<sup>22</sup> The form of expression here is trivial, but if anyone wishes to know how seriously Kierkegaard feared "the leveling process" as a force contributing to the creation of the "faceless multitudes" he has only to read the book called *The Present Age*.

Whenever this multitude is set upon the throne, says Kierkegaard, "the art of statesmanship will become a game. Everything will turn upon getting the multitude pollinated, with torches and with weapons, indifferent, absolutely indifferent, as to whether they understand anything or no."<sup>23</sup> In a manufacturing age it is, of course, possible to manufacture everything—even public opinion, the mightiest dictator the world has ever known. "Of this public opinion," writes the great Kierkegaard scholar David F. Swenson, "the modern press is both servant and master, both creature and creator. It gives a tongue to the impersonal impulses generated by the multitude, and so intensifies their power and extends their scope. Press and public are thus a mutual fit, and the essential faults of the one are also the essential faults of the other."<sup>24</sup>

<sup>21</sup>Cf. e.g., *The Concept of Dread*, pp. 83-86; *Postscript*, p. 486; *Sickness unto Death*, pp. 49ff. and pp. 63ff.

<sup>22</sup>*The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard*, No. 1312=*Papirer*, XII A 118.

<sup>23</sup>*On Authority and Revelation*, p. 195.

<sup>24</sup>*Something about Kierkegaard*, 1st ed., pp. 151f. The long quotation in the next paragraph is taken from Swenson's convenient collection of some of the passages in which Kierkegaard laments that "one great mechanical discovery after the other

"If there were only one speaking trumpet on board a ship," says Kierkegaard, "and this was in the possession of the pantry-boy, and if everybody looked upon this as a perfectly natural and proper state of affairs: what then? Everything that the pantry-boy had to say: 'mouse in the larder,' 'fine weather today,' 'Lord only knows what's wrong in the ship's hold,' etc., etc., would be published abroad through the speaking trumpet. The captain, on the contrary, would be limited to the use of his own natural voice, for what he had to say was of course not so important. At times he would be reduced to begging the assistance of the pantry-boy, in order that his commands might be made audible. At such times the pantry-boy would feel at liberty to revise the words of command; so that passing through him and his trumpet they would become nonsensical and misleading. The captain would then be compelled to strain his voice in competition, but without success. At last the pantry-boy would become the master of the ship, because he had the speaking trumpet.—*Pro dii immortales*—"

And then—if the one and only speaking trumpet should fall into the hands of the "vested interests," a demagogue, or the *Führer* . . . !

With these last words we come within sight of what was, in my judgment, Kierkegaard's most prophetic political insight. He has understood that the real trouble with secularism is that man can never remain merely secular. Inevitably man is religious and will turn religious again; and if it is not the Christian religion to which he turns, it will be daemonic religion, religion horribly twisted and distorted. The trajectory of man's fall is from theism, to humanism, to materialism. But that is not yet the end. There's no stopping this thing. The next step, inevitably, is a new kind of religion. The race which has abolished the old Absolute will presently invent a new one. And Kierkegaard knew what the new absolute would be. He learned from Hegel that it would be the *State*—a State that demanded of its citizens uncritical allegiance, unconditional obedience, religious devotion, and self-immolation.

Kierkegaard perceived that people would give themselves to this wildly, fanatically, religiously, like men possessed. In his *Journal* for 1848 he wrote these words: "In contradistinction to the Middle Ages

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has made it possible to expound doctrines impersonally in increasing measure," with the result that "there has been collected in modern states a huge inorganic precipitate: the multitude. No one ever really comes to grips with this huge mass." For a study of the role of the Press in creating the phantom Public, cf. *The Present Age*, pp. 37ff.

and those periods with all their discussion of possession, of particular men giving themselves to evil, I should like to write a book:

*On diabolic possession in modern times*

and show how mankind *en masse* gives itself up to evil, how nowadays it happens *en masse*. That is why people flock together, in order to feel themselves stimulated, enflamed and *ausser sich*. The scenes on the Blocksberg are the exact counterparts of this demoniacal pleasure, where the pleasure consists in losing oneself in order to be volatilized into a higher potency, where being outside oneself one hardly knows what one is doing or saying, or who or what is speaking through one, while the blood courses faster, the eyes turn bright and staring, the passions and lust seething."<sup>25</sup>

Denis de Rougemont asks the question, "What could Kierkegaard be thinking of when, in his bourgeois, pious and comfortable Denmark, he wrote these prophetic lines?" And he answers: "Kierkegaard understood better than anyone and before anyone the creative diabolical principle of the mass: fleeing from one's own person, no longer being responsible, and therefore no longer guilty, and becoming at one stroke a participant in the divinized power of the Anonymous."<sup>26</sup>

Men who have boasted of their freedom and self-sufficiency discover presently that they cannot bear the burden of this autonomy, and so there is a violent swing of the pendulum to authority and submission. The three big totalitarian movements of our generation, Communism, Fascism, and National Socialism, came as political religions—religions of salvation. So far as I am aware, Soren Kierkegaard was the first man to understand their religious character.

French Socialism appeared in the 1830's. The *Communist Manifesto* came in 1848. On paper, these movements were outspokenly atheistic, anti-religious. But their atheism deceived the world into thinking that this was mere political opposition to any form of religion whatsoever. The world was fooled by this. Not Kierkegaard. In 1849 he wrote: "It will become evident, as that which lay at the basis of the catastrophe, that it was the opposite of the Reformation: then [at the Reformation] everything had the appearance of religious movement but showed itself to be political movement; now everything appears to be politics but will explicate itself as religious movement."<sup>27</sup>

<sup>25</sup>*Journals*. No. 1063=*Papirer*, X2 A 490.

<sup>26</sup>*The Devil's Share*, p. 141

<sup>27</sup>*Papirer*, X6 B 40.

For all their apparent atheism, Kierkegaard discerned that Socialism and Communism were essentially religious,<sup>28</sup> that they were deifications of the State, and that they would appeal to the masses by their claim to be saviours. Hence, the struggle to come was to be a struggle between competing religions of salvation. And with good reason, as history has shown. Kierkegaard feared that secular man, mechanized man, depersonalized man would easily succumb to the blandishments of a totalitarian State which offered him security but at the price of his freedom.

All of this Kierkegaard saw implicit in Hegel.<sup>29</sup> What he saw there was the philosophical justification, in imposing form, of a State which, since it was the incarnation of Absolute Reason, must bend all individuals to its will—and break those who would not. But with sure instinct, Kierkegaard knew that a society which acts on the assumption that society is everything and the individual nothing, always degenerates into the kind of society which destroys individuals and ultimately itself. And when this had happened, then would come the mood of nihilistic despair—this mood which makes our world completely uncertain and completely unpredictable. *Anything* can happen. For the race, said Kierkegaard, will be so exhausted by the convulsions through which it has passed that people will again be “open.” Open, that is, to infection from any quarter. This could be good infection. It could be bad infection.<sup>30</sup> Kierkegaard hopes for the former. The man who anticipated and attacked the foolish doctrine of Inevitable Progress was not himself so foolish as to believe in Inevitable Regress.

“If there is to be real victory, it must happen by means of priests; neither soldiers nor police officers nor diplomats nor political project-makers will be capable of it. Priests will be required . . . who can

<sup>28</sup>“The strength in communism is obviously the ingredient of religion, even Christian religion, but daemonically held.” (*Papirer*, X6 B 41.)

<sup>29</sup>It would take an entire doctoral dissertation (the world is still waiting for a good one to document this point properly. Meanwhile, one may consult Dr. G. Malantschuk's article, “Kierkegaard and the Totalitarians” in *The American-Scandinavian Review* for Autumn 1946—an article still extraordinarily valuable in spite of its having been cruelly abbreviated; one should also read Reinhold Niebuhr's section on “The Loss of the Self in Idealism” in *The Nature and Destiny of Man* and N. H. See's *Karl Marx og Marxismen*. In S.K. himself, cf., e.g., *Journals*, No. 1050 (= *Papirer*, V2 A 426), and *Sickness unto Death*, pp. 192ff. Curious that hardly anyone has called attention to the political implications of *Fear and Trembling*, cf. Problems I and II.

<sup>30</sup>Cf. e.g., *Papirer*, IX B 10, p. 311, and X6 B 41, several passages in *The Present Age*; Preface No. 3 and the Postscript to *On Authority and Revelation*, and the hilarious letter No. 186 in *Breve og Afskykker vedrørende Søren Kierkegaard* (edited by Niels Thulstrup).



break up the "masses" and make them into individual persons."<sup>21</sup> Kierkegaard is convinced that if only each human being could be helped to become conscious of himself as standing "before God," strictly accountable to God and deeply loved by that God to whom he is precious as a unique and irreplaceable individual, the impersonal thing called "the public" would disappear. Instead of anonymous, irresponsible masses, there would be persons personally related to the personal God, a God of justice and love who demands the transformation of society and provides resources for its renewal. Such people could no longer be stampeded like cattle by daemonic totalitarian movements. Motivated by love of God and neighbor, they would become critical and constructive citizens of the State, not fanatical devotees of the State. "And this is my faith," wrote Kierkegaard, "that however much there may be that is confused and evil and detestable in men who have become that irresponsible thing without possibility of repentance which we call 'the masses,' there is just as much truth and goodness and loveliness in them when one can get hold of the individual. Oh, and in what a high degree would men become—*men*, and lovable men, if they would become individuals before God!" And therefore he says: "Religion [i.e. *Christian* religion] is the true humanity."<sup>22</sup>

## PROGRESS AND ESCHATOLOGY

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The theological history of our century to date, at least in our part of Christendom, could be summarized by saying that we have moved from the progressive era into the eschatological era. Around the turn of this century our primary theological preoccupation was with the idea of progress. It is no exaggeration to say that our dominant theological concern today is eschatological.

If this paper has a rather spacious title—"Progress and Eschatology"—and I am afraid that it has, it is not because I propose to tell you all about Progress and Eschatology. My object is simply to explore with you the ground we have marched over in recent years and the

<sup>21</sup>*Papirer*, X6 B 40.

<sup>22</sup>*Point of View*, pp. 153f. and p. 110.

position we now occupy in our theology of hope. We shall recall, or exhume, that old-time religion of Progress and try to see what, if anything, was in it that ought to go into the new-time religion as a genuine part or necessary implication of the everlasting Gospel. And I should like to present finally an outline of a tenable and teachable Christian doctrine of progress worked out in terms of the *Logos* doctrine of St. John.

We are all vividly aware that we live in an era of spiritual disillusionment and in what appears to be an end-time of some sort. To be sure, every generation has said this about itself. There is a story about Adam and Eve, not recorded by J, E, P, or D but plausible none the less, which recalls that as our first parents were leaving the Garden of Eden Adam sententiously remarked, "My dear, we are living in an age of transition!" The same old Adam keeps on saying the same old thing, and now he is saying it through me. But perhaps he is right on the point of fact. Yesterday we tended to think about the future in progressive terms. Today, if we are Christians, we tend to think about it in eschatological terms; and this marks a transition of a sort.

The historical accompaniments and causes of this great change in spiritual mood are too familiar to need recital. They can all together be designated by St. Paul's phrase, "the sufferings of this present time." World War I; the Communist revolution; the rise of modern totalitarianism; World War II; the Bomb—these are but a few of the trappings and suits of our modern woe.

Fifty years ago it was quite easy for a Christian to be not only an optimist about human affairs on this planet but even a believer in the essentially humanistic and non-theistic idea of Progress which we are about to examine. The vital core of that idea is the happy conviction that human progress is inevitable despite anything that either God or man might do for or against it. In 1898, Bernard Shaw paid his sardonic respect to the then flourishing cult, in these words:<sup>1</sup>

The more ignorant men are, the more convinced are they that their little parish and their little chapel is an apex to which civilization and philosophy has painfully struggled up the pyramid of time from a desert of savagery. Savagery, they think, became barbarism; barbarism became ancient civilization; ancient civilization became Pauline Christianity; Pauline Christianity became Roman Catholicism; Roman Catholicism became the Dark Ages; and the Dark Ages were finally enlightened by the Protestant instincts of

<sup>1</sup>In his notes on *Caesar and Cleopatra*.

the English race. The whole process is summed up as Progress with a capital P. And any elderly gentleman of Progressive temperament will testify that the improvement since he was a boy is enormous.

It would be hard today to find in England or America an elderly gentleman of progressive temperament to testify to the enormous improvement since he was a boy.

To say this is not to say that the idea of Progress is dead. It is not dead; and I for one am willing to thank God that it is not. But the form of the idea which was law and gospel for the blithe spirits of a generation ago is dead enough to permit an autopsy.

There are in fact several dead cults of Progress, some of them very ancient; and, like the perennial outcroppings of gnosticism in religion running all the way from Valentinus to Norman Vincent Peale, these cults of Progress in their emergences through the ages seem to follow a single line of mystic filiation. They differ in their accidents rather than in substance. It may clarify our view of the matter if we take brief note of some of the earlier appearances of the religion of Progress.

One of the most interesting of progressive thinkers is the Latin poet Lucretius. Unlike modern believers in progress, Lucretius viewed human progress not with joy but melancholy. Man was progressing all right, in his material culture, but ruining himself in the process! The more civilized man becomes, the softer he grows; and Lucretius could see no good resulting from this. But there are two or three points in Lucretius' doctrine of progress which are characteristic of progressivism in all its forms. One is his observation that men are constantly going forward—he uses the phrase *pedetentim progredientes*—in their discovery of useful facts and their invention of useful devices. He noted “the cumulative character of technical development,”<sup>2</sup> which means that man today enjoys some things that man yesterday did not have. This creates the characteristic progressive presumption that man tomorrow will be in an even happier case. We may note one more key principle in Lucretius' progressivism. Not all progressives are atheists. Lucretius was. In his *de Rerum Natura*, written in the second generation before Christ, he proclaims the death of the gods. Now, at long last, after ages of misery and paralyzing fear of those dreaded potentates of the skies who do not even exist, the human race knows the whole truth about everything. And who has performed this wonderful ser-

<sup>2</sup>J. V. Langmead Casserley, *The Retreat from Christianity*. 98.

vice for us? Blessed Epicurus, who has shown us that all reality consists of nothing but falling atoms. Now that we know this, we know everything, and knowing everything we can do anything. Epicurus *nos exaequat victoria caelo*—by his achievement has exalted us to highest heaven.

Of course, Lucretius' faith in this theory of the atom to solve all our problems for us did not long survive him, and his announcement of the death of all deity was a bit premature. But his progressivism was of the classic and enduring type insofar as it regarded all religious dependence upon God as a hindrance to progress and it looked to science for salvation.

The cult of Progress was lustily reborn in the time of the Renaissance. The savants of that period were sure that their re-discovery of the classical wisdom of the ancient world, combined with the discovery of the new world beyond the Atlantic, would usher in the age of gold. Here again we find in minds saturated with progressive idealism a resentment against theistic religion as a drag on human progress. The Renaissance men believed in man "on his own" rather than in man under God.

Eighteenth-century France was the homeland of a cult of Progress which was sure that there would be for all men a paradise of liberty, equality, and fraternity as soon as the last king could be strangled in the bowels of the last priest. A generous whiff from that French pentecost of progressive idealism blew across to these shores, and had something to do with making some philosophical farmers restive. The American and the French revolutions were the violent offspring of a common spiritual movement under the aegis of Progress.

We could mention other historic cults of Progress, but we must come now to the particular one which concerns us most directly: the cult as it flourished in America and England, roughly throughout the generation immediately preceding the First World War.

What gave this most recent form of the cult of Progress both its enormous popularity and its novel twist was the fusion of classic progressivism with Darwinian evolutionism. Darwin had set forth his revolutionary theory that new and higher forms of life emerge in the plant and animal world as the result of a process which he called natural selection: that which is fittest to survive does survive, and it begets offspring which, because born of superior stock, tend to be superior. Thus the whole direction of biological development is onward and upward. Darwin proposed this as a scientific theory, a working

hypothesis, rather than as a dogma; but, as Henry Adams recalls to us, "To other Darwinians—except Darwin—Natural Selection seemed a dogma to be put in place of the Athanasian Creed; it was a form of religious hope; a promise of ultimate perfection."<sup>3</sup> As the progressive minds of that era saw the human prospect, it was a very bright one. It seemed to promise that evolutionist's path to paradise which he called "unbroken evolution under uniform conditions." To quote again our witness from that era, Henry Adams, this prospect of "unbroken evolution under uniform conditions pleased every one—except curates and bishops; it was the very best substitute for religion; a safe, conservative, practical, thoroughly Common-Law deity."<sup>4</sup>

This evolutionary progressivism was at one with all progressivism in being essentially humanistic even if not always atheistic. One of its bards declaimed, "Glory to Man in the highest, for man is the measure of things." The position of those progressives who believed in Progress and in some sort of reduced deity as well has been parodied, not unjustly, in the battle-cry attributed to them: "Courage, God, we come!"

One of the inferences which the thinking devotee of the progressive cult was bound to draw from his premises was this: that what we used to call sin is, in fact, nothing more than a remnant of our original animality which is growing less and less potent in us as we evolve. In 1904, Sir Oliver Lodge went so far as to announce the death of sin as confidently as Lucretius had announced the death of deity some nineteen centuries before. Said Sir Oliver—and all gentle hearts rejoiced: "The higher man of today is not worrying about his sins at all. As for Original Sin or Birth Sin, or other notion of that kind, that sits lightly on him. As a matter of fact it is non-existent, and no one but a monk could have invented it." Whereupon everybody got up and gave three cheers for us, and went home.

The enlightened ones of that era viewed old-fashioned Christian theology with patronizing pity and amusement mingled. They were finding the fairy-tales in Genesis very comical. And they were feeling sorry for their maiden aunts who still clung to the old-time view of man and his destiny, which seemed to say:

God's Plan made a glorious beginning,  
But Man spoiled his chances by sinning.  
We hope that the story  
Will end in God's glory,  
But at present the other side's winning.

<sup>3</sup>*The Education of Henry Adams*. 231.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.* 225.

God be praised—or Darwin, or somebody, we had passed from that to a more cheerful outlook, in which every prospect pleases and not even man is vile!

There was another potent factor at work in that spiritual and intellectual fermentation, and that was a kind of show-down that seemed to be taking place between Progress and Providence as articles of faith. I believe that Dr. Langmead Casserley is right in saying that "the doctrine of progress is no more than an enfeebled, secularized version"<sup>8</sup> of the Christian doctrine of divine providence, and I want to return to this point later for a consideration of it. But whether this be true or false, the thinking person of the progressive era did not see it so. He felt that he had to make up his mind on this question: On whom is man to depend for the things he needs—on God or on man? Dependence upon God meant providence; dependence upon man meant progress; and it was one or the other. To get down to concrete cases, here was the curse of ignorance and illiteracy which had to be banished. How should you tackle the job? You had two alternative courses, apparently. One was to pray for the banishment of ignorance by divine fiat. The other was to go out and establish a public school system. This seemed to be the typical crossroads dilemma which confronted man in all his concerns. And as he looked around he noted that the people who chose to go out and do things on their own hook rather than to wait for God to do them seemed to be getting the more impressive results than the sit-back-and-pray-ers.

When we consider how people in that era thought and felt about these matters—God, man, sin, providence, prayer *versus* perspiration as ways of getting things done, it is hard to see how anybody kept any kind of faith in any kind of God. The only explanation is that our progressive fathers who remained more or less Christian did so by various feats of theological *tour de force* and ingenious reconciliation of things irreconcilable. The commonest device was to elect God honorary captain of the team of uplift, and to use Him more for inspiration than for practical assistance. Man does the work, but God gets the glory, since it is God whose inspiration evokes our creative perspiration. Wherefore, rise up, O men of God!

It remains now to try to place this progressivism within the range of Christian thought, if it has a place there. I believe that it has, that it is a Christian heresy: flagrantly heretical, but equally "flagrantly"

<sup>8</sup>*op. cit.* *supra*. 100.



Christian in its own way and degree. Reinhold Niebuhr offers this verdict upon it, which seems to me incontrovertible: "The idea of progress is possible only upon the ground of a Christian culture. It is a secularized version of Biblical apocalypse and of the Hebraic sense of a meaningful history, in contrast to the meaningless history of the Greeks. But since the Christian doctrine of the sinfulness of man is eliminated, a complicating factor in the Christian philosophy is removed and the way is open for simple interpretations of history, which relate historical process as closely as possible to biological process and which fail to do justice either to the unique freedom of man or to the daemonic misuse which he may make of that freedom."<sup>6</sup>

If we reflect upon Niebuhr's analysis of the idea of progress, noting especially his observation that the progressive has dropped the Christian doctrine of the sinfulness of man and hence has no realistic idea of the demonic misuse which man can make of his freedom; and then if we reflect upon the horrors of the history of the past forty years, we see what it was that blasted that bright dream to powdered moonshine. Nobody with a functioning organ between his two ears will believe today that sin is just a morbid myth invented by a monk. In 1943 George Orwell wrote an essay entitled *Looking Back on the Spanish War*, in which he expressed the sad perplexity of all disillusioned idealists of our day. Here is a typical paragraph:<sup>7</sup>

Consider for instance the re-institution of slavery. Who could have imagined twenty years ago that slavery would return to Europe? Well, slavery has been restored under our noses. The forced-labour camps all over Europe and North Africa where Poles, Russians, Jews and political prisoners of every race toil at road-making or swamp-draining for their bare rations, are simple chattel slavery. The most one can say is that the buying and selling of slaves is not yet permitted. In other ways—the breaking-up of families, for instance—the conditions are probably worse than they were on the American cotton plantations. There is no reason for thinking that this state of affairs will change while any totalitarian domination endures. We don't grasp its full implications, because in our mystical way we feel that a regime founded on slavery *must* collapse. But it is worth comparing the duration of the slave empires of antiquity with that of any modern state. Civilizations founded on slavery have lasted for such periods as four thousand years.

<sup>6</sup>*The Nature and Destiny of Man*. I. 24.

<sup>7</sup>*A Collection of Essays by George Orwell*. 206.

The conclusion of the matter must be this: Man is bad; and man is not growing better and better as time goes on, as the result of natural selection or growing accumulation of knowledge or anything else; and man apart from God is not his own savior but his own assassin. The more scientifically clever and technologically competent man becomes, the more dangerous he becomes. This is the lesson of the two world wars and all that has preceded, accompanied, and followed them.

We turn now to our present-day theological concern with eschatology, and it will not be necessary to devote so much of our time to considering it. For one thing, we cannot see it in any kind of perspective since we are in the midst of it ourselves. For another thing, this contemporary eschatologism in religion has unquestionably come about as a reaction against the old bankrupted progressivism, and since it is a reaction in the sense of a corrective tendency it can best be understood with reference to that which it is meant to correct. For still another thing, it is difficult to talk about contemporary Christian eschatologism without getting involved in a very bewildering maze: for we have theologies many, hence eschatologies many. But at the risk of over-generalization we may say that the dominant eschatology of present-day Christian thought is an attempt to restore to our Christian view of man and his destiny the dimension of eternity and the goal of the divine end and purpose for man. Both this dimension and this goal were utterly lacking from the old, essentially mundane and temporal, and essentially human, progressivism, which saw not a new heaven and a new earth but simply a new earth—just around the corner—and prepared and adorned not by God but by man.

The authors of *Doctrine in the Church of England*, writing in 1938, soundly expressed what most Christian thinkers of our day seem to have in mind, in these words:<sup>8</sup>

The interest of most modern people in the "Last Things" has an emphasis and perspective different from that disclosed in the New Testament. Today the predominant concern tends to be with the personal destiny of individuals. People ask: What is the destiny of ourselves or (still more) of our friends? That concern is indeed present in the New Testament . . . but it is subordinate. The predominant concern is with the fulfilment of the purpose of God—so manifestly not yet fulfilled on the historical plane. The destiny of the individual is a subordinate part of the whole purpose of

<sup>8</sup>*Doctrine in the Church of England—The Report of the Commission on Christian Doctrine appointed by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York in 1922.* 202.

God. We are convinced that if we are to think rightly in these matters we must recover the perspective of the New Testament: we must begin with the world-purpose of God, and must see everything else in that context. The Gospel knows no private or merely individual salvation: the faithful departed shall not "without us" be "made perfect"; and so neither shall we without them. The world-purpose of God is wrought out partly through history; but for its complete and full working out it requires not only a "new creation" of man, but a "new earth" and "new heavens."

Insofar as modern eschatologism is a reaction against, and a correction of, the liberal humanistic progressivism of yesterday, it is trying to supply these main additions and corrections:

First, a realization of the sinfulness of man, which consists not merely of a lingering primitivism from which we may hope to evolve but rather of a defiance of the Most High God to whom we belong and whom we can defy only to our own perdition.

Second, a realization that God, not man, is the Lord of all history and indeed of all creation. The will of God is the ultimate explanation of all phenomena because it is the ultimate cause and ground of their being. Hence true advancement in knowledge must consist of advancing in the knowledge of God rather than in the knowledge of nature. Chesterton was making this point in his characteristically amusing way, when he said that the sun does not rise in the morning because the earth spins around it; the sun rises in the morning because God says to it "Get up!"

Third, eschatology declares that all history has a purpose which is God's purpose, and that man's part is to accept that divinely intended direction of things as final and to fall meekly into step with it—or else. . . . The purpose of God for His creation is disclosed to us in Christ who is both the Meaning of history and the End of history. If the Christian revelation is true, we know what this whole world is "driving at" under God's control: and that is a situation in which Christ will be all in all, and all things shall be subjected unto Him. And so the chief end of the universe as well as the chief end of man is to be conformed and subjected to Christ. He is the Alpha, the Omega, and the *Logos*—the disclosed Meaning and Destiny—of all things created.

It is by the addition of these elements of eternal dimension and divine purpose that today's eschatology seeks to correct yesterday's progressivism.

This modern revival of the ancient cult of eschatology has inevitably

produced some strange by-products. A sorry lot of modern "eschatologizing" expresses merely a bilious or bitter disgust with the world as it is. In *The New Yorker*—of all strange places for an eschatological homily—we find this plaintive plea:<sup>9</sup>

I have no care for Systematic Theology,  
But oh, the recurrent hour of bile that brings  
Fainness for specialization in Eschatology  
(Greek, you recall, for study of all Last Things!)

Come, day when the wealth of the world is less than tuppence,  
The seas unfretted, and the monuments down,  
When the proud have got their ultimate come-uppence,  
And on the seventh New York the sand lies brown;

And all my sloth and failure, all my passion  
One with the sorrows of the Gaul and Goth,  
And all our fireproof homes are burnt and ashen,  
And in the moth-proof closet dwells the moth;

And every most unspeakable thing is spoken,  
And rust is in the unrusting pipes of brass,  
And all unbreakable things at last are broken,  
Shatter'd the non-shatterable glass.

This of course is pure world-weariness, rather than hope in God. But it can be the preparation of the Gospel in the life of any man upon whom descends this mood of weariness and fed-up-ness with a badly mismanaged world.

A person who hungers for some sense of rational meaning and moral purpose in all the sufferings of this present time is searching for an eschatology and a teleology, and he will probably arrive at one eventually. But there is no assurance that he will become a Christian. He may find his comforting sense of meaning and his stabilizing sense of purpose, not in Christ the Hope of the world, but in communism, or in existentialism, or in one or another of the new messianic movements now struggling to be born. We cannot digress from the subject of this paper, which is Christian eschatology, to consider rival religions with their eschatologies. In the time that remains I wish to sketch out in outline what I submit to be a sound Christian doctrine of progress, derived from the prologue to St. John's Gospel.

Earlier, I quoted Langmead Casserley's remark that the old secular

<sup>9</sup>Morris Bishop, in *The New Yorker Book of Verses*.

idea of progress is "an enfeebled, secularized version" of the Christian doctrine of divine providence. Emil Brunner makes the same point pungently by saying that "belief in progress, hope in a better future, was an illegitimate child of Christianity."<sup>10</sup> I am suggesting that perhaps we can give the poor child a name and make it legitimate.

The New Testament contains a number of passages which one could take as scriptural bases for a Christian construction of a doctrine of progress. One of the greatest of these is our liturgical Epistle for the fourth Sunday after Trinity, the great passage in Romans (8:18-23) declaring that "the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us." In *John* 3:1-3 we find a simple but very solid foundation for our Christian progressivism, in the proclamation that we in Christ are already the sons of God and that we shall come fully into our own at last when we shall see Christ as He is and be fully conformed to Him. Here certainly is our whole Christian doctrine of man and his destiny in an inspired verbal nutshell. If we wish to work out our doctrine primarily with reference to the Resurrection, we have St. Paul's great fifteenth chapter in First Corinthians.

My own preference happens to be for the Johannine prologue, as a scriptural foundation for a Christian concept of man and his destiny and the meaning of man's present life and struggle. In what remains of this paper I shall simply present the main points of this interpretation.

*In the beginning was the Word. And the Word was with God. And the Word was God.*

The world we live in is not self-existent and self-governing, as the secular progressives have supposed; but it is strictly derivative from God and entirely dependent upon Him for its being, its continuance, and its functioning. This is the first principle of our Christian doctrine of progress. If there is to be any progress, it must be of God's permission and accomplishment, not man's.

The next key principle is expressed in the idea of the eternal *Logos*, the Word. There is no need for us to guess, as Philo and other ancient philosophers had to guess, as to the nature of this divine Word; for we have seen Him revealed in personal being in Jesus Christ, the Word incarnate. The statement that "all things were made by Him" means that all things created are meant, by the very fact of their being cre-

<sup>10</sup>Emil Brunner, *Eternal Hope*. 25.

ated, to serve the purposes of Christ. This implies that to use created things in the service of the will of Christ is a truly "progressive" use of them. Nothing else is, or can be.

*In him was life; and the life was the light of men. And the light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness cannot swallow it up.*

The life that is in Christ the Word is here compared to a shaft of light which cuts through the darkness of the world with unearthly power and brilliance, and which cannot be extinguished, or swallowed up, or absorbed, by the darkness. Temple gives this interpretation to the passage:<sup>11</sup>

Take any moment of history and you find light piercing unilluminated darkness—now with reference to one phase of the purpose of God, now another. The company of those who stand in the beam of the light by which the path of true progress for that time is discerned is always small. Remember Wilberforce and the early abolitionists; remember the twelve Apostles and the company gathered about them. . . . As we look forwards, we peer into darkness, and none can say with certainty what course the true progress of the future should follow. But as we look back, the truth is marked by beacon-lights, which are the lives of saints and pioneers; and these in their turn are not originators of light, but rather reflectors which give light to us because they themselves are turned towards the source of light.

*He was in the world, and . . . as many as received him, to them gave he the power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name.*

"He gives the right to become sons of God to those who receive Him, that is to those who 'believe on His Name'. The Name is the manifested love of God. To believe on, or put trust in, the love of God made manifest in Christ is the condition of becoming a son of God who reproduces the divine character."<sup>12</sup>

It must be an axiom of any authentically Christian concept of progress that the only real progress must be in the character of man himself. We progress as we become more Christ-like people, thereby exhibiting and reproducing within ourselves the divine character—the manifested love of God. Christ-like people will do Christ-like works and will build a Christ-like society. But the real progress must take

<sup>11</sup>Readings in St. John's Gospel. 8.

<sup>12</sup>ibid. 12.



place in human nature itself. Then, and only then, can the social and cultural fruits of progress follow.

*And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory. . . .*

In beholding His glory we behold in fact the end of all creation as God ordains it to be. The appearance of the eternal Word in our flesh is to show us, not only what God is like, but also what God wills us to become. The glory of God which is revealed in Jesus Christ is the purpose of God for His whole creation. This gives us a clear vision of what must be the direction and goal of all true progress. Having seen the glory and the goal, we know whether any given thought, word, or deed helps the world on its way toward that "far off, divine event to which the whole creation moves", or whether it gets in God's way.

In Christ we find not only the truth about God's purpose for all creation but we find the grace we need for the service of that purpose in our own lives. Christ the End of all creative striving is also the Strength for all such striving; He is not only our Goal, He is our God-with-us.

To sum up: What have we, as Christians, in the way of a workable philosophy and strategy of progress?

We have a divinely revealed vision of God's purpose for all creation. We have, in Christ, a criterion for judging whether any given thing is acceptable in God's sight or not—in other words, whether it makes for progress. We have, in Christ, a vision of what the whole world must be conformed to in the end. We have, in Christ, the grace we need to make us profitable servants of God's purpose. And finally we have, in Him, the assurance that there shall be a new heaven and a new earth; and that the things which shall be hereafter have already been shown to us in the Word made flesh.

Therefore we know whence we come and whither we go. This, I believe, is the word of Him who is the Word of God, to our bewildered and broken world today.

## INTERCOMMUNION: ITS BASIS, CONTENT, AND CONSEQUENCES

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The 1952 Lund Conference on Faith and Order provides us with our subject, for there the topic of "intercommunion" was prepared in a special report and dealt with in a section of its own. The discussions on this topic followed a laborious course, and the final result was rather unsatisfactory. The background and its consequences are more or less indicated to be sure, but not fully developed. The chief defect seems to me to be that nowhere is it explained in clear and unequivocal terms what "intercommunion" really is. In the final report, to be sure, a terminology is presented in which all sorts and degrees of "intercommunion" are catalogued, but this procedure was unavoidable and can restrict neither our thinking nor the facts. In our opinion the greatest error was probably the association of the term "intercommunion" much too much—indeed, almost exclusively—with the common Eucharist (die gemeinsame Abendmahlsfeier.) This becomes most apparent when they attempt to translate "intercommunion" by the German, "Abendmahls-gemeinschaft." This gives the impression of being very concrete, but it ends up by narrowing and impoverishing the concept of "intercommunion." We understand that the Eastern Orthodox Church does not acknowledge the term "intercommunion." Nevertheless, for our part we are convinced that the Old Catholic Church can say especially important things about both the term "intercommunion" and the actuality—not only on the basis of our own intercommunion with the Churches of the Anglican Communion, but also on that of the negotiations between Orthodox and Old Catholics held in Bonn in 1931, where full agreement was reached.

Questions of intercommunion bring to light the greatest of the difficulties and the deepest of the oppositions which exist within the ecumenical movement. In addition, in ecumenical circles the pressure in the direction of so-called "open Communion" grows stronger day by

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day, but all the disparate concepts of Church, Ministry (*Amt*) and Sacrament—or, on a still higher level, of Revelation, Bible, and Tradition—are hushed up or passed over as annoying obstruction. To the “Catholic,” this procedure looks like reaching for too high a goal, with the result that what is actually attained is not the goal itself, but only the appearance, improper and insincere.

## I

When the commissions named by the Archbishops of Canterbury and Utrecht met in Bonn in July, 1931, to negotiate a closer agreement between the Churches of the Anglican Communion and the Old Catholic Churches, they came to an agreement which was later accepted unchanged by both Communion (Kirchengemeinschaften). The first article of this concordat reads: “Each Communion (Kirchengemeinschaft) recognizes the Catholicity and Independence of the other, and maintains its own.” . . . . The essentials are established in this first paragraph, *viz.*, the recognition of mutual *Catholicity* and *Independence*. Then in the second article this principle is elaborated as follows: “Each Communion agrees to admit members of the other Communion into participation in the Sacraments.” . . . . Very emphatically this does not refer exclusively to Eucharistic fellowship, which after all, was really being realized in practice before this, but above all to mutual participation in the episcopal consecrations. The third article draws the limits, *viz.*: “Intercommunion does not require of either Communion the acceptance of all doctrinal opinion, sacramental devotion, or liturgical practice peculiar to the other, but implies that each believes the other to hold firmly all the essentials of the Christian faith.” These “essentials” (Wesentliche) were carefully weighed, as for example the relationship between Scripture and Tradition and the authority of both, the attitude towards the Councils held since the year 1000, the interpretation of the Eucharist, and the significance of the “five commonly called Sacraments,” the five other Sacraments.

We cite all this in detail because we want to show first not the results but the basis of “*intercommunio*.” This basis is clearly expressed here, *viz.*, the recognition of each other’s *Catholicity*, The intercommunion which took place in 1931 meant that the Old Catholic Church considered the Anglican Church as “the Catholic Church of England,” and that the Anglican Church considered the Old Catholic Church as

"the Catholic Church of the Netherlands (of Germany, of Switzerland, etc.)." This meant both the unity and the independence and autonomy of the two. *And this is the full meaning of their intercommunion.*

No organic "*unio*" has taken place, nor is any intended. It remains questionable whether this will be necessary, or whether it would bring us a step further. Intercommunion is not a means to an end, but an end in itself. There always remain historical and regional boundary-lines, which are, however, not lines of separation, but logical marks of historical and local autonomy. But the deeper unity, the "*unio*", lies in "Catholicity," wherein is recognized the continuity with the ancient Church, before any break or schism. In this Catholicity lies the conclusion that each party is convinced that the other possesses the "*holon*," the wholeness of the Church, in Doctrine, Ministry and Sacrament. Individual Old Catholics may shake their heads doubtfully on reading some of the thirty-nine Articles; naturally the doctrinal emphases differ in the two Churches, but there exists a common foundation of the "essentials" which guarantees full Catholicity. And there is assurance on the Anglican side that no new beginning was ever intended in a Reformation, and on the Old Catholic side that no deflection has taken place (e.g., in the Roman spirit) which would forsake the foundation of the ancient Church.

As to the Ministry, it can be stated that in Evangelical circles of the Anglican Church the emphasis has been more historical than doctrinal. But there too we are convinced that the Anglican Church "always intended to continue the three Orders of the Ministry, and to make Bishops, Priests and Deacons *as they existed in the Church from the beginning*"; that the *Holy Spirit is given in Ordination* for the work of the Ministry," and that in the formula of Ordination there is *nothing* that would indicate that it is *not* intended "to confer the charisma of the Catholic Ministry." Whether or not Ordination is designated theologically as a Sacrament therefore makes very little difference. But more about that later. On both sides there is the express conviction that the Ministry of each exhibits a different, let us say, more sacral character and stronger assurance of continuity, than the Ministry in the Protestant Churches. From this common basis of the recognition of mutual Catholicity, it follows that, in principle—dogmatically and devotionally—"the Order for the Administration of the Lord's Supper or Holy Communion," and the Old Catholic Celebration of the Mass are identical; that in Ordinations to the Ministry, the imposition of hands by Anglican or by Old Catholic bishops is of the same apostolic

validity; that Confirmations can be, and actually are, performed interchangeably; that a "*reconciliatio*" by prayer and the laying on of hands is of like efficacy as performed by both parties; that the sick are "comforted" with equal validity and with power as well; that an Old Catholic may consider his marriage in an Anglican Church as sacral as in his own Church; and that the Ministers of both Communions can exchange with each other everywhere and in everything—subject, of course, to canonical—disciplinary decisions and agreements.

## II

For the "Catholic," the foundation of Catholicity is determinative in the theory and practice of "*intercommunio*".

This includes a connection, a continuity, with the undivided Church, which knew nothing of any separation, break or reformation. For the "Catholic" the Church is not an institution or growth or machinery of human invention and origin, which has thus merely arisen of itself, and with which we can do what we wish, because we humans presently compose the Church and when necessary reform it, and tailor it according to our taste, which we fit out with a Bible, with Ministries and sacramental apparatus and which is ultimately only our servant, as it so very often is for Protestants in practice, though not, of course, in theory. No, the Church is the Body of the glorified Lord; it proceeds from Him alone; it is born of Him; its life is from Him, through the Holy Spirit, Who gives it life. It is the bearer of His salvation—more than just bearer of His assurance of salvation, for it is more than an eschatological guide—and therefore strictly *His* servant, setting forward His work of salvation, representing Him, i.e. making Him "present," so that, as St. Ambrose said, "No one can have God as his Father who does not have the Church as his Mother." The "Catholic" knows that the nature of the Church must be understood from its original basis, that is, from the revelation of God, and that it is the living, abiding, effectual and dynamic witness of this Revelation. The "catholic" professes unconditionally the "*CREDO ecclesiam*," and "*credere*", "to believe", means for him: obey, serve, and live by, the thing believed.

Of course he knows that God's love and wisdom also gave him the written document of the Bible, which is the lamp for his feet, but it is this primarily and principally because it is the lamp of the Church, kindled by the same divine Hand which also created the Church and made it the bearer and protector of this lamp. For him there is no

question whether the Church, subordinate to the Holy Scripture is its pliant servant and the executor of its will, which we—yes, notice this, WE!—may rap on the knuckles and call to order every time. It is witnessed to by God in the Holy Scriptures, and this divine witness is the authority of the Scriptures. But the sole, authentic witness is the Church, which possesses, on the basis of its direct, divine origin, the right and the power to bear witness, concerning the Holy Scriptures and their authority, that they, the Scriptures, are God's testimony—and this is the authority of the Church. At this point, all questions concerning subordination or co-ordination are swept away and only the beatific Mystery of the identity of the "*credo ecclesiam*" and the "*kata tas graphas*" is valid. For here only one thing is basic: God who creates and speaks, God who reveals Himself in His Son Jesus Christ, who is the Head of the Church and the Heart of the Scriptures.

Therefore too the "Catholic" cannot do without the word "Tradition," for every revelation of God, despite the operation of the Holy Spirit, follows a human route, the route of successive transmission, of "*tradere*." God "Himself extends Himself" in His Church, and He "extends His Word" in the written document inspired by His Holy Spirit, the agent of which is the Church. Though this Tradition is a human route, it is nonetheless of God's will and creation; it has the Church as its dwelling-place and organism for all centuries, and its voice is God's holy Word.

On the authority of the Church as the Body of Christ—strictly and exclusively, therefore—depends the *Ministry of the Church*. The Ministry can never be indifferent, never "good" in just any form. Never can it be "merely" practicable—it is indispensable. The Ministry is a factor and a link in God's Tradition, in God's self-extension, which is as permanent and basic as the Church itself, rooted in and sprouting from the Revelation, from which it receives, through the Church, its truth and authenticity, its authority and permanency, its calling and its office. Therefore the Ministry is not merely a matter of the "well-being" ("*Wohlsein*") of the Church, whereby the Church's work may proceed efficiently and systematically and in order, but with which one could, after all, dispense. No, the Ministry belongs to the "being" ("*Sein*") of the Church, to its nature as Church. Without the Ministry the Church is mutilated, and not the perfect Body of its Lord, who is its Head, and who has "robed His Church with glory" so that it may be "without spot or wrinkle" (Eph. 5:27).

It is scarcely necessary to mention that for the "Catholic" the Min-



istry takes the threefold form of Bishop, Priest, and Deacon. The "Catholic" acknowledges this threefold Ministry as the inalienable and unchangeable heritage of the Church of the Apostles, who, instituted by the Lord as the "foundation", received the commission and the authority to build up the Church, so that "In him all the building fitly framed together groweth unto an holy temple in the Lord" (Eph. 2: 20f.), who is "the Head from which all the body by joints and bands having nourishment ministered, and knit together, increaseth with the increase of God" (Coll. 2:19). In the promise that by the hands of His Apostles the building is to grow up "in Him" and "to the growth which God has willed" lies the assurance of the absolutely sacral character of the Ministry. For us the assurance of the Apostolic origin of the Ministry lies in the express directions of the New Testament Epistles and in the practice of the early Church, which corresponded to those directions and sprang out of them.

Embedded in this last sentence is, indeed, the opposition between "Catholic" and "Protestant" (*"protestantisch"*). When we are assured from the Protestant side (*reformatorischerseits*) that the New Testament stands for a presbyterian system, we would like to reply that the New Testament does not recommend any system, but shows us building stones.

It is not a question here of systems, of constitutional forms, or methods of organization. Our Lord founded the "Church" and not an institution with rules, laws, functions, liturgical, ceremonial and ministering personnel all exactly defined in advance. His Gospel proclaims the realization of the Kingdom of God, and the external form of the Church is only a means to that end—but a means which He Himself gives, inescapable and indispensable, absolutely necessary for all those who want to attain to His Salvation. So too the Gospel contains the principles which establish the Ministry, though without ministerial prescriptions, and the principles which call forth the means of grace, though without liturgical description. He founded a living organism, not an organization, not a constitutional law. Therefore He gave room for development, but not for temporal or local limitation.

The Church itself creates all these "secondary" things, because it is built up through the Apostles of the Lord, furnished with the Spirit of the Lord, and therefore dealing in the authority of its Lord, who is its Head, and whose Body it is. The Lord functions through His Church just as the head rules the body. Thus the Church gives the Ministry and the Sacraments (*Heilmittel*—means of grace) their

"form" (Gestalt), at first feeling its way amid the needs of place, time and circumstance, in a measure of freedom which is especially the prerogative of the "Catholic", just as rigidity is the prerogative of the heretic and schismatic.

From this logical and sound development grows up the established form of the Ministry of bishops, priests and deacons—rooted in the principles of the Gospel, shaped in the early Churches (Gemeinden), and consolidated in the Church of the first centuries. The "Catholic" does not hesitate a moment in accepting here the assurance of the most ancient Tradition. He who is not in a position to do this runs the risk of a source which is nebulous from its beginning, and at the same time picks up the risk of a peculiar, "private" Tradition lacking all continuity—dating, for example, from the Reformation.

### III

We think that the question "Bishop or not" is not the most important thing in the question of "*intercommunio*," although we concede that since the Reformation fear has been aroused by the figure of the "Bishop" and even now it is not put to rest. If it were a question merely of the *figure* of the bishop, or of the *word* "priest", the difficulties and fears would soon be removed from the world, on the basis of the fact that bishops function everywhere even in the Protestant (reformatorischen) Churches. "To take episcopacy into their system" can ultimately be only an organizational or practical issue.

The most important, the crucial questions, remain those concerning *consecration* and *apostolic succession*. They belong close together, but at the same time they connect the area of the Ministry with that of the sacramental or sacral.

The *imposition of hands* has its origin in the time of the Apostles. The institution of the "Seven" (Acts 6:1-6) by the imposition of hands and by prayer is the exemplar liturgically, dogmatically, and sacramentally. Even if in the beginning there was a difference in the persons who performed this act, the form itself appears to be continued from the beginning. Imposition of hands as the form of ministerial commissioning and transmission betrays not the least uncertainty. Imposition of hands on new bearers of office takes place through the Church—i.e. on behalf of the Church—through the hands of its legitimate Ministers (Diener). There is nothing magical here, unless one insists on calling everything magical that is sacramental or sacral. Prayer

asking the "Gift", the charisma, is never omitted, whereupon the imposition of hands then "symbolizes", "denotes", the coming of the gift from above, i.e., reveals the reality of the coming.

Thus for the "Catholic", *Ministry* and *transmission of the Ministry* (or *ministerial consecration*) are inseparable. Let us use the technical terms "*ordo*" and "*ordinatio*". Now, where the necessity of the "*ordo*" is once recognized in the Church, then the conferring of this "*ordo*", that is the "*ordinatio*", can be considered not as a merely practical factor, but this "*ordinatio*" is sacral by itself. Authentic Catholic theology aims even here to protect itself in the face of two extremes.

There can be a one-sided emphasis here, as we see it on the Roman side. It is an emphasis which turns the "*ordo*" into an hierarchical apparatus, and in the long run divides the Church into a teaching and a hearing Church, and at the same time makes the Church more or less clearly dependent upon the clergy, and considers them the real Church. Here especially the "*ordo*" loses its characteristic of "serving." It develops from a Ministry (*Ministerium*) which has "*diakonein*" as its function into a "*regimen ecclesiae*" in both a material and a spiritual, in a disciplinary and a sacramental sense. The Church becomes dependent upon its clergy, who possess the power of administering the Sacraments. This means that the "*ordo*" replaces God, Christ, and the Holy Spirit, and, expressed philosophically, it renders the concept of God a deistic one. God has his earthly vicar, who at the same time is the Tradition. To be sure, clerics are still called "*servi Dei*", but practically speaking, God—the *Sanctum* or the *Sancta*—becomes their slave, their object, their prerogative, whom they have at their sovereign disposal by the power of their "*ordinatio*". Then the one who is "consecrated" by the "*ordinatio*", becomes one clothed with divine power, someone who is different from, and stands higher than, the *homo laicus*. He becomes a "mediator" in the strictest sense. Here, too heavy a stress is laid upon the *potestas*, the fullness of power (*Vollmacht*).

But on the Protestant (*reformatorischen*) side, as we see it, the danger is ever present that this *potestas*, this fullness of power is all but denied. Insofar as this *potestas* is present, it is divided among all sorts of functions and offices which are connected not so much with an "*ordinatio*" but rather with human regulations, for they depend upon human choice and preference and can be assumed and then later on laid down. Thus the character of the Ministry becomes rather casual, temporary, more prophetic than priestly, more a matter of witness than of mediation, more teacher than mediator, more dependent upon

a charisma or grace received at a particular moment than upon an abiding fulness of power or commission. Here the "*ordinatio*" confers too little. Are we in error when we say that the Reformation has always taken pains to circumscribe the office and power (*Vollmacht*) of the Minister (*Amtstragers*)? There is always a possibility, even a strong possibility, that someone other than *the* minister will "take over" or "usurp" his office and "incidentally" become the Minister himself. From the "Catholic" viewpoint this always endangers the inviolability and reality of the administration of the Sacrament—the great hindrance on the road to "*intercommunio*."

The "Catholic" finds his criterion between these two extremes. The "*ordo*", the Ministry, is a necessary factor in the structure of the Church; it is a mark of its nature. Without "*ordo*" the Church cannot exist nor be a Church. As Christ called His Apostles and "sent them before Him", so the Church calls its servants and sends them in the same manner; but they thus always perform *its* i.e. the Church's—duties, and are Ministers (*Amtstrager*) only *through its will, through its commission*. They are always "servants of Christ" and never have any power, *potestas*, might (*Vollmacht*) or commission of their own. They administer something which they themselves essentially do *not* possess. No Sacrament is dependent upon their whim. They have only the heavy duty of obeying their calling and commission from on high and of doing "*quod facit ecclesia*."

But their "*ordinatio*", their consecration, calls and sends them *really* as well; them, precisely them, and none other. Thus when they act, the Church, God, Christ, the Holy Ghost acts, and their human action really does God's work—nothing less than this. And so absolutely really, but also so absolutely ministerially (*ministeriell*), that it always remains "*Deus qui operatur*", and not Paul or Apollos. Here is no incidental possession of grace which makes anyone qualified on a particular occasion for some ministerial function, but an abiding charisma which carried its fulness of power (*Vollmacht*), the "*ordo*", under the heavy burden of responsibility, and is possessed and exercised worthily by the bearer only through *grace* (the "*ordinatio*").

#### IV

The question of Apostolic Succession is immediately and most intimately connected with the foregoing. It is even called "the Catholic

bulwark", on which "*intercommunio*" between "Catholic" and "Protestant" (*protestantisch*) is frustrated.

It will be well if we establish that the concept of the Apostolic Succession has undergone a development which needs a certain correction. The oldest view intends to show the bishops as the successors of the Apostles, and puts the emphasis upon the episcopal succession in the great Sees which go back to the Apostles. The occasion was the struggle against the Gnostic sects, which appealed to secret traditions of the Apostles. Against this the Church appealed to its "open" Tradition, which was manifested in the known line of bishops. Such a line, agreeing as to the "*depositum fidei*" with that of every other great see, presents a strong witness for the truth. In this line or in these lines lie authority, confirmation and preservation of the truth. Here is Tradition in the best sense of the word. Here therefore an unbroken line of Ministers (*Amtstragern*) is indicated. The force of the proof lies in their legitimacy, i.e., in their legitimate, public induction into office. Nothing is said here about "*validitas*", the validity of the consecration, which would depend upon this succession. Again, just as little is said about the dependence of this succession itself upon special "spiritual gifts" which are conferred and transmitted in the consecration. At the bottom of this primitive thinking about the "line of bishops" probably lies, however, the conviction that these "successors of the Apostles" *exercised precisely the same functions as the Apostles by virtue of being their successors*. Like them they shepherd the Church of God, administer its discipline, keep its doctrine pure, administer its Sacraments and impose hands. They are the visible monument of unity. In this "*successio episcoporum*" lay the assurance of the integrity of the Tradition of doctrine, the proof of the continuity of the true Church, and the guarantee of the apostolicity of the Ministry. And this succession comes about through legitimate election within and through the Church, through consecration according to ecclesiastical rules, and in consecration by the servants of the Church.

With this, we think, the most important thing has been said about the Apostolic succession. But later ages, much later indeed, changed the emphasis. In *The Church and the Ministry* (p. 59ff.), Bishop Charles Gore paraphrases this view when he says:

It was intended that there should be in each generation an authoritative stewardship of the grace and truth which came by Jesus

Christ, and a recognized power to transmit it, derived from above by Apostolic descent.

According to this line of thinking, it is a matter not only of the succession of the Ministry (*Amtes*) but of the succession of the consecration to the Ministry, and the author means here that the sacramental gifts, the "*dona Spiritus*", or their coming, or in any case the competence for the Ministry, the ministerial authority (it is never quite clear exactly what the "*dona Spiritus*" precisely include) comes about through transmission. The gift of the Ministry—whether it be as a special gift of grace or only as ministerial competence (*Amtsbefugnis*)—is, therefore, transmitted "*per manus episcopi*", by the hands of the bishop; and this transmission is an Apostolic Succession if it occurs in the line which goes back to the Apostles. He who does not receive the Ministry in this way of the "*successio apostolica*" is not a priest or bishop. But everyone who does receive it in this way is validly consecrated, and "stands in the Apostolic Succession."

This line of thinking—and we suppose that this above all irritates the Protestant (*reformatorische*) heart—is mechanical. Though thoroughly consistent, it binds grace to human power and discretion. One thinks of a golden channel for which authority is to be found neither in the New Testament nor in the ancient Church, and to which even Rome itself has never appealed. Transmission becomes only a matter of the Ministry; it is *no longer bound to the Church*, i.e. to legitimate calling and election *through the Church*. Here threatens the way of magic and Gnostic theosophy. In conjunction with theories about "*materia*" and "*forma*" and "*intentio*", it casts doubt upon all consecrations of the early centuries, which were still unacquainted with these theories. On the other hand it explains as valid all sorts of consecrations which take place under arbitrary circumstances and conditions, and which were accounted inadmissible in the early Church. It eliminates the Church, which alone has to decide about the Ministry and which alone bears the Ministry. It makes the operation of the Holy Spirit, as it is revealed in the Churches which do not possess even *this* so-called "Apostolic Succession", inexplicable, and is compelled to deny this operation of the Holy Spirit if it would otherwise have to admit that *this* form of Apostolic Succession is not really indispensable.

The Liturgy of the Church, in its formulas of ordination from the earliest times onwards gives more correct doctrine. The emphasis there falls chiefly upon legitimate *election by the Church*. The Church must



be present in her structure of bishops, priests and people to identify the ordinand as the person for the bishop to consecrate. No one can be bishop unless *the Church* calls him—"nullus episcopus sine ecclesia". The actual prayer of consecration or ordination is directed to God, That He, through Christ, may send the Holy Spirit by the imposition of hands of the consecrating bishop. The Holy Spirit is no continuing possession of the consecrator, but the gift, the "*donum*", which is implored for the *consecrandus*. Everything must take place according to Church rules accepted as Apostolic. And everything must be carried out through the legitimately directing administrator, the consecrator, who has received authority for this purpose. Therefore through the Bishop, not as the bearer, more or less magical, or the powers received "*per transmissionem*" from the Apostles, but *by virtue of the will of the Church*, which itself has allowed him to be consecrated for this purpose.

There is nothing magical in this "*successio apostolica*", for the "*ordinatio*" or "*consecratio*" is thoroughly sacramental, i.e.: God gives the Holy Spirit in response to the *prayer of the Church*, and this prayer takes place according to the will of the Church, during the "*impositio manuum*", the laying-on of hands. Thus it is and remains *the Church* which bears and realizes the "*successio*". It is God who answers the prayer of the Church, and thereby brings about the same thing that has come about again and again in the same way since the days of the Apostles. *And that is the Apostolic Succession.*

Therefore we would like to interpolate here the declaration which the Old Catholic Church sponsored in the report on "The Ministry and the Sacraments" of the Edinburgh Conference on Faith and Order in 1937:

The Old Catholics maintain that the episcopate is of Apostolic origin and belongs to the nature of the Church. The Church is the bearer of the Ministry. Ministers (*Amtspersonen*) act only on its orders. The Ministry is received, exercised and transmitted in the same sense and in the same way in which the Apostles transmitted it to the Church. The Apostolic Succession is the inseparability of Church and Ministry and the unbroken continuity of both.

## V

As we have just said that the Ministry requires a consecration (*Weihe*)—therefore that "*ordo*" demands an "*ordinatio sacra*"—so we can now say also that, contrariwise, the "*ordinatio*" preserves the in-

tegrity and validity of the "ordo". The consecration (*Weihe*) preserves the integrity and validity of the Ministry.

There is here, however, a difficult and delicate question, which is especially a burning one in the problem of intercommunion, and arises time and time again. It is this: *What is the Catholic opinion of the Ministry in the non-Catholic Churches?* Friendly relations, ecumenical association and personal esteem very quickly and easily lead one to avoid the question, to choose the safest way, and to refrain from making a judgment. But when the problem of "intercommunion" is on the agenda, and one side has uttered a "No", then the other side has the right to an answer as to the motivation of that "No".

Our answer can, to be sure, be deduced from the foregoing, in which we have expressed our "Catholic" conviction, but it is just and honest to speak more precisely and more fully about it.

First of all the following should be made clear. For the "Catholic", Church and Ministry are inseparably inter-related. The Ministry belongs to the nature ("*esse*") of the Church—without the Ministry, no Church. Thus whenever the idea of the Church, the understanding of the Church, is weakened or even neglected, there the Ministry too is bound to be of less significance. It is no longer borne by the Church nor required by it. It has no root, it turns into a more or less official teaching Ministry (*Lehramt*) reduced *ex professo* to the preaching Ministry (*Predigeramt*). Where the Church possesses no longer, or not yet, or, briefly, not at all, her character of Church, of the Body of Christ, in the strict sense, the sacrament too suffers damage, and there is there no Ministry which is comparable to the revealed significance of the Church.

But in orthodox Protestantism (*orthodox-reformatorischen*) in general, Church, Ministry and Sacrament are esteemed, although honesty compels us to say that the Protestant (*reformatorisch*) idea of the Church probably has been and in many ways probably still is today much weaker than one would assume from ecumenical discussions. We certainly do learn a good deal from one another in those discussions!

In the Lutheran Churches we find a Ministry which, in one country (Sweden) is acquainted with priests and bishops whose origin goes back to a continuity from the Ministry of the pre-reformation Church. This continuity and this unbroken line will surely not be broken, but at the same time no special stress is put upon *this* origin of the Ministry as being of the nature ("*esse*") of the Church. Elsewhere we encounter bishops (who are such) not by consecration but in accordance with a

ministerial organization of later date. In other places still (the Netherlands), Lutheranism has no bishops. Throughout Lutheranism it is emphatically denied that the Ministry is a factor in Apostolic Succession or the continuity of the Church, and the succession is looked for in the continuity of the true Faith.

The Churches of Calvinist orientation possess a highly developed ministerial organization which is proudly called presbyterian, and which therefore rejects on principle the episcopal order (*das Bischofsamt*) and does not accept the necessity of a sacramental consecration and transmission of the Ministry which preserves the bond with the early Church. Very deliberately a new, Protestant (*reformatorisch*) beginning has been made with the ministry. It is precisely this new beginning which the "Catholic" can never accept as sound and right. Here he meets a roadblock which completely debars him from agreement with this concept and evaluation of the Ministry.

Of course the "Catholic" cannot and should not shut his eyes to the fact that the Holy Spirit also works and works wonderfully in the non-Catholic Churches and through their Ministers (*Diener*). The Spirit bloweth where He listeth. Ecumenical life, teaching, and learning have clearly revealed this also to us, and this lesson, in and of itself, is already a great step nearer one another. But even this does not allow the "Catholic" to erase the boundary-lines, which are for him a matter of profound conviction of belief. If, on the basis of this conviction, irregularity, mutilation and defect exist on the other side, but if, in spite of it, God wants to work there too, then the "Catholic" bows his head before God who "is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think." But this does not give him the right to surrender the bounds and the order which God has taught *him*, or to consider the other as of equal worth.

The "Catholic" desires—with all prudence and humility in his judgment of the Ministry of the other Churches—to keep the balance between personal divine calling and ecclesiastical succession. It is the same tension that exists also between sacramental grace bestowed directly by God and the authenticity and trustworthiness of the sacramental action guaranteed by the Church. For him, (the "Catholic") firm certainty lies in *God*, Who calls, sends, consecrates and ministers *through His Church*. Church, Ministry, and ministerial consecration for him are indissolubly one, and therefore solely and absolutely reliable, because "by His Spirit God governs and sanctifies the whole Body of the Church", as the immemorial Good Friday prayer says. For him

there is in this certainty the assurance, at every ministerial consecration of the fulfilment of the ancient prayer of the Church: "Grant him, O Almighty God, through thy Christ, to share in the Holy Spirit, so that he may possess power . . . , in accord with the power which thou hast given to the Apostles."

We will add still another point, because this too stands as a "*crux*" on the way to "*intercommunio*". We mean the Sacrament, or the Sacraments. To be frank, the ecumenical movement has not yet reached this point. It has, to be sure, repeatedly come up in discussion, and has even been discussed more or less in detail now and then, but Church and Ministry have already taken up so much of the discussion that the deeper probing of the question of the Sacraments has not yet appeared on the agenda. For that reason, current ecumenical aspirations and intentions seem to the "Catholic" to be too easy-going. This is apparent in the "agreement" on the holy Eucharist or Holy Supper. In this connection we are not convinced that this "agreement" is subscribed to by all parties, and still less that it is interpreted by all in the same sense. We see light here, however, and, no doubt, possibilities of better mutual understanding and of better grasp of our *own* inheritance (*Besitzes*). What we mean is this:

Until recently it has been a firmly rooted usage in the ecumenical world to speak of *the two* Sacraments, or even of the New Testament Sacraments. It is scarcely taken into account that the "Catholic" recognizes seven Sacraments. We are indeed convinced that discussion of these two Sacraments, Baptism and Supper, will raise questions enough, but . . . what about the other five? Will the discussions ignore them forever? Will the Protestant (*reformatorische*) side continually gainsay their worth and not be shown its own poverty? Must the "Catholic" hide them as if behind his back, as a private possession to be accounted a mere bagatelle? In the first place, what presents itself here are fundamentally different sacramental concepts. The "seal and sign" will never be enough for the "Catholic"; he believes in the reality and in the sure, unerring action of God through the Sacrament. He believes too that what the Sacrament confers is given in no other manner, in no other way. Never will the "Catholic" be able to accept the notion that the Sacrament bestows nothing besides what the "Word" also bestows.

This brings up something else on which we lay special value, and which we would like to commend at this point. If indeed sometime the

theme "the Sacraments" becomes the subject of study of the "Faith and Order" group, they ought to have the courage at the outset simply to drop the word "Sacrament" altogether. The word itself is harmless, but the theology of a later time has hedged it in. It is well known that the Eastern Orthodox Church prefers to speak of the "Mysteries". The defining of the word "Sacrament" was always a cross in theology, and the Reformation calmly took over this cross from the Middle Ages and still bears it to this day. They keep trying to force, to re-mold, and to evaluate according to a definition what is really a fact, an action, of the Church. And according to the terms of the definition they add and subtract Sacraments.

Would it not be sensible for each Church to take account of every single action it employs, whether as Sacrament or as a particular action of the Church? Catholic theology too has always spoken of the "two most important Sacraments", the "*duo praecipua sive eximia sacramenta*", and it is aware that among the seven, or between the two most important Sacraments and "those five commonly called sacraments" there are profound differences. For the "Catholic", in Baptism and the Eucharist something quite different occurs than in his "*sacramentum ordinis*", the consecration of the priesthood. But is the last-named therefore less sacral in character, less real in operation, in that it has to do with ministerial commission and transmission and the grace of the Holy Spirit? More important than the question whether "*confirmatio*" ought to or may be called a Sacrament is the question whether it truly and effectually mediates the Holy Spirit.

And does the Reformation then know nothing at all about these "five"? What does "Confirmation" mean to it? Is it unacquainted with prayer for the forgiveness of sins, in which it presumes to give assurance that the *sins* are forgiven? Does it know no "effectual" comforting of the sick? What meaning does it attribute to its ministerial induction? And what actually happens, or what does it understand to happen, when it "solemnizes" (*einsegnet*) a marriage?

In our opinion it remains the task of theology on both sides, first, in its sacramental theology, to "disorganize" all this, to strip it down, to deliver it from the oppressive bonds of a never congenial sacramental definition, in order then to discern every holy action of the Church in its own meaning and its own value, and only then to "organize" a new and better sacramental theology. We are convinced that Protestant

circles (*reformatorischen Kreis*) would thereupon achieve a better and richer estimate of their own sacral inheritance (*Besitz*).

## VI

All this now lies ahead on the road to "*intercommunio*". We have tried to expound from the "Catholic" standpoint the most important questions that arise here. We have intentionally written the word "Catholic" in quotation marks throughout, as a signal to indicate a standpoint which is occupied, globally speaking, in the ecumenical movement by those Churches which are not assimilated to the Reformation. It should be superfluous, but it still is necessary to say time and again that "Catholic" is not identical with the Church of Rome. Indeed, "Catholic" is a prerogative which the Protestant (*reformatorischen*) Churches too claim for themselves where they profess in the Apostles' Creed (in an inaccurate translation, alas!) to believe in "the Holy, universal, Christian Church". But even viewed in this wider sense, they will not want to deny it to us, or criticize us as arrogant, if we emphasize the Catholic-Protestant (*protestantisch*) opposition. It is precisely this juxta—and oftentimes contra-position which comes up again and again in the question of "*intercommunio*".

"*Intercommunio*" is more than joint Communion. The latter is a result, though an important result. "*Intercommunio*" is the boundary of unity because it is the recognition of authentic and complete *Catholicity*. We put it this way because our Church knows "*intercommunio*" from experience. The first thing the Churches of the Anglican Communion and the Old Catholic Churches established as the basis of their intercommunion was the recognition of Catholicity. And this comes out so forcefully that every action of this "*intercommunio*" is a witness to this mutually recognized Catholicity. That this basis may some day be found by all Christendom remains our prayer. That it can be found remains our belief.



## THE GREEKS AND THE INNER MAN

By ROYDEN KEITH YERKES

Sycamore, Illinois

*The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time and Fate.* By Richard Brixton Onians. 2nd ed. Cambridge: University Press, 1954. pp. 573.

The second edition of this valuable book appears within three years after the first and is marked only by addition of a few facts and suggestions. The demand for it indicates its peculiar and important contribution to the work of the anatomist, the philologist, the psychologist, the philosopher and the student of religion.

Man early recognized that the chief problem of every living creature is adjustment to its environments which form the sustenance of its life and also threaten it with death. Every individual is forced to establish as favourable relation as possible with these environments. When men became able to think about the problem they tried to explain the processes and the tensions involved.

Environments were soon divided into four obvious classes: solids (earth), liquids (water), gases (air) and fire. Everything, including man himself, was composed of one of these "elements," or of two, or of three, or of all four in varying combinations. The ability to recognize this made man suppose that the ability itself must proceed from interaction of the "elements." Words must be used to describe this interaction, but words are physically spoken and written symbols of ideas which can be neither seen nor heard; they have no basic relation with the ideas themselves. The only way of expressing and communicating ideas is by use of physical experience interpreted by current tradition.

The development of thought can be best understood by study of the words of the various groups of languages whose gradual fusion is still far from complete. No substitute or surrogate has been found for patient, thorough, accurate and toilsome philological study. Professor Onians addresses himself to this work and presents the development of explanations which obtained until discovery of new data and which have left their vestigial marks upon much modern language, although

their denotations have been supplanted so long that they are now often interpreted as metaphors.

We still speak of *sunrise* and *sunset*, of *boiling* anger and *black* looks, of *getting something off our chests*, of *deeply rooted* convictions, of cowards as *white-livered*, of the *wish bone* of a fowl, of a *choleric* disposition, of being *tied down* to a task or being *bound* to do something, of *binding and loosing sins* and of the future being *in the lap of the gods*. We think of these and innumerable other phrases as figures of speech and we are apt to attribute this metaphoric method of speaking to all writers, even to the earliest.

Selecting outstanding words and phrases from Homer, Prof. Onians presents the metaphorical and abstract meanings assigned to them by Monroe, Leaf, Lang, Liddell and Scott (both the early and revised editions), Rohde, Boisacq and many other scholars. Coming to the conclusion that proposed interpretations leave much to be explained, he notes the accompanying verbs and traces the use in Hesiod and other early writers of whose work only fragments remain. Further development of the words indicates their gradual change of meaning. Illustrations are taken from other Indo-Germanic languages and from Hebrew because of its definite influence upon western European thought through the Old Testament and the Talmud. Occasionally Babylonian and Etruscan illustrations contribute. Successive word studies convince him that the early meanings were based not upon use of metaphor but upon the fact that the separation of physical and spiritual into categories was very late and left each strongly influenced by the other.

In the interpretation of early literature, a readiness to see figures of speech in phrases which depart from our conceptions of reality is not a virtue, though in later times when the hypotheses of primitive fancy have, relatively speaking, yielded before a closer scrutiny of fact, and when, alas, the relation of language to thought has become less severe, it may be commendable caution (p. 326). We should take the words at their face value and not try to explain them away as *rhetorica allegoria* or any other "figure of speech," take them as no passing figments of the poet's brain, but allusions to one of the images under which a whole people interpreted life (p. 325).

A few examples of word study will illustrate the method of the author.

1. The *phrenes* are generally identified, by Plato and modern lexicographers, with the diaphragm or midriff. For metrical reasons Homer

uses the singular *phrén* but the normal use of the plural would debar reference to any single organ or member of the body. Abundant evidence (pp. 23-43) indicates that the only satisfactory explanation of the dark coloured, dense, spongy *phrenes* enclosing the heart and located in the chest is that in Homer they were the lungs. The word, like many other common words, changed its meaning during the centuries of interval between Homer and the Attic age. The normal condition of the *phrenes* is *pelkalimos* (dry not *prudent*, as the word is sometimes rendered), but when sleep (apparently a mist) is "poured" on one, his *phrenes* become moist, as they do in intoxication, and cease to function. They are the ultimate source of seeing and hearing (p. 73) by receiving a vapour transmitted to them by the eyes and ears through the throat. As the seat of *thymos* and *pneuma* they receive information and emotional stimulus by breathing or by being breathed into. From them, therefore comes the initiative for emotions, thoughts and acts. The Latin equivalent for *phrenes* is *praecordia*, the organ in front of the heart.

Phroneō, from the same root, likewise not only denoted intellectual activity but included every action of the *phrenes*, emotion, cognition and volition.

2. The *thymos* was a vapour or moisture in the *phrenes*, coming from the blood but not confined to the chest. It was the conscious self, a plus over *phrenes* and *pneuma*, and its work extended ever to visual imagination (p. 73). It was the "stuff of consciousness," the title of chapter III of Part I. Consciousness was based upon the unity of feeling, thinking and willing, for which healthy *phrenes* were necessary. Later it was identified with the air in the chest and centred by Aristotle in the region of the heart. Its Latin equivalent was *animus*. At death it was destroyed.

3. The *psyche* in Homer was the soul or life-principle (p. 96). Located in the brain, it functioned through the spinal fluid and bone marrow. Similar to our modern concept of "the Unconscious", it continued to function through sleep and after death. As the life-principle it was the source of procreative activity, ordinarily using the genitals as instruments, but able to function without them as did Zeus at the birth of Athene. The act of generation was regarded as actual diminution of the *psyche*. This is suggested as a possible origin of the idea of continence or celibacy as a virtue. Another form of procreative activity was the sprouting of hair on the body and more abundantly on the head where the *psyché* was located. An interesting survival of the

location of the *psyché*, with the seed of life, in the head is seen in our continuation of the ancient use of *head* to designate the seed clusters of grains.

The head of a sacrificial victim was not burned; it contained the *psyché*. The suggestion is made (pp. 107 f.) that the custom of casting some of the hair of the animal upon the sacrificial flame may well have been by way of offering the product of the *psyche* as a surrogate for the head itself. This is the first satisfactory explanation of the act and makes sense.

Nodding and sneezing were functions of the *psyché*. The first was a voluntary act of the individual; the second, an involuntary act, was due to the initiative of a god and therefore was an omen (pp. 103-105).

Alcmaean of Croton, a Pythagorean of the sixth century B.C., did careful dissection and seems to have been the first to suggest that perception, thought and feeling were the work of the *psyché* (pp. 71-76, 115). Thus was marked the beginning of the fusion of *thymos* and *psyché* which characterized later philosophers but not without many disputes pro and con. Old ideas have a habit of persisting. In the *Timaeus* Plato illustrates the uncertainty concerning the *psyché*, which first is regarded as an entity located in the head and surviving death, but also possessed of a mortal part located in the chest; thus it is definitely united with *thymos*. Later the older concept obtains and the *psyché* is a seed of life rooted in the marrow as well as in the head and spine and "breathing" through the genitals.

The Latin words fairly equivalent to *psyche* are *anima* and *genius*. A group of illustrations from Jewish, Persian and Germanic sources indicate a conception of the soul similar to that in Greek and Latin sources, thus supporting the thesis of the community of fundamental beliefs of early Greece and Italy with Germanic, Celtic and others already current in the Old Stone Age (p. 1).

4. *Pneuma* was the breath by which the lungs functioned for contact with the environing world and with other organs of the body. One might "breathe in" information, or it might be "breathed into" him. The gods frequently communicated by breathing. Because seeing and hearing were interpreted as reception of a vapour from an object and communication of it to the *phrenes*, the communication became an actual possession of the breath.

Many biblical passages are discussed by way of indicating the similarity of Jewish psychology with the Greek, but little is said about the Christian use of *pneuma*, which is said to be "more complex" (p. 51).

The study would illuminate the mistranlation of *pneuma* by *wind* (John 3:8) in the Authorized version and its varied successors, and the further mistranlation of *pneō* as *blow*. (Even Ronald Knox reveals his early background by forsaking the more accurate and more intelligent translation of the Douay Version.) Prof. Onians could make a genuine contribution to students of historic Christian doctrine, which commenced with the acceptance of the union of *thymos* and *psychē*, but passed slowly to the further union with *pneuma*, thus regarding man as dichotomous. Even today, however, one finds adherents to trichotomy who are a bit non-plussed to explain the difference between soul and spirit.

##### 5. *Hēpar*, the liver.

*Cholos* (usually translated *wrath*) and *Cholē* (bile) appear as variant forms of the same root, referring to the secretion of the liver, always active in emotional disturbances, especially in anger. In Homer the *Cholē* was thought of as penetrating the heart and lungs, the emotional organs, via the blood, in which the liver abounded, and therefore affecting the *thymos*. Not only did blood pass from the liver to the chest but it also passed in the reverse direction. The *phrenes* could therefore send breath and *thymos* to the liver. "It would seem that the liver thus came to be regarded as the inmost spring of the deeper emotions, stirred only by powerful stimuli" (p. 85).

##### 6. *Thelos*.

One of the most suggestive chapters of the whole book is the last of Part III (pp. 426-66), which shows the totally unsatisfactory interpretation of *telos* as abstractly denoting the idea of completion or perfection, and thus leaving unexplained such phrases as the *telos* of war, the *telos* of death covering the eyes and nostrils, and *telos* as a crown of happiness. In the preceding chapters is discussed the whole question of Fate under the image of spinning. The spindle rested on the knees, in the lap, of the spinner who drew the wool from a basket at his left and fixed the pattern by successive knots (*peirata*).

The events of the life of each mortal were regarded as spun by the gods or the fates. Inescapable events were fixed by successive *peirata*, which were not produced by tying the ends of two long ropes together, but were the knots which fixed the pattern. The finished product was a *telos* or a band fastened about the head of each man, thus binding him to his fate inescapably. The root meaning seems to be *fixed* or *bound*. Thus Pindar (Nem. vii:56) can say, "For one to win complete happiness and take it for himself is impossible. I cannot say to whom Fate

has offered this sure *telos*." One can easily see how the root could develop to connote finality or purpose or ultimate issue, but the root idea was based upon inevitability.

An illustration of this may be seen in *ateles* and *ateleia*, often translated as *immune* and *immunability*. Certain persons were *ateles* from taxes, which were not as inevitable for them as for others. We can easily understand how *telos* came to denote the primary object to which determined persons were devoted, thus connoting both purpose and ultimate achievement, both of which are still described by the word *end*, and continued in our phrase *bounden duty*.

The adjective *teleios* would be applicable to a person who had a definite and determined purpose and could or would not deviate from it. In its best known and most quoted use (Matthew 5:48) this word is translated by the colourless word *perfect*, plainly under the influence of the Latin *perfecti*, and is made the equivalent of *sinless*. The context shows that the connotation was not abstract but that it described God as loving men whether they were friends or enemies and giving his sun to the good and the evil alike, and his rain to the just and the unjust alike. Thus he was not like men and swayed from his purpose by the friendly or the inimical attitude of others. Thus he is *teleios* and presents a vigorous, practicable pattern for men to try to duplicate. Col. 3:14 gives the interesting instance of *agape* as the *sundesmos tēs teleiōtētos*, "the companion slave of 'boundness.'" Since the peculiarity of *agape* is that it is an act of the will, we can see here a threefold emphasis upon devotion either to people or to ideals, or even to God.

These instances are suggested to illustrate how much Prof. Onians's study can contribute to biblical and theological interpretation. He indicates a few instances in which his conclusions may affect theological thinking but, as a philologist, he does not assume the role of a theologian; he contents himself with pointing out the influence which might be expected from the facts presented.



## BOOK REVIEWS

*Theology and Reality.* By W. Norman Pittenger. Seabury Press, 1955. pp. ix + 235. \$3.25.

This is a work in apologetics, not a system of moral theology or philosophical theology. Although apologetic thought has been developed much more by Rome and Constantinople than by Canterbury, yet the Anglican is well suited to this task because his mind has been much more concerned with the impact of modern science, anthropology, philosophy and psychology than have the Roman and Eastern Churches. We were the Church which first felt the impact of Newton and Darwin on Christian thought because these movements were to all intents developed within our own communion and we were, therefore, the first to see the implications of the new physics and the new biology for the Christian thought. The same is true of anthropology, which was utilized early and well by Anglican thinkers.

Dr. Pittenger has set as his task the restatement of Catholic theology in terms of modern thought. He knows that the modern man thinks in terms of the thought of this age. He thinks in terms of postulates of thought applied to experience rather than of Newtonian analysis. He thinks in terms of economics and sociology rather than of the balance of ethical rights and duties. He thinks of function rather than substance, of pragmatism and instrumentalism rather than of eternal hierarchical law.

These are the concepts which Dr. Pittenger uses. There are modern conceptions which he does not use. He avoids Logical Positivism and Marxism. He also repudiates the modern revivals of ancient philosophical systems, such as Neo-Platonism and Neo-Thomism. And like the William Temple of *Foundations*, who restated historic theology in terms of Bosanquet and Croce rather than the Oxford Aristotelianism of Thomas Case and Cook Wilson, Pittenger has restated theology in terms of realistic epistemology, emergent evolution and functionalism rather than in terms of the current Neo-Platonism and Neo-Thomism.

What are the striking characteristics of Dr. Pittenger's Catholic theology written in terms of the "new" philosophy and the "new" scientific method? They are stimulating and most interesting. First, Dr. Pittenger asserts that the Christian revelation is true for faith and in faith. It does not depend upon a foundation of science or of philosophy. It

stands in its own right for the Christian community, although it must be thought out in terms of the modern world, if it is to have meaning or intellectual relevance. Yet its own validity does not depend on the other aspects of experience than Christian experience. It is not however completely cut off from other experience, and can be expressed in intellectual and cultural terms of this age. This is a postulational method based on religious experience.

Second, the Incarnation should be expressed in terms of an emergence within the world rather than an intrusion from without. The older substantival view with its doctrine of fixed genera and the rigidity of the human type as type made an intrusion from without necessary in classical Christology. Here Dr. Pittenger differs from another theologian who has attempted to rewrite Christology in terms of modern philosophy. Dr. Thornton really preserves the formal elements of the older Christology but uses Whitehead's language to express it. Actually, Father Thornton's *Incarnate Lord* would be clearer if it were written in terms of the traditional Aristotelian Neo-Platonic metaphysics. But Dr. Pittenger, in the spirit of Archbishop William Temple, rewrites Christology in new terms. Both Temple and Pittenger dislike the ancient thought scheme of substance and fixed genera; and each in his own way writes a modern Christology in terms of modern thought. The Pittenger concept is emergence.

The Eucharist is given an instrumental interpretation, and by instrumental Dr. Pittenger does not mean the term instrument is used in quite the sense of Hooker and St. Thomas. It is closer to the virtualism of the seventeenth century divines. Yet it is not the same, because the older concepts are done away and behold, all things are made new!

This type of apologetics is rich and interesting and unafraid of the general character of what it considers modern thought. Its power of persuasion is great because it speaks forth a message as new and as contemporary as a diesel locomotive or a jet-bomber. Of course, the method is such that there must be a constant change in theology as thought moulds change. Every such book of apologetics is inevitably dated, and it intends to be dated, for that is its value and its ideal.

There is a matter of which our author seems unconscious, yet it is important to the success of his apologetics. He thinks that the philosophical principles he uses are the general assumptions of all contemporary philosophy. In that assumption I believe he is wrong, for contemporary philosophies have not that much community of thought.

What our author has done is by implication to develop a philosophy of his own in terms of which he expounds Christianity, rather than to express his theology in terms of modern philosophy in general. For that reason, his exposition has a coherence and relevance it would otherwise lack. He has wrought better than he knew, and has wrought well. His positive philosophy gives his apologetics a positive and convincing character.

JOHN S. MARSHALL

*Man's Knowledge of God*, by William J. Wolf. Doubleday & Co. (Christian Faith Series). 1955. pp. 189. \$2.95.

"Man's Knowledge of God" is really a study of the meaning and process of revelation within the Christian tradition. While much of the material with which the book necessarily deals has been covered many times by other writers, here is a well-organized, clear and systematic presentation well worth reading.

Dr. Wolf, professor of Theology and the Philosophy of Religion at the Episcopal Theological Seminary, Cambridge, Mass., himself represents a position which might be described as a working synthesis between the best in the liberal Protestant heritage and modern Biblical theology.

The thesis of the book is simply this: Jesus Christ is the center of Christian revelation, which is something which can only be appreciated from within the Christian community which always sees it as the interpretation of history. To be sure, revelation is not esoteric. The Christian community is constantly under the imperative to interpret its faith to the world.

The theme of the book might be stated by two relevant quotations: "In my appropriation of the dramatic saving events of the Bible, I meet not a doctrine about God, not a special type of religious experience, although these are secondary products of the encounter, but I meet God himself. I meet him, moreover, in the person of Christ, which is perhaps another way of saying that God so valued personal relationships that he sent not a law, not a prophet, nor a special rite, although all these are in the background. But he came himself." (p. 83). "Revelation then is not the extension of our knowledge but the painful transformation of our ideas and attitudes" (p. 102).

Revelation, says Dr. Wolf, occurs within "existential history," involving personal openness in a world of personal relationships. Into this setting comes Jesus Christ, the result of the divine revelatory initiative, and the result is the transformation of those with whom he comes

into decisive contact. But this revelation needs continual interpretation by the believing community—"Christ left not a book but a fellowship."

Of great value in this book is Dr. Wolf's restatement and interpretation of the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity, both of which are looked at in terms of revelation transforming the believing community.

The book concludes with three interesting chapters, the first of which is the only really difficult reading in the volume. It deals with "Revelation and Reason" on the basis of restating the classical ontological argument. This chapter is followed by a valuable section on "Jesus Christ and the World Religions", and then the book concludes with a chapter on application of the thesis to the modern situation.

This reviewer recommends Dr. Wolf's study to readers who are concerned about the meaning of "knowledge of God" in terms of mainstream Christian teaching.

CHARLES D. KEAN

*Grundriss der Ethik.* By Paul Althaus. Gutersloh: Bertelsmann, second ed. 1953. pp. 175.

This preface to Christian Ethics is the reworking of a book which first appeared in 1928 under the title, *Leitsätze zur Ethik* (Theses on Ethics). The author, a veteran evangelical theologian, made use of the war years to sharpen his thinking on moral issues. The result is an incisive work. A thorough cross-indexing gives the treatise an admirable unity and enables it to be used truly as a handbook.

The author insists upon a religious basis for ethics if there is to be a moral seriousness. In the religious experience man receives the command of God which demands unconditional obedience. The will of God comes to man, as it were, from "outside" himself, but it binds him inwardly in the conscience. Man recognizes this as unquestionable and knows the will of God in a trinitarian way: (1) by regard for God's creation and rule (which place man in his situation); (2) by the light of the revelation of God in Christ as given in the Holy Scriptures; and (3) by the Spirit-taught conscience.

The Christian life unfolds in worship and in service to men. Prayer is the way to a living knowledge of God, and to life with Him. Community with God, which He commands, requires faith, hope and love. Man lives in society, has vocation therein through the place "given" by the Creator. (This is a phase of God's creative work). There must

be reverence for this God-given existence in care for the body, in work and leisure, in marriage relationships, etc. We also have a call to suffer with Christ, but such suffering is not without joy, dignity and hope. We are bound by God to each other in responsibility; but we are in a real sense free from each other because God only is to be obeyed. This dialectical problem is resolved in love of our neighbor, for in this we obey God.

The life of the Christian in the order of society occupies the last part of the book. The author deals with the modern problems of love and marriage, the unmarried in relationships between the sexes, nationality and race, the state and politics, and economics. In this section, as well as in a preceding chapter on culture, Dr. Althaus gives principles from which decisions can be made, although he is deeply sensible of the difficulty of these decisions. But in this book there is guidance. It is a wise book.

When the reader lays this book down he may recall the statement of Kierkegaard, that ethics leads to despair. And so it does, if there is no forgiveness of God in Christ. The reader may then pick up the book again to read the beautiful section on forgiveness.

WALLACE I. WOLVERTON

*A Layman's Guide to Protestant Theology.* By William Horden. Macmillan. 1955. pp. viii + 222. \$3.50.

Working with the "conviction that there is a need for the Protestant laity to do more creative thinking about theology," but recognizing that the field presents many technical difficulties, Dr. Horden, Assistant Professor of Religion at Swarthmore, has written a book intended to "help the layman to discover what is going on in theology." He begins with two chapters which review the formation of systematic theology from the New Testament through the Reformation, and the growth of threats and oppositions to the orthodox traditions. The major schools of modern theological thought are then described: fundamentalism, with sympathetic analysis of the ideas of Machen and Carnell; liberalism, outlining its history and its branches (humanism, empiricism, personalism, etc.) with a chapter on "the remaking of liberalism"; and finally, in the larger portion of the book, the varieties of the new orthodoxies, with outlines of the thought of Kierkegaard, Barth, Brunner, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Tillich. A chapter on "modern orthodoxy", with which he identifies himself, includes discussions of Temple, Richardson,

Donald Baillie, and Aulen. A list of books for further reading is given, although he has deliberately avoided completeness of biographies or bibliographies, intending his work to be a guide to types of theology, not to modern theologians. A useful book for the layman who is aware of the confusion of modern theological positions, and willing to take the first steps toward serious reading, and also helpful for the clergy who have not had time to "keep up" with recent debates. It is not, however, a first book for the theologically illiterate.

CLEMENT WELSH

*Faith Active in Love, An Investigation of the Principles Underlying Luther's Social Ethics.* By George W. Forell. The American Press, 1954. pp. viii + 198. \$3.75.

This book grows out of the conviction that Luther's social ethic is inextricably involved in his whole approach and understanding of theology. The author is right in pointing out how often this connection is ignored or denied by even the most eminent authorities writing about Luther. He might well have cited a passage in a recent book of Barbara Ward's, *Faith and Freedom*, where the astonishing statement is made: "The Luther view opened a chasm between the inner life of the soul where salvation might be achieved and the outer secular world in which, since no religious restraints or institutional checks were to be allowed to work, men would be left to the temptations and violence of their own desires." (Page 107). It would be hard to do more injustice to Luther than this passage does. Professor Forell cites Luther himself to the effect that "Faith brings you to Christ and makes Him your own with all that He has; Love gives you to your neighbor with all that you have." (Page 101). Luther's lack of system in his social ethics is notorious, but Forell insists that it grew out of a lively sense of the dynamic character of life and a suspicion of any attempt to make the Gospel a law. Much of the ground covered by Forell in dealing with Luther's basic ethical concepts will be familiar to readers of Anders Nygren's *Agape and Eros* or Paul Ramsey's *Basic Christian Ethics*.

At some points Professor Forell's ingenuity will intrigue even when it falls very far short of convincing. To the familiar criticism that Luther held a generally static view of society, Forell answers by citing his treatment of the "hero" theme in the Old Testament: "Acting under the influence of special divine guidance, these men are used by God to bring about the necessary changes of the existing political and



social conditions." (P. 136). But this strain in Luther is rendered less impressive by his insistence that the ordinary man must "remain under the common laws unless we have a special calling or a heroic inspiration. . . . Ordinary persons must be distinguished from heroic persons." (P. 138, fn.n 71). Obviously Luther did not believe that the peasants who rose in rebellion in 1524-25 could claim the prerogatives of the hero, for his famous injunction *Against the Murderous and Thieving Hordes of Peasants* includes the words: "nothing can be more poisonous, hurtful or devilish than a rebel." Especially interesting is Forell's insistence upon the important influence of Luther's eschatology upon his social and political thinking.

Although not wholly reliable by itself, this is an important and useful contribution to Luther studies, made more so by a generous use of citations from Luther's own words—which can sometimes be used to correct the author's own bias!

JOHN M. KRUMM

*Ultimate Questions.* By Nathaniel Micklem. Abingdon, 1955. pp. 136. \$2.00.

Dr. Micklem has defined the nature of his book in the Preface: "I have long puzzled over the proper title for this book. I have hit upon several appropriate but improper titles, such as 'The Last Thoughts of a Discontented Theologian,' or 'The Regrettable Bankruptcy of Traditional Theology,' or even, least satisfactory but most appropriate, 'Who Was This Man?'" For, as I see it, the real theme of the book, after a preliminary uncluttering, is the inescapable question put to the modern, serious, educated man by the enigmatic figure of Jesus of Nazareth, as I understand sober historical inquiry to present him to our consideration. I surmise that the varying forms of orthodoxy, each after its kind, will be shocked at much that I have written. In shocking them I take no pleasure. But after many long years given to religious and theological study I understand so well why many serious and not irreligious minds are alienated from the Christian faith." This understanding dominates the book, but Dr. Micklem need make no apology for it. By honestly admitting the ignorances and difficulties of the theologians, he has opened to fresh consideration the central mysteries, removing much of the atmosphere of smug certainty which offends the secular minds to whom he speaks. He will shock few orthodox Anglicans. With every admission of ignorance, he heightens our sense of the reality which the theologians are attempting to describe,

and as a result, he has written a book to give to the cynic, the sceptic, and the wavering. Through it there speaks with clarity and distinction a mind infused with a devout and learned imagination. Since so many books written in the field of apologetics are suicidally dull, it is a pleasure to find one that exhibits humor, grace, and an attractive frankness.

The book presents the Cole Lectures "substantially as they were delivered" at Vanderbilt University in the spring of 1954.

CLEMENT WELSH

*The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas.* Trans. by Yves R. Simon, John J. Glanville, and G. Donald Hollenhorst. University of Chicago Press, 1955. pp. xxxiv + 638. \$10.00.

This is the latest in the series of Chicago Editions which seeks to make available in readable English translation classical philosophical works which have hitherto been unobtainable for one reason or another. There can be no doubt about this being a classical text, and, as such, there can be no problematic aspect to a reviewer's decision heartily to recommend the work. Because of the wealth of material contained in the volume, a problem may arise, however, in deciding on just what grounds to recommend the book to specific groups. As dealing with "material" rather than with "formal" logic the issues and implications of the subject matter are among the most vital which exist today, for the concern of the author in this treatise is not just formal *consistency* in thought, but full and decisive *truth*. Such problems are treated as the nature and types of demonstration, the nature of universals and abstraction, analogy, explanation, certainty, opinion, belief, and the relations of the sciences to external reality and to each other.

For readers of this *Review* whose interest is apologetics there can be no doubt of the direct applicability of this work to, and its importance for, their study. Those interested in either systematic or historical theology will find the book enlightening in its illustrations from, and background for, those fields. Those whose interests lie in the fields of logic and metaphysics as debated today will have at their command a work described by Professor Henry Veatch in his *Intentional Logic* (after he has acknowledged his own indebtedness to it) as "very rich but sadly neglected." Jacques Maritain, in the Preface of the present volume, describes John of St. Thomas as "among the greatest metaphysicians who ever existed," and as "the latest and most mature of the

geniuses who explained St. Thomas." There can be no doubt that the accessibility of John of St. Thomas to English-speaking readers has been inversely proportional to his importance.

Briefly, John of St. Thomas was a Spanish Dominican, a contemporary of Descartes, who lived from 1589 to 1644. This translation is based on the Reiser edition of the three volume *Cursus Philosophicus* and consists of most of the second part of the first volume, the *Ars Logica*. This portion of the text reaches its efflorescence in the commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*. The selection of Questions to be translated is sound, and the presence of omissions does not in any way effect the feeling of unity in the work as a whole. The translation itself is very good and often clarifies—as well as simplifies—the latin original. In a technical work such as this literalness of translation is often an advantage. Thus it is that *rationis ratiocinatae* and *rationis ratiocinantis* are translated as "of reasoned reason" and "of reasoning reason" respectively. In these cases, however, it would seem that departure from literalism would be an advantage and that the freer translation of "of the reason of the thing reasoned" and "of reason reasoning" would be a more significant and intelligible translation for the English mind. It might well be added here that both the Preface and footnotes are generally elucidating to an extremely high degree. The book is printed in the varitype manner.

Because of the great bulk, complexity, and technicality of this book, one service which the reviewer may perform is to give some highlights of its contents with specific page references. This may aid in preventing stylistic difficulties from obscuring perceptive contents. It should be mentioned in addition that these selections often have been made with the interests of contemporary readers in view rather than the strict purposes of John of St. Thomas.

Sections on the nature of logic make a direct and salutary contribution to contemporary polemics on the subject by showing that formal and material logic (nowadays approximated in the logical arts of syntax and semantics) cannot properly be treated as two completely disparate disciplines. A justification of the independence of logic from psychology is also furnished. (Cf. pp. 41 and 60). The treatment of the notion of "negation" in intellection (p. 66) is enlightening, as is the interesting discussion on the distinction of the attributes of God (pp. 77, 80, 84, 173). The discussion of the relation of universals to the singularity of individuals (pp. 102 ff.) is important; and there is a

splendid summary of analogy following the exposition of Cajetan (pp. 152 ff.).

As signs of the times in which John of St. Thomas wrote, one often finds what are to us telling theological insights incidentally mentioned by way of illustrating logical or metaphysical points. Thus it is that in discussing *substance* one finds illustrations from Christology; *quantity* leads to Eucharistic illustrations; *relation* to Trinitarian examples; *quality* to Grace and the Sacraments as examples.

The concluding four Questions of the book concern Demonstration and Science. This whole section has much of value for our age. As attention-calling examples, the following topics may be mentioned. An examination of demonstrations of existence as against demonstrations of nature is made, with illuminating references concerning the relation of metaphysics to theology. (Cf. pp. 445 and 569.) Since demonstration properly can be applied only to the essential properties of genera or *kinds* (cf. p. 484) the relation of demonstration to the attributes of the *singular* God is indicated on page 465. This is a living problem for much contemporary philosophy of religion. The traditional Western treatment of the relations of certitude to doubt in faith and opinion is briefly and clearly indicated on pages 528 f.

ARTHUR A. VOGEL

*The Meaning of the Creative Act*, by Nicholas Berdyaev. Translated by Donald A. Lowrie. Harper and Brothers, 1955. pp. 7-337. \$4.00.

*The Meaning of the Creative Act* is, of course, not a new book or even a posthumous publication. It is one of Berdyaev's earliest works, written while he was exiled in Siberia and first published in 1914. The author was often urged to revise and reissue this work in Russian but never did so. The present translation is unchanged from the original text except for minor revisions authorized for the German edition published in 1927. The translator has collated the Russian and German texts to present an English edition of what was authorized at the later date. We have, then, one of Berdyaev's early works, which he claimed as the foundation for much of his later writing, presented for the first time in English.

Berdyaev presents his thoughts on the meaning of the creative act in an act of ecstatic creativity of his own. This is very obvious even in translation and gives this book a quality quite different from some of his later works which have become so well known. The driving

power of the author's own creativity is rooted in his clear insight into the crisis of world culture. This crisis results from the failure of secular humanism and the bankruptcy of traditional Christianity in the face of the shattering problems raised by this failure. The world is moving toward a new age, a new and final revelation which will overcome the split experienced in the old world in an age of freedom and creativity. This is epochal writing. The old ages of the law and redemption, of Father and Son, pass into the new age of freedom and creativity, of the Spirit. The law and redemption function in the realm of necessity, of unfreedom. Traditional ascetic Christianity has been an adaptation to the necessity of the "world". It has served as a necessary step but the redemption is negative; it places upon man the burden of the consequences of sin. Evil is justified as man compromises with it and is content to war against it to minimize its effects. There is in redemption no flight of the Spirit although the experience prepares for the age of creativity by the restoration of man's freedom. "The world has not yet seen a religious epoch of creativeness" as the final age is just breaking in. This new age is beyond the redemption, it is a "third revelation which goes "beyond the borders of the Old and New Testaments". The New Testament is wisely silent about creativeness because creativity is truly free and unlimited by God in the law and redemption. Creativity, the new age of freedom in the "eighth day of creation", is an anthropological revelation of man's full powers as partaking of divine creativity. It is an immanent revelation of the Absolute Man as man discovers his true Image of God in triumphant free creativity.

The exposition of the author's thesis is ordered and coherent. The first three chapters set out the problem in a critical analysis of modern philosophical and religious assumptions. The first chapter, one of the most stimulating in the book, attacks philosophy governed by the spirit of the "scientific" shows it to be caught in necessity and adaptation to the given world. It is the philosophy of obedience, "a philosophy of sin," culminating in Kant and modern positivism. The central difficulty is in an objectified and mechanized view of man which is basic to "scientific" philosophy. The second chapter deals with this problem and the third struggles with the consequences of modern epistemology and anthropology in Christian thought. Christianity is either terribly distorted or reduced to the logic of sin. The creative aspect of the Gospel is held captive by traditional Christian conceptions. The next three chapters review much the same ground presenting positively Berdyaev's own views. His call for creative philosophy and anthro-

pology leads him to a discussion of his own existentialist personalism. Creativity is the heart of being and the ground of man's freedom, and creativity is the culmination of religious maturity. "The final, ultimate freedom, the daring of freedom and the burden of freedom, is the virtue of religious maturity." The remaining chapters work out the concept of creativity in the various areas of cultural and religious life, first pointing out the breakdown of old conceptions of life which have held men in bondage and sin, and then leading on to the new era of freedom. These include chapters on genius, marriage and the family, art, ethics and society. The chapter on sex is difficult and often mystifying, with the strange concept of the "androgynous." The final chapter is a summary in terms of the three epochs and a broad cultural analysis of the part played by various cultural strains leading to the culmination of the creative religious epoch in the transformation to a Johannine Church of love.

There is in this work one great difficulty. It is the problem of Berdyaev's dualistic "other-worldliness" which turns on itself and becomes strangely immanent. It is beyond logic, as the author accepts both head and heart. "I confess an almost manichaean dualism." "And I also confess an almost pantheistic monism". The result is a creative struggle to bring together under the Orthodox emphasis on the Spirit and the triumphant, reigning Christ. This is an emphasis much needed and very stimulating to the mind schooled in Western Christianity. There is nevertheless a haunting dualism which is never really overcome and expresses itself in ideas of a "cosmic" fall, of "evil multiplicity," and a negative attitude toward "materiality." This, however, does not seem to be the major difficulty. The most puzzling aspect of the book, yet one of the most interesting, is the separation of the creative religious epoch from the revelation in Christ. Berdyaev is speaking of a new revelation, an eighth day, a going beyond into a realm that seems cut off from the Christian God. There is a "deficiency of the Christian New Testament revelation". Yet love, not creativity or freedom, is the governing action of God in Christ as Berdyaev recognizes in his chapter on ethics and states boldly in an earlier chapter. "Love is the content of freedom, love is the freedom of the new Adam." Creativity and freedom contained by Love are not beyond the message of God in Christ but are at its heart. Creativity and redemption are inter-related paradoxically, and not steps or stages in a straight line. Berdyaev's creativeness always hangs in the air, nothing can be said about it except in ecstatic expectation. His eschatological outlook is futuristic and not transcen-



dent, related to all times and to all life. As a result Christianity becomes too much and too little; we hope for too much and live by too little. There are times and seasons and we must recognize them. History moves and presents its crises. But the meaning it bears for the Christian was given in the middle, in the fulness of time, and Christ fills all ends and all beginnings. In Berdyaev this sometimes seems all but forgotten.

This book sparkles with insight and with the author's own creative spirit. The reader will be greatly enriched and rewarded despite the puzzle of Berdyaev's ultimate viewpoint and its sometimes strange consequences. The message is one much needed in a time when the modern religious revival too often shows us nothing except the burden of our sins. The book has the further advantage of being quite free of Berdyaev's brooding Russian messianism and provides a basis for understanding much of the author's later writing. This is a book which takes a rightful place among the basic literature in the current theological scene and its publication for the English world is welcome indeed.

JOHN J. HAMEL, III

*A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Amos.* By Richard S. Cripps. S.P.C.K., 1955. pp. xlii — 365. 25s.

This is the second edition of a work which appeared first in 1929. The author died while the revised edition was going through the press. There is an occasional change in the text of the first edition. The exigencies of publication kept the changes to a minimum and the revision consists almost entirely in the addition of a new preface of forty pages where the progress of biblical studies in the past quarter century are taken into account. This is somewhat scrappy and the supplementary bibliography is incomplete. In the 1929 bibliography mention was made of Peake's commentary, but Gore and Abingdon, not to speak of more recent works, are not mentioned. The treatments of Morgenstern and Bewer are noted, but these are the only American scholars listed for the interim period.

On one point at least Mr. Cripps seems to have modified the position taken in the earlier edition. Previously he held that Amos regarded the sacrificial system as unnecessary and could contemplate its abolition without misgivings. In the 1955 Preface, influenced by the writings of such scholars as Welch, H. W. Robinson and Rowley, he feels that Amos was far less radical than to preach complete abolition. Amos

5:25, the crucial passage, is probably out of context and spoken partly playfully.

On another point Mr. Cripps is not clear. In his first edition he leaned to the viewpoint that Amos composed the book substantially as we have it. In the 1955 edition he cites those who regard the original oracles as quite brief and their literary connections abrupt. He refers to the Scandinavian school with its theory of a long period of oral transmission. He closes the discussion however by citing with approval the opinion of Van der Ploeg. The latter argues that since the prophetic oracles were regarded as *words of God* this "makes it *a priori* very improbable that they were transmitted orally from generation to generation without people taking the trouble to put them into writing." I wonder what Papias with his preference for the living and abiding voice would say to that. There is more to be said for the theory of brief oracles, orally transmitted, than the author would admit.

On still a third point Mr. Cripps retains his former position, continuing to date the prophet's ministry 742-741, a decade later than the usually accepted date. His prophetic activity, although not confined to Bethel, could not have lasted more than a year.

The first edition of the commentary was a comprehensive treatment of the Book of Amos, the man and the world situation behind it. Its introduction took up the usual historical, theological and literary questions with particular attention to the eschatological views of Gressmann. In the opinion of this reviewer, Mr. Cripps's treatment is sane and judicious. For him Amos is mainly concerned with the immediate, political menace of Assyria.

In addition to the Introduction and the usual commentary on the text, the 1929 edition had an extensive appendix of "Additional Notes" of a more technical nature and a final section of "Excursuses". To all of this has been added the 1955 Preface! This makes for an unwieldy treatment. Somewhere in the book almost every question relative to Amos is discussed in the light of the relevant literature although it is often difficult to find the passage. For example, the secondary character of 1:2 is mentioned on p. 115 but that of 1:9, 10 on p. 282. Indeed, it does seem that the literary problems could have been treated at greater length. They are dismissed with two pages in the Introduction.

The book would have been improved by a thorough revision, an omission of the over-long discussion on points no longer of primary interest and a greater attention paid to more recent research. In his 1955 Pre-

face, Mr. Cripps refers to the necessity of adding theology to exegesis and application to interpretation. In spite of his cumbersome form, his Commentary does lay the groundwork for a critical study of the book of Amos and is to be recommended for that purpose. It is our loss that he did not live to accomplish his second objective and show the relevance of Amos for our age or incorporate such a study in the present volume.

CORWIN C. ROACH

*From Faith to Faith: Essays on Old Testament Literature.* By B. Davie Napier. Harper, 1955. pp. ix + 223.

Present-day Old Testament studies, as opposed to criticism of an earlier era, tend to emphasize the meaning of the Scriptures as a unity rather than that of their several constituent parts in isolation. The work of editors is seen as a creative thing, transcending the multiplicity of points of view in the various sources, and the tendency is to interpret the Old Testament in terms of its major, recurrent themes. It is a concern to point up the unity of these themes in various types of Old Testament literature that informs this excellent book by an associate professor in Yale University.

In the five chapters of the book examples of myth, legend, history, prophecy and law are selected from the Old Testament, and treated so as to show the common theological presuppositions that underlie such varying literary types. The author sounds his keynote in the preface: "From faith the literature in all of its types came into being. To faith it is all addressed. From myth to law, Old Testament literature deals centrally with the same concepts of faith, such concepts as Creation, Sin, Judgement, Covenant and Redemption. As different from one another as are these varied literary types *as literature*, they are remarkably unified in the common history and faith of the community of Israel." (p. ix). All this is ably and interestingly elucidated in terms of the myths of the beginnings of man, the legends of the patriarchs, the history of the kingdom, the prophetic message of Isaiah and the legal codes of ancient Israel.

The book thus makes available in English a type of study of the Old Testament that prevails at present in Europe, particularly the approach of Gerhard von Rad. As such it is a valuable addition to the resources for Old Testament study in colleges and seminaries, and it is so written that it may also be used in teaching adults what the Old Testament as a whole is really all about.

Some questions do, however, come to mind. It is easily possible, when the unity of the Old Testament is being emphasized, to underrate the problems faced by the older school of criticism and to undervalue the results of that school. For example, Napier is reluctant to ascribe chronological priority to either of the sources in the accounts in I Samuel of the founding of the kingdom (pp. 109-110), preferring to see them as different views of the matter which may well "reflect opposing *contemporaneous* interpretations." Certainly earlier critics were not too overly logical in drawing certain obvious conclusions from the fact that Samuel simply could not have been *both* a little-known seer in a small village who found lost asses for half a shekel *and* one who was known and followed and obeyed by "all Israel". The present-day understanding of the unity of the biblical themes, of which Napier's book is an excellent example, has been made possible by penetrating literary and historical analysis, and it can undermine the foundation on which it is built if it is nonchalant or truculent in a refusal to face up to literary and historical problems.

All this is only an important minor qualification of the recommendation of a book that should be welcomed by all concerned about the real "message" of the Old Testament.

HARVEY H. GUTHRIE, JR.

*The Messianic Idea in Israel From Its Beginning to the Completion of the M'shuah.*  
By Joseph Klausner. Translated from the third Hebrew edition by W. F. Stinespring. Macmillan, 1955. pp. vii + 543. \$7.50.

Judged by the usual standards, this is a lengthy book. The author speaks of his "extensive and difficult labor" on this project, and the book bears him out.

Part One, though entitled "the Messianic idea in the period of the prophets", is a 240 page treatment of the dominant notes of this theme from Genesis through the Maccabaeon Psalms. Part Two examines at length the Messianic idea as it is found in fourteen books of the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha. Part Three covers the period of the Tannaim, but treats the theme by topics instead of by literary groups. A general survey is given at the end of each of the first two sections, and an appendix to the book contrasts the Jewish with the Christian Messiah.

Klausner renders faithful service to the reader by setting up three categories into which the Messianic ideas indicated by this complex of Scriptures may be grouped. First, he draws a distinction between vague

Messianic expectation and explicit belief in a personal Messiah. The former is "the prophetic hope for the end of this age, in which there will be political freedom, moral perfection, and earthly bliss for the people Israel in its own land, and also for the entire human race." The Messianic passages in Amos illustrate this concept. The more specific form is "the prophetic hope for the end of this age, in which a strong redeemer, by his power and his spirit, will bring complete redemption, political and spiritual, to the people Israel, and along with this, earthly bliss and moral perfection to the entire human race." The Messianic passages in Hosea and Isaiah illustrate this concept.

The second category marked by Klausner distinguishes between the figure of a national-political Messiah and an ethical-spiritual Messiah. The first is expressed in terms of material prosperity and earthly bliss for the Jews; the second includes also the spiritual weal of all peoples. Among the canonical prophets some emphasizing the former concept are Amos, Micah, Obadiah, Haggai, and Joel; the latter, First and Second Isaiah, Jeremiah, First and Second Zechariah. Klausner points out that the ideal Jewish Messiah is, therefore, a composite figure, joining the politico-worldly virtues of the king with the ethico-spiritual virtues of the prophet. But under the historical exigences of the later Jewish period this dualism resolved itself in the creation of a two-fold Messiah: "*Messiah ben Joseph*, an earthly Messiah who fights against Gog and Magog and falls in battle; and *Messiah ben David*, a spiritual Messiah, who prepares the world for the Kingdom of God."

The third category features what Klausner calls the "Messianic chain". In the prophetic corpus the main links in this Messianic chain of causes and effects are sin, punishment, repentance, and redemption. Although all four elements are not found in each prophet or, even when they are, not with equal stress, these are its distinctive marks. During the time of the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha the complete chain was hammered into shape with twelve links, found also in the Talmudic-Midrashic literature: "the signs of the Messiah, the birth-pangs of Messiah, the coming of Elijah, the trumpet of Messiah, the ingathering of the exiles, the reception of proselytes, the war with Gog and Magog, the Days of the Messiah, the renovation of the world, the Day of Judgment, the resurrection of the dead, the World to Come."

Further, when dealing with the evolution of the Messianic idea in Israel's history during the Old Testament period, Klausner very helpfully calls attention to certain vacillations in the process (p. 242f.) and when dealing with the Tannaitic period makes a judicious distinction

between the Days of the Messiah and the World to Come (p. 408ff.). By delineating such categories Klausner materially aids the reader to find his way more clearly in this vast field.

In the province of literary criticism Klausner occupies a position well to the right of center. Occasionally he agrees with the majority of modern critics: for instance, he excludes chapters 13-14, 24-27, 34-35, and 40-66 from the work of Isaiah of Jerusalem; makes a division between Zechariah 1-8 and 9-14; maintains that most of the Psalms were written in the Persian period, some in the Greek, and for some even down to Hasmonean times; and argues persuasively for a Maccabean date for Daniel. However, he holds to Amos 9:8-15 and Hosea 3:4-5 and the "consolation passages" in Micah and Zephaniah as genuine, while merely stating that the case now largely made against some of them is "unproved and unnecessary" (p. 84) or "something which the mind cannot endure" (p. 136). He holds to the essential unity of Zechariah and Daniel by suggesting that the first parts were written by the respective authors in their youth, the latter in their old age.

Again, judged by the usual standards, this is an old book. Neither the author nor the translator withholds this information from the reader, though the publisher's dust-jacket does. The first part was composed between 1903 and 1908, the second part in 1921, and the third in 1902. But the author claims to "have incorporated all the copious material on this subject" which reached his hands up to 1927 and to "have taken into account the new opinions and have called attention to the new works touching upon the main theme" up until 1949. The book fails to bear this out. Part One relies heavily upon Wellhausen, Huhn, and Duhamel for its statement of "current" positions. There Klausner speaks of Cornill as one of the "later scholars" (p. 137) and Budde and Marti as "modern scholars" (p. 207). This reviewer never found any mention on Klausner's part of G. F. Moore or his standard three-volume work on Judaism. In short, the scholarship of this book rests overwhelmingly in the period marking the change of the century. And a considerable portion of the references to literature after 1925 concerns only Klausner's own writings, mostly in Hebrew. These facts do not detract from the book's permanent worth. But for all practical purposes the work appears to be from thirty to fifty years old, and the reader should know this.

Finally, judged by the usual standards, this is an expensive book. In view of the fact that it has no illustrations, photographs, or plates and makes no extensive use of Greek or Hebrew type, its cost is surprising.



The translator should be thanked for good performance on what must have been a long and arduous project. His result is readable, pleasant English, produced with virtually no printer's errors.

In closing with an expression of appreciation for the considerable insights into the Messianic idea afforded by this book, the reviewer must nevertheless dissent strongly from the concept of the Messiah which Klausner attributes to Christians, notably in his Appendix.

R. LANSING HICKS

*The Mission and Achievement of Jesus.* By Reginald H. Fuller. Chicago: Allenson, 1954. pp. 128. \$1.25.

In this monograph Prof. Fuller takes issue both with Bultmann's thesis that Jesus was merely a prophet who announced the impending advent of the Reign of God and that it was only after the Resurrection that the Church identified Jesus with the bringer of the eschatological salvation and with Dodd's 'realized eschatology'. Instead he thinks that in the ministry of Jesus "God was already acting in his proclamation, works of power and teaching, and these activities were organically related to the End and that in some sense they might be described as proleptic instalments of the final blessings of the End".

Jesus did not directly teach a Christology, but he provided the raw materials on the lines of which the post-resurrection Church was able to work one out. Jesus did not claim to be Son of God, "but he did know that he stood in a unique relationship of Sonship to God", and this consciousness finds its closest reference in the Servant poems rather than in Greek speculation. Neither did He claim to be Son of Man during his ministry; rather He would become so after his 'glorification'. "The Kingdom and the Son of Man 'spill over' or 'jut out', as it were, on this side of the cross, yet the cross itself remains the decisive event which sets both in motion". Much the same can be said of 'Messiah', 'Son of David', 'Lord'.

In one sense it can be admitted that Bultmann is right in saying that Jesus was 'un-Messianic' in that He did not fulfill the Jewish eschatological hope, nor himself possess what modern critics call a 'Messianic consciousness', nor impose a Christology upon his disciples, but it would be truer to say that the Life was 'pre-Messianic', "for it was the outcome of the lowly history of Jesus that He was, in the belief of the Church, exalted to be the Messiah".

The *Kerygma* of the Church stems directly from the teaching of

Jesus. No more Jesus or Paul! "It is not . . . possible to drive a wedge between the proclamation of Jesus and the proclamation of the Church here. The sole difference between them is that whereas for Jesus the decisive event is still in the near future, for the Church the decisive event now lies in the past." Both Jesus and the early Church were mistaken about the brevity of the interim between the decisive event of the Cross and the final consummation, although "Qualitatively, both Jesus and the early Church were, in the perspective of the Christian faith, correct in their division of time. . . . The rightness or wrongness of the perspective of the Christian faith is, however, not a matter for the historian to decide. His sole concern is to establish the identity between the *kerygma* of Jesus and the *kerygma* of the earliest Church". (This is, of course, true, but we wish someone would take the matter in hand.)

These conclusions are arrived at after a thorough study of the relevant texts, and that Prof. Fuller is very much at home in the contemporary literature on the topic is attested by two and one-half pages of bibliography and constant references. This is an important addition to the growing number of studies in this field. If one is not entirely convinced by the arguments, at least they must be borne in mind in trying to work through this most difficult problem, one to which there may be no final solution.

E. J. COOK

*Prophetic Realism and the Gospel.* By John Wick Bowman. Westminster, 1955. pp. 276, indexes. \$4.75

These chapters are based on the Sprunt Lectures given in 1951 at Union Seminary, Richmond, Va. but show later work in references to more recent literature. They are also an extended documentation of an article which appeared in *Theology Today* for July, 1954. The article was a plea for a school of thought in Biblical Studies which might be designated by the first two words of the title. It is intended to stand between the extremes of liberalism and apocalypticism, indebted to both for insights and scholarly contributions, but opposed in many respects to each. Such a viewpoint, it is contended, provides a central and consistent and biblical interpretation of the Bible.

The book starts with definitions of the two opposing schools and an exposition of "Prophetic Realism—the Dialogue of Revelation." Part II deals with the "Theme of Scripture's Prophetic Realism" in relation to the Gospel and to History. Here the consistent emphasis is on *Heilsgeschichte* or the linear viewpoint of redemptive history taken by va-

rious strands of New Testament thought and so illuminating the Old Testament. The diagrams in it are not particularly helpful but the distinctions between nature-religion and revelation, between history in general and redemptive-history are clearly drawn.

Part III, the major part of the work, deals with the content of "Scripture's Prophetic Realism" under four designations of the Gospel—of Jesus Christ, of God, of the Kingdom, of Our Salvation. Here there are valuable discussions of the true relevance of God's righteousness as the real issue in "justification", of atonement, of the Biblical interest in God-in-history as opposed to metaphysical interest in God-in-Himself, and of the Kingdom in relation to both God and man.

In many respects it is a baffling book. Not one nor two readings can provide a real estimate. Perhaps in the nature of the case this is bound to be so. It may be intended to raise more questions than can be given a definitive answer, for Dr. Bowman is well aware that on many of the issues he raises, discussion and study are in full cry. That in the main his thesis is correct many will agree. As many, like the reviewer, are bound to want to ask further questions. Part of this difficulty arises from the nature of the task of what he designates as "Prophetic Realism". Is it always the best approach to all of the Biblical literature? Does he, for instance, do full justice to the theological construction which has gone into the Synoptics, no less than into John, even if one by no means goes along with Austin Farrer? At times he condemns Form-criticism roundly and at times speaks favorably of its results.

The polemical elements in the book I think sometimes distract attention from the development. At least I found it most helpful when it was confined to exposition of the results of applying this method to the Scriptures. There is a tendency, in spite of earnestly expressed safeguards, to throw together too many viewpoints into two opposing camps—but then perhaps the author stands closer to some extreme representatives than most of us do? The positive exposition on the other hand has an irenic character.

The book ought to be in the hands of all those concerned in the discussion (and who, really, is not?). In a brief review it is not possible to take up actual points. Some of the topics which call for further discussion seem to be: How far is God's initiative lost sight of in discussing man's response? Are Kingdom and Church to be so equated that the former can also be the object of the verb "build" as well as the latter? Are valuable present applications sometimes read back into the first-century terms in a way that would not have occurred to the origi-

nal writers—e.g. “person”, “body”? Or one might ask: Is the presentation of “absolute otherness” in the polemical passage at p. 109 quite what is meant by it in relation to cardinal Biblical teachings? Does not n. 14 at p. 125 fail to observe that F. C. Grant’s remark applies to the “popular modern theory” that the Baptism marked the *birth* of Messianic consciousness?

The necessity of holding fast to the Scriptural identification of Jesus and the Christ, to the influence of corporate categories on many of the New Testament figures and to the actuality of God’s revelation in history is well put. The brief study of alternation in modern church history might well be applied to all of it. There is a great deal in the book of fruitful exposition, digested study and illuminating insight.

Dr. Bowman has essayed a difficult task for which we must be grateful. The very variety of method and the range of discussion in themselves are challenging. The book has a sub-title, “A preface to Biblical Theology”, and attempts to be no more. As such it serves well to initiate or to re-define the discussion of basic approach and is a plea for a middle way—always difficult to expound or to define clearly at the edges. It can hardly be doubted, however, that he who attempts it renders a service to us all.

CHARLES W. F. SMITH

*Conscience in the New Testament.* By C. A. Pierce. Allenson. 1955. pp. 147 and index. \$1.50.

The editors of the *Studies in Biblical Theology* have put us further into their debt with this valuable treatise, No. 15 in the series. Mr. Pierce is Chaplain of Magdalene College, Cambridge and has provided us with a penetrating study of *suneidēsis* and its cognates—a word which, as far as I am aware, the Kittel *Wörterbuch* has not yet reached. At the end of the book are displays analysing the use of the terms in classical and hellenistic Greek literature.

The study begins with the theory that the often repeated assertion of a Stoic background for the New Testament word “conscience” is without foundation in literary evidence. The author then goes on to seek the meaning the word had when Paul introduced it into Christianity, “complete with its connotation”. Paul’s treatment is taken as the norm for Christian use. Its origin is found in a popular and commonplace idea met with by Paul in Corinth. It is developed in the New Testament but without any discernible effect on its use in subsequent Greek literature. It is not a Biblical word in the sense that it has no

Old Testament (LXX) background. (Though does not a similar idea appear in the use of *kardia* in at least II Sam 24:5, 10?) Its coloring is therefore purely Greek, popular, not philosophical.

The analysis of the terms is handled under what seems to me an unnecessarily baffling set of symbols. Would there not have been space for the use of words or phrases rather than, e.g., "MBNeg"? (I also found confusing the type-setter's habit of using a hyphen where there should be a dash indicating a parenthetical remark). The symbols are intended to make easy reference to the tables possible and are important for the study. From the root meaning of "know with", self-knowledge or self-converse (ethically indifferent) it comes to have a connotation in which the content of consciousness is the moral character of one's acts. In the analysis of this usage the symbols come into play. The consciousness of wrong which makes the subject unhappy is shown to be the dominant meaning. Careful analysis leads to a description of the popular idea of *suneidēsis* which may be summarised as: an element in human nature which makes a man conscious of specific past acts he himself has performed or initiated which appear bad to the extent of causing him pain. Its function is to do just this and has reference to future courses of action only in so far as recollection of past or present pain may cause the subject to avoid a repetition.

On page 62 there is a chart of the use of the term in the New Testament. It is apparent from this that Paul's use is the key and that the crux is Corinthians and Romans. Mr. Pierce then proceeds to examine each case. His treatment of Romans as more calm and reasoned than Gal, or Cor, but only "systematising in a fashion" is acceptable and so is his treatment of the "Corinthian catchword", so that the relevant sections of Cor. become, as certainly other sections should be treated, virtually a diatribe. The exegesis involved is carefully done and leads to the conclusion that the New Testament treatment of "conscience" arises out of popular usage and retains by and large its current meaning modified only as it is viewed against "the richer setting" of the Christian faith. Conscience emerges as a factor of only negative value in Christian morals, subject to limitation and weakening by wrong information, wrong environment and habitual sin. It has no affirmative capacity. An outraged conscience may even lead to departure from faith.

As Mr. Pierce points out, the study ends with chapter XII and the two final chapters ("Conscience and the Modern World" and "Conscience and the Church") are an epilogue. In the first is an illustration

of the way in which a Biblical word-study may enable us to re-assess assertions we might otherwise too readily accept. In the second are comments on what the study might teach about the Church's practice of ascetic theology and the cure of souls.

This is an important book and exactly the kind of study which makes this series profitable. It may be difficult to read for those who have neglected Greek but it should be digested, made known and its conclusions discussed. So to define a Biblical usage that it provides a standpoint from which to re-study the matter involved, particularly so pastorally practical a matter as conscience, is to provide a norm for the true function of "Biblical Theology".

The crux of the discussion turns on whether conscience can have any future reference of a positive kind. The decision here is rendered on the evidence of the New Testament and contemporary literature and must be so judged. I am better able to judge the former than the latter. The exegesis involved illuminates in its exercise more than the matter in hand and this is as it should be. CHARLES W. F. SMITH

*The Pattern of Christian Truth: A Study in the Relations between Orthodoxy and Heresy in the Early Church.* By H. E. W. Turner. Mowbray, 1957, pp. xvi + 508, 42 shillings.

Professor Turner of Durham begins his Bampton Lectures with an analysis of the classical theory of the origin of heresy (an offshoot from a prior orthodoxy) and criticizes it in the light of the diversity and developmental nature of orthodox thought. He accepts the "broad conclusions" of Loofs as providing a generally accurate picture—not unlike, we might add, the work of A. V. G. Allen, though better grounded in detail. He stresses the fluidity, as well as the relative fixity, of early Christianity; as he says, the church had a "broad experimental grasp" of religious realities (p. 28). On this ground he attacks the exaggerated theories of Harnack and Martin Werner and then proceeds in the second lecture to a thoroughgoing demolition of Walter Bauer's notion that heresy always and everywhere preceded orthodoxy but was finally defined and rejected by the Church of Rome. "Perhaps the root difficulty is that Bauer fails to attain an adequate view of the nature of orthodoxy" (p. 80). In an important appended note Turner gives examples which prove that the border-line between orthodoxy and heresy was not very clear in the second century, at least as far as some significant individuals were concerned.



The third lecture gives "a theological analysis" of heresy—examining Gnosticism as dilution, Marcion as truncation, Montanism as distortion, various kinds of binitarianism and monarchianism as archaism, and Arianism as evacuation. Turner rightly emphasizes the variety of heretical thought as well as the variety of approaches and responses made by more orthodox writers. His classifications are not meant to be absolute; thus Montanism surely possesses a strong flavor of archaism as well as distortion.

The next four lectures first set forth the heretics' appeals to scripture, tradition, and reason (philosophy), pointing out their inadequacies, and next discuss more fully the orthodox use of the Bible (canonicity, exegetical methods, relation of scripture to tradition), the rôle of tradition in the development of doctrine, and the relation of orthodoxy to Greek philosophical thought ("no absolute dichotomy", p. 470). The concluding lecture points out "the essential autonomy of orthodoxy" (p. 478) and reiterates the importance of its scriptural, traditional, and philosophical sources in relation to modern theology. "The history of Christian thought taken as a whole does not usually lend much support for an either-or method of approach" (p. 497). Two excellent brief indices bring the book to an end.

No theological library can afford to lack this book, especially in view of its low English price. The first two lectures alone are enough to convince the reader that there is rather less than meets the eye to the widely accepted theory of Bauer, and the other lectures provide illuminating, indeed essential, prolegomena to the study of Christian doctrine. It is balanced, judicious, and interesting.

Points of detail can occasionally be criticized, but it may perhaps be more useful simply to add, in discussing Christianity's relation to philosophy, that the Platonist Justin was converted to Christian faith by an "old man" who used Aristotelian arguments against Plato, and that recent discoveries of gnostic literature largely confirm Turner's picture of gnosticism, except for his statement (p. 202) that "no Gnostic could . . . retain belief in the Resurrection of the Body in any form"—Valentinians did.

A more basic question involves orthodoxy's grasp of religious realities in the second century. The church rightly insisted on the reality of the Incarnation and of the Creation; but it remains a question whether at some points the gnostics, for example, did not grasp more fully the implications of Redemption than such writers as the apologists did. Here, of course, we must bear in mind the limited objectives of the apologists,

as well as the element of chance in the preservation of second-century literature. But it may well be asked whether heresy cannot also be regarded as the attempt to respond to a need which orthodoxy is not meeting and perhaps cannot meet. Does not orthodoxy sometimes exaggerate the unity of religious reality?

ROBERT M. GRANT

*The Early Church and the Coming Great Church.* By John Knox. New York: Abingdon Press, 1955. pp. 160. \$2.50.

In this most remarkable book, John Knox brings his massive, exact and discriminating knowledge of the New Testament and the early church to bear upon our modern approach to the reunion of Christendom. The result is a contribution of the first importance to the interpretation of the early history of the church as well as to the literature of the ecumenical movement.

Knox begins by demonstrating that the church of the New Testament does not offer us a model of perfection to which the united church of the future has only to conform; it is sheer illusion to imagine that we can find "a feasible and authoritative pattern of unity" (p. 14) in the New Testament. The recognition of this fact is of the utmost importance. First, it "will keep us from interpreting the goal of the ecumenical movement as being simply the restoration of the forms and usages of the early church" (p. 15). Secondly, it enables us "to give due heed to the ecumenical movement in early Christianity and to profit from it as we should," for we then see the ancient "Catholic movement" as representing "the first large-scale effort to unite a divided Christendom . . . the great prototype of our modern crusade for unity," . . . which "had results solid, constructive, and decisively important for the whole subsequent history of the church" (p. 17). Thirdly, "the recognition of the divided character of early Christianity will have the value of forcing our attention beyond the church itself—whether Protestant, Catholic, or primitive—to the event which alone determined the fundamental character of the church and therefore was, and is, the ground of its unity" (p. 18).

Among many striking features of this book, two may be particularly noticed: the treatment of the ancient catholicizing movement as the prototype of the modern ecumenical movement, and the handling of the argument for episcopacy. Neither of these discussions can be profitably summarized; they require to be read, mulled over, and digested. The manner in which the central features of the old Catholic movement are

traced to their roots in the New Testament writings and to the "event" of Christ which lies behind them, and the indications of the direction that can be given and the hope that can be inspired in our contemporary quest for Christian unity—these are bound to be suggestive and stimulating to every reader, based as they are on thorough knowledge and appreciation of all the relevant facts and on cogent reasoning. Anglican readers will find cause for thankfulness in the fact that Knox perceives not only that the union of Christendom is inconceivable "except on the ground of a polity which . . . involves the full acceptance of the historic episcopate", but also that "an acceptance of episcopacy based on merely pragmatic considerations . . . will not be acceptable to Catholics, and should not be" (pp. 142, 144). He makes it clear that "the crucial issue is . . . whether we shall accept episcopacy in a special sense: namely, as a distinct order of ministry, superior to the presbyterate and diaconate, and as standing in a particular historic succession," and he sees "no hope of a united church without the universal acceptance of episcopacy in *this historic sense*" (my italics) (p. 143). He is convinced that "there are sound reasons in principle for doing so" (p. 144). Although the argument is adumbrated rather than fully developed, it marks out the line along which serious discussion of the issue must proceed. The argument for episcopacy is all too often discredited by the attempt to prove too much; no such error is introduced here.

We shall devoutly hope that we shall hear much more from John Knox about this matter.

F. W. BEARE

*Church of South India: The Movement Toward Union, 1900-1915.* by Bengt Sundkler. Published at Greenwich, Conn. by The Seabury Press, 1954. 350 pp. plus notes, appendix, bibliography, indices. \$6.75.

This book is a "must" for all who are concerned about the Church of South India. It is very stimulating to Anglicans who are pondering the distinctive genius of their Communion and its role in the purposes of God. It is valuable to all who are interested in Church Unity or in the missionary work of the Church. It is not easy reading. It is so crammed with factual information that unless one brings to it some knowledge of its subject, or refers frequently to the detailed table of contents and to the outline of the changes made in the various editions of the Scheme, one is very likely to lose the thread of the story.

The fact that Dr. Sundkler was Research Secretary of the Interna-

tional Missionary Council and is now Professor of Missions at the University of Uppsala guarantees that he is a thorough scholar and that he looks at C.S.I. from the perspective of the whole missionary enterprise. He has written a history of that Church which I suspect will be the standard reference work on the subject for years to come; a book to be *studied* and not skimmed. The notes take 70 pages; the select bibliography (including references to periodicals and unprinted sources) 20. He is concerned to provide an accurate account of the men who led the various societies and Churches into union in India, of their convictions and motives, of the events which occurred.

Dr. Sundkler's theme is that "the early Church was almost invariably taken as the blueprint of the Church of South India" (p. 347), and he substantiates this contention chiefly by quotations from letters and memoranda of the chief architects of the union and from the minutes of the Joint Committee in which the different points of view were argued. The aim of the most important men became not so much to find a way by which the contributions of the uniting bodies might be harmonized (their earliest aim) as to reproduce the ancient Church in the new India, to reestablish the ancient rules of the Catholic Church (e.g. in regard to episcopal ordination and priestly celebrations) while allowing for occasional necessary exceptions to these rules.

After outlining the 19th century background, Dr. Sundkler sketches the formation of the South India United Church (consisting of Presbyterians, and Congregationalists, later joined by the Methodists) and then the thirty year struggle to find a way by which the Anglicans could join. He tells briefly about the Faith and Order discussions after 1910; the influence of evangelism and of nationalism and of the "Tranquebar Manifesto" of 1910; the debates over the historic episcopate, the parity of ministries and the Pledge, which came to an impasse in 1935; the new theological climate which shifted the center of interest to the faith of the Reformers, the priesthood of all believers and intercommunion, the discovery of a way out of all these difficulties and the final achievement of unity. This immense amount of closely-packed detail is clarified by the brief summaries at the beginning and the end of each chapter. (There is a note about the effect in India of the negotiations for unity in America between the Episcopal and the Northern Presbyterian churches.) He includes pen portraits of many leaders: especially the great Anglican Bishops Whitehead of Madras (a determined Tractarian who became increasingly Evangelical), Palmer of Bombay and Azariah of Dornakal, the Congregationalist theologian of

Oxford, Professor Vernon Bartlett, the Dutch Reformed Missionary, Dr. J. J. Banninga who was for years Principal of a theological college in India and then Secretary of the Joint Committee, of Dr. J. M. S. Hooper, an English Methodist who succeeded Banninga in this Secretaryship, of the theologically learned Indian layman, Dr. D. M. Devasahayam who represented the radical wing of Congregationalism, of Dr. G. Sherwood Eddy, the American evangelist, and the part he played in the early days of the movement toward Church unity in South India.

My estimate of this book as one *to be studied* and used for reference is very favorable. I hope it is pondered by all who determine the attitude of PECUSA to C.S.I. Not only is it immensely learned but its judgments are balanced and eminently fair. Occasional passages are deeply moving.

A. C. ZABRISKIE

*The Protestant Tradition. An Essay in Interpretation.* By J. S. Whale, D.D. Cambridge: at the University Press, pp. xv + 360. \$3.75.

Where Protestant Christianity holds true to its own inner character, it must produce a variety and repetition of self-interpretations. Its prophetic principle demands not only testimony for the Most High God against ever-recurring temptations toward idolatry as Christians live in this world. That principle demands also a constant witness against the tendency to idolatry traditional Protestantism itself; thus critical re-evaluation of itself is a very Protestant enterprise.

Dr. Whale's present Thomas White Currie lectures for 1953 at the Austin Presbyterian Theological Seminary comprise such a re-evaluation. The book falls into four rather obvious divisions. Putting first things first, Luther's quest for a merciful God is the initial consideration. There follow essays on Calvin, and on "The Sect-Type" of Protestantism. Finally, a number of modern issues are discussed in what is the lengthiest portion of the book. Luther is portrayed as the theological awakener of the Protestant tradition, Calvin as the systematizer and ecclesiastical organizer, the Reformation radicals as contributors of the definitive inner religious character of Protestantism. No one of the three components of the tradition binds together these three features; thus the Protestant Tradition is a synthesis of elements which originally were widely disparate. The modern issues which are seen as challenging that tradition are Roman Catholic heteronomy, political totalitarianism and ecclesiastical disunion.

The book covers much the same ground as Professor Wilhelm Pauck's *The Heritage of the Reformation* (Boston, 1950). What the earlier book lacks in unity (it was a collection of essays) is supplied by the present one; but the careful argument and thorough documentation of Pauck's book does not pervade Dr. Whale's published lectures. Both books stem from the present renaissance in reformation-studies, and both attack the subject in a thoroughly appropriate way. But neither can be considered definitive, mainly because of their forms.

Dr. Whale unflinchingly bites into many of the perplexing antinomies of thought and doctrine in the Protestant tradition. That his final word upon some of them is a wittily relaxing, rather than a profoundly solving one, does not fundamentally detract from the good wisdom of his lectures. But his thesis does some injustice to the Reformers: to reserve the role of churchman for Calvin tends to slight Luther's emphasis upon the Church; Luther's indubitable theological genius is allowed to overshadow some of Calvin's sparkling originality as a thinker.

However, the treatment of the reformation radicals is so highly selective as to be unsatisfactory. The principles of dissent, individualism, voluntarism and spiritualism rather aptly survey the contributions of the "sect-type" of Protestant. But that the first three of these are grounded in the English dissenters and only the last in the continental left-wing reformers produces a fuzzy picture of this complex element of the Protestant tradition. That Dr. Whale's own inheritance of that tradition is through English congregationalism partly allows for his emphases. But his own theological awareness, already familiar to readers of his previous *Christian Doctrine* has such a well-rounded (I am tempted to say "Anglican") flavor, that the thoroughness of his identity with dissent is questionable. By treating English dissenters without much regard to the various conditions in the Church of England against which they rebelled, he seems to assume for them a finer churchmanship than they actually had. And while on the subject of Anglicanism, it is rather startling to discover a book on "The Protestant Tradition" which virtually overlooks the Church of England's own participation in and contribution to that tradition.

Perhaps all of my objections are really covered by the word "An" in the sub-title. The book must be admired and heartily approved for its unmistakable clarity, its wide grounding in the primary sources of its subject, and its full consciousness of the best secondary works on the subject which have come from the Continent, Britain and America.

WILLIAM A. CLEBSCH



*The Bent World.* By J. V. Langmead Casserley. Oxford University Press, 1955. pp. viii + 286. \$4.00.

In this excellent study of "East-West tensions", Dr. Casserley has sketched a familiar thesis, but with a fresh and imaginative touch. The thesis, in his words, is that "the present secular mood or phase in the development of Western civilization is sapping its vitality and menacing its future." In contrast to the "intellectually ordered secularity, secularism turned into a coherent doctrine" of Marxism, Western secularity is a loose association of isolated doctrines and axioms with an accidental pattern of social habits and attitudes. Our Western tendency to idolatry of our political institutions, our "superstitious reverence" for technical efficiency, our confusion about the true nature of economic activity, the ambiguity of nationalism in our world, and the break-down of happy marital and family life . . . these are the five fields examined by Dr. Casserley in establishing the thesis. A final chapter, whose cautious optimism is indicated by the phrase from Hopkins which gives the book its title—the world is bent, not broken—briefly explores the signs of hope for a resurrection of the central tradition of Western civilization, and calls for a revival both of the prophetic office of the Church and also for a "ruthlessly critical orthodoxy" in the work of 20th-century theologians.

Two qualities differentiate the book, for me, from the run-of-the-mill output on the same theme. One is the vivid clarity with which Dr. Casserley writes. No area in contemporary writing suffers more from mush and murk than this one, of the "challenge to democracy" and the "survival of Western civilization." No doubt this blurriness is symptomatic of the confusions and the low vitality of which Dr. Casserley writes, but it is a most dangerous handicap, that where the West most needs sharp tools, we do not have them. By contrast, Dr. Casserley has the gift of the surgical word—not merely of the slick and memorable phrase, but of the word which goes with the thought and exposes and communicates reality. Such a sentence, for example, as "the greatest handicap of democracy in the modern Western world is the fact that it has arrived" (p. 67), does more than tickle the mind. It breaks a trail for thought into a country unfamiliar to many readers, and both requires and facilitates reflection. He does not necessarily invite agreement; he invites more exact examination, which is precisely what is needed.

The second quality is the range and variety of his concerns. The clergyman, and supremely the clerical theologian, is probably the last

of the general practitioners left in our specializinig society. He ought to be so, at least, although even in theology we seem to be going through a distressing period of expertise. Dr. Casserley may be a specialist in something—if so, I do not recognize it—but in such a study as this, where it is so supremely important that the world be one and the critic blessed with a whole and single eye, it is a joy to follow his humane and discerning and liberal mind into one province of experience after another.

Disagreements in detail are to be expected, perhaps most of all from those who will agree with the main thesis. Certainly many would not agree that (p. 156), "the elimination of the proletariat" (by initiating them into the values and deeper satisfactions embodied in the great traditions of Western civilization) "has not only not been solved, its solution has not even been seriously attempted." That dictum smells of the 20's; one of the notable developments in American education has been at least a "serious attempt" at this; and I doubt whether any student of American labor would agree that a coherent and recognizable "proletariat" can any longer be taken for granted. Indeed, the dynamics of our contemporary labor scene are hopelessly confused, and exactly on this point, that the "proletariat", when you most need it for theoretical purposes, refuses to exist.

Similarly, I think that many would not fully share Dr. Casserley's pessimism regarding marriage in a divorcing society. A society which permits divorce becomes, in his term, a "divorcing society", "exposing marriage to the rigors of an unhealthy and uncongenial climate, and indeed transforming the very nature of marriage by altering the assumptions predominating in the minds of those who enter into it." (p. 206). With this I wholly agree. But were the assumptions better under the old order? The hopelessness, the adultery agreed, the frustrated retreat into self, the deliberate lie . . . a "divorcing society" is a high price to pay to be free of these, granted; but many will wonder what Dr. Casserley's alternatives would be.

Such disagreements and questions as these do not blunt the sharp edge of this fine analysis. I am left, at the end, with warm appreciation of it. I am also left with the disquieting question, "What happens now?" Dr. Casserley is one of the best, in a generation of competent analysts. He sounds the way an Anglican and Catholic critic ought to sound. But as our generation is acute in criticism, so are we undeveloped and timid in theological restatement—the "ruthlessly critical orthodoxy" which he rightly prescribes for our healing. Who is writing the moral theology

for the post-technical society? Who has restated the doctrine of work for a people among whom work is more and more of a luxury? Where does one go to read the theology of the United Nations, or of the reunited world it symbolizes? I do not know the answers; I suspect that the theological organs and dynamics of our society are pretty much askew; theology is being written by the physicists, the social philosophers, the "Madison Ave. boys" of public relations. I am far from blaming them; it is a free country and theology is anybody's game. But if the second step, of restatement, is to be taken, it must be taken by people who are prepared and qualified to take it. If our present educational system does not prepare men to be good theologians (and I agree with the author that it doesn't), then what do we do, in the Church, about it? I am not suggesting that Dr. Casserley's present book is incomplete. I'm only saying that I hope he writes a lot more.

STEPHEN F. BAYNE, JR.

## NOTES ON NEW BOOKS

*The Foundation and Early Years of Queen Anne's Bounty.* By Alan Savidge. Printed by the Church Historical Society. S.P.C.K., London. 1955. pp. vi + 159. 15s.

In 1534 legislation of the Reform Parliament seized to the English Crown that considerable portion of annual ecclesiastical taxes and other revenues known as First-fruits and Tenth, previously paid to the Papacy. These customary taxes and payments were collected by the Crown until 1704—the iniquitous element being their use for secular purposes instead of the furtherance of the welfare of the Church from whose properties the income was derived. In the time of Charles II, for example, ecclesiastical taxes provided pensions for a series of royal favourites and other dependents of the Crown. In 1704, however, by the famous "Bounty" of the

pious Queen Anne the ecclesiastical payments of First-fruits and Tenth were set apart from Crown income to be returned to the Church in the form of grants augmenting the inadequate stipends attached to poor livings. It was a modest benevolence: £17,000 did not go far among the five thousand benefices that were then officially rated as worth less than £80 per annum. Nevertheless, from these modest beginnings has developed one of the great administrative institutions of the modern English Church, and the Bounty today plays an important part in the Church's financial system.

Mr. Savidge's careful study of the foundation and early years of Bounty's operation will be of interest and value to students of the period. The book has a useful bibliography, and its appendices contain the text of relevant charters and statutes.

P. M. D.

*The English Church in the Fourteenth Century.* By W. A. Pantin. Cambridge University Press, 1955. pp. xii + 292. \$5.

Mr. Pantin's Birkbeck Lectures of 1948, here printed in a slightly expanded form, constitute an important study of some significant areas of English Church life and thought in the age of Chaucer and Wycliffe. Recent years have witnessed a revival of interest in the thirteenth century, and here the author is concerned to show how the structure of Church life and the development of thought a century later depend upon the earlier period. It is a welcome contribution to have the fourteenth century treated not as simply a century in which one may discern the origins or causes of the changes that are to follow in the ages of the Renaissance and the Reformation, but as a period of peculiar significance in itself.

The author makes his point evident in handling three themes among the many topics available: the social and political aspects of the Church's life; intellectual activity and controversies; and the religious literatures of the time: moral, pastoral, and mystical. It is in handling the latter that Mr. Pantin presents a picture of the religious life of the fourteenth-century English Church that is fresh and instructive. The book will be extremely useful to serious students of English Church history.

P. M. D.

*Sakrales Konigtum im Alten Testament und in Judentum.* By Geo. Widengren. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1955. pp. 127. DM 10.80.

This is a presentation of the material in the Old Testament, the Apocrypha, the Samaritan Liturgy and the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* pointing to the part played by the kings of Israel and Judah in the cult. The introduction describes the way in which desert Jah-

wism was related to the settled life of Canaan with its traditions and customs. The four chapters treat respectively of the king as leader of the state cult; of his role as high priest, custodian of the torah and mediator of wisdom; of his part in the feast of tabernacles; and of the ritual of coronation and enthronement. There are also two excurses, the first a discussion of II Samuel 7, and the second calling attention to material, hitherto unnoted, regarding the New Years Festival. The monograph is admirably documented, with an exhaustive bibliography. The whole work is a model of scholarly investigation, even though the author may seem at times to have allowed his enthusiasm to cloud his judgment. One of its outstanding features is its demonstration of the pervasive influence of cult phraseology throughout the Old Testament. The book would be a most useful foundation for a seminar.

C. A. S.

*Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament.* Ed. by G. Friedrich. Bd. VI, Lfg. 3 (pp. 129-192). Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1955. DM 4.60.

The new installment concludes *pim-* *plēmi* and cognates, by Delling, covers *pinō* and cognates, by Goppelt—who deals fully with the sacramental usage:—*pipraskō*, by the late Dr. Preisker, *piptō* and cognates by Michaelis, and begins the article *pisteuō*, *pistis*, and cognates by Bultmann. This article is to be in four major parts, with many subdivisions, virtually a compendium of New Testament theology from a special point of view. The classical and Hellenistic usage is dealt with fully by Dr. Bultmann in Pt. I, the Old Testament usage in an equally thorough section (Pt. II) by Dr. Artur Weiser—not completed in the present Lieferung. The classical Greek use of words derived from *pist*—never developed a religious vocabulary, but re-

ained on the level of secular thought: faithful=reliable, faith=confidence, etc. But in Hellenistic Greek the idea of *faith* in God began to be common, especially in philosophical discussion. Instead of *hōmizein* (=assume, suppose), belief (or faith in) came into use, as in Plutarch's *Essay on Superstition* (II. 170f.), "The atheist does not think [*ouk oietai*] that gods exist, the superstitious man doesn't want them to, but believes in spite of himself [*pisteuei d'akōn*]-for he is afraid to disbelieve [*apistein*]." Hellenistic religious propaganda likewise encouraged this usage. "Every type of missionary propaganda called for *faith* in the god it proclaimed" (p. 181). For Stoicism, however, *pistis* was mainly the quality of consistency, being true to oneself, as in Epictetus's saying, "You are a man. Well then, be a man!" One thinks of Shakespeare's "first to thine own self be true," though a Stoic would have repudiated the dramatic application.

All the greater, accordingly, was the N. T. debt to the LXX for the ideas now centering in *pistis*. The O. T. combined two great religious ideas in one master concept, the ideas of *fear* and *trust* (p. 182). What the N. T. borrowed from the O. T. was one of its greatest and most original conceptions, according to which "faith" is not so much a condition of real existence ("believe and you will survive") as it is *identical* with that existence, as in Isa. 7:9 with its unforgettable play on words, *Im lō taamīnu lō lō tāmēnu*. Even for Isaiah faith is the only possible "form of existence," excluding every alternative which offered some kind of independent relation to God.

This article surely is destined to be one of the greatest in the whole work, and though still unfinished one already hopes it will be added to the list of major selected articles from THWB now appearing in English.

F. C. G.

*Lexical Aids for Students of New Testament Greek.* By Bruce M. Metzger. Princeton, N. J.: the Author, Enlarged ed. 1955. pp. 118. \$1.25.

The additions to the earlier edition consist of a list of the principal parts of the verbs that occur most frequently in the New Testament, and a list of all second declension nouns in -os which are feminine in gender.

For the benefit of those not already familiar with the book, it includes a vocabulary of words classified according to their frequency of occurrence in the New Testament, a list of words classified according to their root, appendices on the Indo-European family of languages and on prepositions in composition with verbs, and a table of correlative pronouns and adverbs.

Indispensable to the student who values his time, and a great boon to the teacher.

H. G.

*Life in Christ.* By Théo Preiss. Trans. by Harold Knight. Chicago: Allenson, 1954. pp. 104. \$1.25.

The five chapters contained here are taken from the author's *La Vie en Christ*, published posthumously. The titles of the chapters give a clue to the contents: Justification in Johannine Thought; Life in Christ and Social Ethics in the Epistle to Philemon; The Mystery of the Son of Man; The Vision of History in the New Testament; Was the Last Supper a Paschal Meal? The theme which appears in all except the last is what the author calls "juridical mysticism", the meaning of which is a little hard to grasp, but which according to the "publisher's note" binds "together the fundamental ideas of justice, justification, witness, ambassador, pledge, seal, etc."

In general it is what one might expect from an evident follower of Cullmann. There are a number of interesting insights and many striking sentences. One has

the feeling that each chapter might well be read as a paper at a meeting of biblical theologians as a basis for thorough discussion. It is unfortunate that the writer is no longer able to expand further some of his ideas and answer some of the questions which immediately arise in the mind of the reader. In the last chapter there is an elaboration and defense of the thesis that the Last Supper was not a passover, but "an anticipation . . . of the Paschal motifs, and oral tradition has taken this meal for a true Paschal meal and thus given rise to the mistaken chronology of Mark".

E. J. C.

*Otherworldliness and the New Testament.*

By Amos Niven Wilder (The Jackson Lectures at Perkins School of Theology and the Shaffer Lectures at Yale) Harper & Brothers, 1954. pp. 124. \$1.75.

The Christian pleads guilty to a kind of otherworldliness; but the kind of which he is accused or suspected by the world is escapism. The church has given grounds for this libel by separating faith from life and making it unreal. The modern variety of the dualism that has perennially troubled the church shunts off all aspects of the spiritual onto a side-track, just as is done with esthetic life. But a religion that can be called Christian must be true to its own principle of incarnation. The Holy Spirit, in a sense, comes not down but through, providing solutions within life rather than escape from it. When religion deals with only a part of life and a part of man, it is guilty of a false spirituality.

The answer is not to say that God speaks to us in church or in prayer, and then we must do his will in secular life. "Man's real religion or irreligion develops out of his experience with the things that are truly important to him . . ."

Dr. Wilder proceeds to develop the analogy with the arts and the contrast

of modern falsely-spiritual religion with that of the Bible. He then evaluates the strength and weakness of the biblical criticism of what is usually called the 'nineteenth century' or 'liberal' kind, and presents a critique of contemporary biblical theology. Of the latter he says that for all its value as recovering the biblical message, the newer theology plays into the hands of those whose emphasis upon the *kerygma* or even "word and sacrament" would once again obscure the fact that to appropriate the revelation means to share in the total life of a community. He concludes with his own phrasing of the "message" he would give to the modern man who asks what Christianity really means.

The separation of faith from life is further explored in the chapter called "The Jesus of History and Modern Docetism", extending the critique of contemporary biblical theology. Here Dr. Wilder rejects the 'unknown Jesus' of neo-orthodoxy as he does the supernatural figure of the old orthodoxy—in these Christ is preached but not Jesus—and the embodiment of our ideals reconstructed by liberalism—where Jesus is preached but not Christ.

In the concluding chapter on "The Resurrection Faith and a Relevant Salvation", the resurrection faith of the primitive church is shown to be anchored in the life situation of the witnesses, using the hints and clues supplied by the record with acute perception and at the same time with restraint. The same treatment is accorded the titles given to Jesus in the section that concludes the chapter.

Despite its brevity, this book is a significant contribution to our thinking our way toward fulfilling the "imperative that the Gospel, both community and mission, be replanted in every age at the crossroads of human concern and die to



live in new and relevant expressions". It is acute, pithy, judicious, superbly written; and the more refreshing and illuminating because Dr. Wilder can speak as a master in the realm of art as well as of theology and illustrate his theme in both areas.

H. G.

*Commentary on the Epistles of James and John.* By Alexander Ross. Erdmans, 1954. pp. 249. \$3.50.

Conservative throughout, Ross defends the apostolic authorship of the Johannine Epistles, quoting opposing opinion only to dismiss it (e.g. that of C. H. Dodd in the *Moffatt Commentary*) as 'misplaced ingenuity' yielding a 'meagre harvest'. Similarly the well-known statement of Papias cited by Eusebius, HE III:39, while correctly quoted, is almost certainly misinterpreted to mean that Papias claimed to be a personal hearer of the son of Zebedee. 'The Elder John' must, according to Ross, mean 'the Apostle John'. In the Second Epistle, 'the elect lady' was 'evidently a woman of the finest Christian character' rather than a figurative name for the Church. As for the Epistle of James, its author was 'undoubtedly a Jew'—'possibly a Jew who wrote in Palestine'—and from such beginnings Ross proceeds to argue that he was James, the Lord's brother. The Epistle 'may be the earliest N. T. writing'. In the matter of relative dates, this reviewer finds himself in agreement with Dr. Ross in placing the Epistle of James earlier than First Peter, but what is the date of First Peter? As for echoes of the thought of James in the Shepherd of Hermas or in First Clement, particularly the use of the Greek term 'double-minded' (*dipsychos*), thorough study of the evidence convinced me many years ago that 'James' probably borrowed it, as 'Clement' certainly did, from some lost apocryphon. (*Journal of Biblical Literature*, 1944, 1947)

However, the numerous parallels of language adduced between the Epistle of James and a speech attributed to him in Acts 15 are interesting, though one would suppose that a Palestinian Jew might have used the greeting 'Peace be with you' rather than the characteristically Greek *chairein*, which even Paul never used.

O. J. F. S.

*The Septuagint Bible.* In the translation of Charles Thomson as edited, revised and enlarged by C. A. Mues. Indian Hills, Colorado: The Falcon's Wing Press, 1954. pp. xxiv + 1426. \$6.50.

Thomson's translation was published in 1808. Alterations are made here only where in the judgement of the editor textual material now available requires. Wording has occasionally been changed, and certain explanatory helps are provided.

H. G.

*Le Ministère dans L'Eglise Ancienne.* By Gregory Dix. Neuchatel & Paris: Delachaux et Niestle, 1955. pp. 137. Fr. s. 6.

This is a French translation of the chapter by Dix in K. E. Kirk, ed.: *The Apostolic Ministry*, with a Preface supplied by J.-J. Allmen.

H. G.

*Roman Civilization: Selected Readings. Volume II: The Empire.* By Nathaniel Lewis and Meyer Reinhold. Columbia University Press, 1955. pp. ix + 652. \$7.50.

This admirable volume, forty-fifth in a series of *Records of Civilization. Sources and Studies*, presents well arranged quotations from literary sources, papyri and inscriptions, along with enough notes to make them completely intelligible to any interested reader. The selections are excellently chosen for making almost every aspect of life in the Roman empire become vivid in the stu-

dent's imagination, and the book might well replace several treatises on Roman history when readings are chosen for background material in New Testament or church history courses. It has a good bibliography and index.

R. M. G.

*Astrology in Roman Law and Politics.* By Frederick H. Cramer. Philadelphia, American Philosophical Society (Memoirs, Vol. 37), 1954. pp. 241. \$5.00.

This delightful, large, and fascinating book is divided into six parts: (1) the rise of astrology in the Hellenistic world (with an invaluable description of techniques), (2) the conversion of republican Rome to astrology, (3) astrologers—the power behind the throne from Augustus to Domitian (perhaps a somewhat exaggerated title, but the chapter sheds new light on first-century political life), (4) astrology in Rome to the year 235, (5) expulsion of astrologers from Rome and Italy, and (6) empire-wide legal restriction of astrology.

As an analogue to the Roman treatment of Christianity (and, to some extent, to the Christian treatment of astrology) the subject deserves the careful attention of every student of early church history. He will find the book highly rewarding because of the author's thoroughness, sense of humor, and even occasional inconsistency. The illustrations are well chosen, except for the rather badly drawn map which for some reason serves as the frontispiece.

Theologians need not be told that in note 78 on page 90 the author confuses Potiphar with Potiphar's wife.

R. M. G.

*The Story of the Church.* By Walter Russell Bowie. Abingdon, 1955. pp. 208. \$2.95.

This is one of the finer efforts to tell simply the story of the Christian Church

within the compass of a short book. A series of dramatic episodes depicting the rise of the Church are followed by a quick survey of western Christendom through the Reformation. Thereupon the focus is upon Protestant history, with emphasis on missions and the American development. The story is told in a lucid, swift-moving, narrative style; familiar material takes on life and power at Bowie's touch. As a first introduction to church history, this book has many strengths. Written to dramatize the glory of the Church, it nevertheless admits of its failures and shortcomings.

Obviously, to cram a history of 2000 years into 200 pages is drastically to select—it is remarkable indeed how many topics are mentioned. In a few instances (e.g., early persecutions, the Great Awakenings), the treatments are so brief as to perpetuate widely-held misunderstandings. It is unfortunate that no suggestions at all for further reading are made—some who will read this attractive introduction may well want to go further with the story of the Church. An index, and illustrations by Clifford Johnston increase the value of this survey, which should have long usefulness among young people and laymen approaching church history for the first time.

R. T. H.

*The Doctrine of the Church in Anglican Theology 1517-1603.* By H. F. Woodhouse. Macmillan, 1954. pp. viii + 223. \$4.25.

The Principal of the Anglican Theological College in Vancouver here gives us a careful summary of the understanding of church, ministry, polity, state and inter-church relations as held by the English Reformation divines. The book displays an admirable mastery of an enormous corpus of theological literature. Its great virtue is its synthesis of the thought of the Anglican Fathers

about the main logical structure of the doctrine of the church. That virtue, however, tends to underemphasize the sometimes startling divergency of thought among those divines, and to seize upon their thought without full regard to the very difficult problems which the Church of England faced during the successive decades within the period covered. These flaws, as well as that of a rather involved style of writing, are chargeable to the extreme brevity of the book. It is nevertheless an immensely valuable reference manual for its oft-neglected subject.

W. A. C.

*The Evolution of the Christian Year.* By A. Allan McArthur. Greenwich: Seabury Press. pp. 192. \$3.00.

Within the limitations imposed by its purpose—there is no consideration given to such matters as Ember and Rogation days or the *sanctorale*—this is the most extensive treatment of its subject we so far have in English. The author surveys the evidence of patristic and liturgical documents (including early lectionaries) for the first four or five centuries to trace the development of the ecclesiastical year, in which the course of our redemption is set forth. Most of his conclusions will not appear new or startling to Anglicans; and for us the chief value of the book lies in the thoroughness with which the early evidence is presented and appraised. "The primitive liturgical year consisted of three unitive festivals, Epiphany, Pascha, and Pentecost. In the fourth century three new festivals were established—Christmas, Good Friday, and Ascension Day. The resultant process of evolution broke down the unitive nature of the older commemorations. It is the six festivals of Christmas, Epiphany, Good Friday, Easter, Ascension, and Pentecost which constitute the permanent structure of the Christian Year."

The unusual and perhaps not altogether happy use of the word "unitive" underscores the assumed fact that each of the primitive festivals was originally a dual observance. Quite naturally there followed a rapid process of bifurcation.

Dr. McArthur writes with the primary purpose of furthering the recovery of the Christian Year in the Church of Scotland, whose Reformers here "parted company with their brethren on the continent, and went to an unnecessary extreme". Some specific suggestions are made which we of the Anglican Communion might well consider.

P. V. N.

*The Episcopal Church and its Work.* By Powel Mills Dawley. Greenwich: Seabury Press. 1955. pp. ix + 310. \$2.50.

With this sixth volume the *Church's Teaching* series is brought to a triumphant conclusion (though Bishop Bayne's *Christian Living* is still in process). It is not unlikely that this will have a wider appeal than the others in the series, for it contains the sort of information which even the least intellectually curious of churchmen would be glad to have within reach. The first part (some 70 pages) is an historical sketch of the Episcopal Church, with the material marshalled to show how we came to be what and where we are, with our comprehensive character and our unique Catholic-Protestant dual heritage. Part II deals with the structure, law, and organization of the Church. Part III (where the late Dr. James Thayer Addison deserves much credit) is concerned with the missionary, educational, ecumenical, and other phases of the Church at work.

Prof. Dawley has done a superb piece of exposition and interpretation. It would be difficult to name any significant matter relevant to the scope of the

book which is not adequately treated within the limits of space imposed. Particularly to be commended is his judicious comment (pp. 77-85) on worship and the use of the Prayer Book.

P. V. N.

*A Tale of Two Brothers, John and Charles Wesley.* By Mabel Richmond Brailsford. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. pp. 301. Illus. \$4.00.

A lively account of the intertwining lives of the two clerical brothers, lives distinguished by rare Christian devotion to forgotten folk and touched by elements of romance and tragedy. John's long domination of his younger brother came to an end when Charles, himself happily married, from motives of jealousy which he sought to disguise even from himself, interfered callously to break up John's one great affair of the heart—and in so doing plunged two souls in misery. Finally came what Miss Brailsford calls the "dissolution of the partnership", when Charles' stronger churchmanship was shocked by the ordination of superintendents for the Methodist Societies in America.

This is basically a psychological study of a conflict in loves and loyalties; and as such it has much of the charm we find in a first-rate historical novel.

P. V. N.

*Belief and Unbelief since 1850.* By H. G. Wood. Cambridge: The University Press, 1955. pp. viii + 143. \$2.75.

In a series of public lectures under the sponsorship of the Divinity Faculty of the University of Cambridge, a brilliant Nonconformist scholar analyzes the causes of the breakdown in religious faith and practice in Britain during the past century: a retreat from religiousness which, for reasons not altogether flat-

tering to us, as yet has no parallel in America. Singled out for discussion are scientific positivism, the unsettling consequences of literary and historical criticism applied to the Bible, devastating inferences drawn from Freudian psychology, and the collapse of traditional Christian moral standards. Incidentally, the little book contains some first-rate apologetic in its rebuttal to the negations of the secularists.

P. V. N.

*Introductory Papers on DANTE.* By Dorothy L. Sayers, with a preface by Barbara Reynolds, Lecturer on Italian in the University of Cambridge. Harper and Brothers, 1954. pp. xx + 225. \$4.00.

Blessed is the introduction that really introduces, encouraging one to read the work that it is related to instead of serving as a substitute therefore. This is the happy success of Miss Sayers' papers on Dante, which encourage the reader to take up the *Divine Comedy* with a real understanding of what the author is trying to say, and some awareness of the particular way in which he says it. Outstanding is the central chapter on "The Fourfold Interpretation of the *Comedy*", to which Dante himself has given us an often neglected key. Literally the *Comedy* is a story of the fate of souls after death; allegorically it is a picture of the pilgrimage of human life, political, moral, and mystical. Thus the vision of heaven in the *Paradiso* gives us Dante's ideas of the right ordering of the commonwealth, of the training of the soul in virtue, and of the approach to the final vision which is the climax of the poem in all its senses. Miss Sayers' first three chapters explain necessary aspects of the approach to Dante—his imagery, and the meaning of heaven, hell, and purgatory (since even readers who do not believe what he believed should try to understand what he meant, which

not even scholars have always done). The last three take up more specific questions—the ranking of sins in the *Inferno*, “The Comedy of the Comedy”, and “The Paradoxes of the Comedy” and some of Dante’s other works. Examples of the latter are the question of the “lady of the window” in the *Vita Nuova* (where Dante himself seems to confuse us as to whether she was real or symbolic), and the ambivalent treatment of Boniface VIII—he is no true Pope, and yet his insulting by French agents at Anagni crucifies Christ afresh in his Vicar (*Purgatorio* xx 85-90). Miss Sayers assumes the obvious elementary background; it may be that in correcting the common over-emphasis of Dante’s political ideas she rather minimizes the importance that they do have in his work. She rightly emphasizes that we must look at Dante’s work as a whole, and with his intentions, not ours—in the words she quotes from Middleton Murrey, “Great poets mean what they say”. In passing she gives us an admirable appreciation of Dante’s view of his own personality—conscious that he really was a great poet, he was also aware that in various ways he cut a ridiculous figure in daily life. I especially welcome Miss Sayers’ calling attention to the importance of the *Purgatorio*, often neglected because it does not provide such striking episodes and phrases as the rest of the work. All in all, her modestly entitled *Introductory Papers* offer an admirable stimulus and guide to the reading of Dante.

E. R. H.

*Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality.* By Paul Tillich. University of Chicago Press, 1955. pp. x + 85. \$2.25

As we all know, Dr. Tillich has gone to Harvard as University Professor of Religion after more than two decades as

a member of the faculty of Union Seminary in New York. His latest book—a masterpiece of condensation, simple yet profound, with the meat of his whole “system” in it—is based on lectures given at the University of Virginia four years ago. In this reviewer’s judgment, the present volume is *the* introduction to Tillich’s thought; but it is more than that—it is also a beautifully lucid statement of the only kind of Christian teaching which can meet the needs of men today without outraging their reason or offending their proper sense of the importance of all the new data which modern men have acquired.

But lest I continue to deal in superlatives, let me sketch briefly the argument of the book: Every philosopher is faced with questions that are in the last resort ontological; so likewise, the affirmations of “biblical religion” in the long run turn out to be concerned with ontological issues. In religious faith, these are put in the form of symbols; in philosophical study, the questions are put in more conceptual form, having to do with the nature and meaning of “being.” Every religion demands a philosophical background; every philosophy leads to the final religious question. On both of these avenues, man faces the ultimate Reality with whom he must come to terms, but he faces that Reality in different ways. The unique claim of Christianity is that “Jesus as the Christ is the concrete place where the Logos becomes visible.” This is an affirmation of faith; yet it is itself an ontological claim. The Christian is that one who can “live serenely and courageously” in the midst of the tensions between negation and affirmation, transcending these as we meet them in life (and in thought) in the God who is “Being itself”, made transparent to us in “Jesus as the Christ.”

W. N. P.

*An Essay on Christian Philosophy.* By Jacques Maritain. Philosophical Library, 1955. xi + 116 pp. \$2.75.

*Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism.* By Jacques Maritain. Philosophical Library, 1955. 383 pp. \$6.00.

*The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain.* Scribner, 1955. pp. xiv + 348. \$5.00.

Here are two volumes by the distinguished French neo-Thomist, now translated into English, and an anthology of Maritain's writings on social and political problems, compiled by Joseph W. Evans and Leo R. Ward. It is good to see that almost all of Maritain's works are now available in English, while the collection by Fathers Evans and Ward (evidently intended for a text-book in Roman Catholic university courses on the subject) provides us with a convenient summary of his views on the philosophical and theological implications of our contemporary problems of government, social relations, and economic theory.

There is little that is new to the reader already acquainted with Maritain. In the collection of writings, large selections are rightly taken from "The Rights of Man and Natural Law", "True Humanism", and other well-known works. The choice of material seems excellent and it is useful to have ready at hand the considered thought of one of the great "liberal" Roman Catholics in the political and social spheres.

The essay in Christian philosophy is a translation of a small book that has had a wide reading in France; it is a persuasive, although to this reviewer unconvincing, argument for the *philosophia perennis* as the "natural" philosophy for the Christian faith. The other work, on the philosophy of Henri Bergson, is both a skillful criticism of the vitalistic theories of the great French thinker, and also a tribute from an admirer who was

obliged to go beyond Bergson himself. The last chapter, in particular, concerned with Bergson's big book on morality and religion, is written with singular tenderness. Whatever else may be true of M. Maritain, he is a gentle and loving philosopher.

W. N. P.

*The Church in Our Town.* By Rockwell C. Smith. Abingdon Press, 1955. pp. 220. \$2.50.

This is a revised and enlarged edition of the book first published in 1945. It is a splendid introduction to the question of the relationship of the rural church to the life of the community in which it is located. The community is defined as the town and that area surrounding it where the majority of the people look to the town to satisfy the majority of their needs. The writer emphasizes the fact that the church in the town has a responsibility for the well-being of those who live in the surrounding area.

He brings out also the fact that since the well-being of the people in the area is conditioned by their social and economic as well as their spiritual health, the church must be concerned with these factors in shaping the course of her ministry. He says, "It is a book about the church looking out away from collections and organizations and budgets and appointments to its people in their working world; it is about the other groups in and about the town looking in toward the church and discovering the message and standards it has for their common life."

In dealing with the ever changing social and economic conditions of any community it is necessary constantly to re-examine one's ideas. Hence the writer says in regard to this edition, "The passage of time, the accumulation of new data, and social change have made it necessary to revise this book." Accordingly he has brought the book up to date.



has rewritten many of the passages in order to consider new conditions, and has added new facts and ideas based upon new knowledge.

The book defines what is meant by the term, "rural population," which includes people of both farm and non-farm occupations in the smaller places. The author outlines the structure of rural society and the nature of the rural community. He shows how the church must take into consideration the various factors which make up the community in its entirety in order to succeed as a rural social organization.

There are three chapters on the question of the land, dealing with the land in its spatial content, with the question of its fertility and conservation, and with the matter of ownership. There are chapters on rural social organizations, on rural trade, on rural schools and other means of education, especially the governmental service agencies, on the social class system in rural life and its effect on the rural church.

The last chapter is an excellent exposition of the role of the church in the community, setting forth the peculiar functions of the church—the part which she and she alone can and must play in the on-going life and welfare of the community.

The book contains helpful notes to facilitate further study of the content of each chapter, and has an adequate bibliography.

E. D. B.

*Doing the Truth.* A Summary of Christian Ethics. By James A. Pike. Doubleday and Co., 1955 pp. 192 \$2.95.

The title appropriates St. John 3:21 where Archbishop Temple finds it suggesting "the openness and straight forwardness of right doing." What an apt description of the way in which the Dean of St. John the Divine presents many

phases of the Christian ethic! His training in law has equipped him for discussion of the deeper but cognate field with a minimum of ambiguity. An outstanding instance of this appears in the transformation by which the tentative *permission* to married couples in certain circumstances to employ birth control—becomes the positive *duty* to do so in order that the children may be properly spaced. Many of the topics of traditional moral and ascetical theology as well as those of so called social ethics come in for similar refreshing treatment in this compact little volume. Quite rightly the Dean brings to the forefront the role of the church as the *redeeming society*. What one misses is appreciation of the correlative aspect of the Ecclesia as the *society of the redeemed* and with it a proper stress on the edifying character of Christian love. But then—one should not expect to find everything about the Christian way of life in one book.

H. H. H.

*Preacher's Note-Book.* Outline Sermons and Illustrations for Every Sunday and Holy Day in the Church's Year. By Paul B. Bull S.P.C.K., London 1954 (MacMillan, New York) pp. 566 plus Indices.

The most recent writing on the liturgical movement asserts that the unity of the eucharistic rite lies in the ministry of the Word of God! If the movement among ourselves is to gain the momentum we all desire, it follows then that this ministry must be more adequately discharged than simply reading the appointed epistle and gospel for the day. The Word must be proclaimed in the sermon—and bear some recognizable relation to these lessons. The clergy must school themselves to do this—and do it well. Aids have not been wanting. Easton and Robbins' *The Eternal Word in the Modern World*. Kennedy's adap-

tations of this material together with much that is new in *Meditations in His Presence*, and Shepherd's exposition of the collects, epistles and gospels in his *Oxford American Prayer Book Commentary* are all of great value. Evidently Father Bull's *Preacher's Note-Book* has proved its worth in this field or the S.P.C.K. would not be bringing out a new edition fifteen years after the last one. Few could use the outlines as they stand. It is possible to make *three* sermons out of the material suggested for each Sunday and Holy Day. What however is of imperishable value is the treasures of illustrations which make up at least half the book. There are few if any duds amongst them. The book should wear for another fifteen years and speed the development of liturgical piety among us.

H. H.

*The Priesthood and Perfection* by Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P. translated by E. Hayden, O.P. The Newman Press, Westminster Md. pp. 197 plus indices \$3.00.

This little book may have considerable value in Roman Catholic Seminaries but the same starchy stuffiness which characterized Father Garrigou-Lagrange's work *Christian Perfection and Contemplation* serves to make its usefulness among us very slim. It stands in sharp contrast with so much recent theological writing which has come from France!

H. H. H.

*The Priesthood*. A translation of the *Peri Hierosynes* of St. Chrysostom by W. A. Jurgens. The Macmillan Co., New York pp. 112 plus notes and indices. \$2.50.

Father Jurgens has placed us all in his debt by this fresh and careful translation of the famous work of the golden mouthed Greek father and by his tidy, apposite introduction. One hopes with

him that it will fill a gap in the pastoral literature of our seminaries and find a place in the devotional readings of prospective ordained servants of Jesus Christ.

H. H. H.

*The Confessions of Jacob Boehme*. Compiled and edited by W. Scott Palmer, with an Introduction by Evelyn Underhill. Harper & Brothers, 1954. pp. 188. \$2.25.

*The Spiritual Life*. By Evelyn Underhill. Harper & Brothers, n. d. pp. 124. \$1.75.

Two recent issues in Harper's series of devotional classics, which are pocket size ( $3\frac{1}{2} \times 5\frac{1}{2}$ ) and uniformly bound. The second is a re-issue of the broadcast talks published in 1937; the first includes a twenty-six page introduction that will be of especial interest to admirers of its author as well as to those who know or wish to know Boehme.

H. G.

*A Diary of Readings*. By John Baillie. Scribner's, 1955. pp. 385. \$2.50.

This volume is offered as a companion to the author's *A Diary of Private Prayer*. The many who have used and use that treasured guide will be delighted with this, and those who are drawn to it perhaps by Baillie's name will be rewarded. Its sub-title—"Being an anthology of pages suited to engage serious thought, one for every day of the year gathered from the wisdom of many centuries" makes a promise that is richly fulfilled.

H. G.

*A Treasury of the Kingdom*. An Anthology compiled by A. A. Blackburn and others. Oxford University Press, 1954. pp. 280. \$3.50.

Another rich collection of readings, this one representing selections chosen to illuminate a single theme. The passages are grouped under the following heads:

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The Approach to the Kingdom, Festivals of the Kingdom, the Fruit of the Kingdom. Servants of the Kingdom Perfected. They are taken from the writings of philosophers (Plato, Whitehead), poets (Keats, Hopkins, Eliot), theologians (St. Augustine, Temple), reformers (Luther, Fox), writers (Shaw, Dostoevsky), statesmen (Lincoln, Nehru)—to cite a few examples. There is a very brief introductory note before each passage.

H. G.

### BOOKS RECEIVED

- A Christian Palestinian Syriac Horologion.* Edited by Matthew Black. (Texts & Studies, New Series, .I) Cambridge University Press, 1954, pp. ix + 458, two plates. \$12.50.
- Origen: Prayer, Exhortation to Martyrdom.* Translated by John J. O'Meara (Ancient Christian Writers, No. 19) Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1954, pp. vii + 253. \$3.25.
- Origen's Treatise on Prayer.* Translation and Notes, with an account of the practice and doctrine of prayer from New Testament times to Origen, by Eric George Jay. Macmillan, 1954, pp. 237. \$4.25.
- Tillotson: A Study in Seventeenth Century Literature.* By Louis G. Locke. (Anglistica, Vol. IV) Copenhagen: Rosenkilde and Bagger, 1954, pp. 187. Dan. Kr. 23.
- German Protestants Face the Social Question.* Volume I. *The Conservative Phase, 1815-1871.* By William O. Shanahan. Notre Dame, Ind.; University of Notre Dame Press, 1954, pp. 434. \$6.75.
- The Rungless Ladder: Harriet Beecher Stowe and New England Puritanism.* By Charles H. Foster. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1954, pp. xv + 2278. \$4.50.
- Revolution in Missions.* By Willis Church Lamott. Macmillan, 1954, pp. vi + 224. \$3.50.
- The Christian World Mission in Our Day.* By Kenneth Scott Latourette Harper & Brothers, 1954, pp. 192. \$2.50.
- The Broadening Church: A Study of Theological Issues in the Presbyterian Church since 1869.* By Leferts A. Loetscher. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1954, pp. 195. \$4.75.
- The Christian Hope and the Task of the Church.* Six Ecumenical Surveys and the Report of the Assembly prepared by the Advisory Commission on the Main Theme. Harper & Brothers, 1954, pp. 347. \$5.00 (The official report of the Second World Council of Churches Assembly, Evanston 1954)
- Report of the Anglican Congress, 1954.* Edited by Powel Mills Dawley. Seabury Press, 1954, pp. 276. \$1.50.
- Søren Kierkegaard: a Biography.* By Johannes Hohlenberg, translated by T. H. Croxall. New York: Pantheon Books, 1954, pp. 321 plus 28 illustrations. \$5.00.
- The Hope of Our Calling.* By H. G. G. Herklots. Seabury Press, 1954, pp. 82. \$1.75. (A Bible study on the theme of Hope, with most of the biblical passages quoted in full).
- The Symbols of Religious Faith.* (A Preface to an Understanding of the Nature of Religion) By Ben Kimpel. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954, pp. 198. \$3.75.
- Irrationalism and Rationalism in Religion.* By Robert Leet Patterson. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1954, pp. 155. \$3.00.
- Man and Christ.* By Albert Clayton Reid. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1954, pp. 90. Paper, \$2.00.
- Catholicism: Humanist and Democratic.* By Robert Woodfield. Seabury Press, 1954, pp. 96. \$2.00. (A brief exposition of the Christian faith by a 'liberal Catholic')
- The Faith That Rebels.* By D. S. Cairns. Harper & Brothers, 1954, pp. 260. \$3.00. (The subtitle is, "A Re-examination of the Miracles of Jesus". The book had a wide influence when and after it was first published in 1928, and went through five editions by 1933. The present edition has a foreword by Donald Baillie)

- Faith and Behavior: Christian Answers to Moral Problems.* By Chad Walsh and Eric Montizambert. Morehouse-Gorham, 1954, pp. 188. \$2.75.
- Christianity and Anti-Semitism.* By Nicholas Berdyaev, with a commentary and notes by Alan A. Spears. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954, pp. 58. \$2.75.
- Manners and Morals of the 1920's: A Survey of the Religious Press.* By Sister Mary Patrice Thaman. New York: Bookman Associates, 1954, pp. 215. \$3.75.
- Spiritual Awakening. An Interpretation of Contemporary Problems in the Light of the Eternal Truths of Religion.* By Kurt Klappholz. New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1954, pp. 100. \$3.00.
- Why Not Think It Over? Essays on Popular Fallacies.* By A. T. Barr. New York: Exposition Press, 1954, pp. 163. \$3.00.
- Preaching in a Scientific Age.* By A. C. Craig. Scribner's, 1954, pp. 119. \$2.50. (The Warrack Lectures for 1953)
- The True and Lively Word.* By James T. Cleland. Scribner's, 1954, pp. 120. \$2.50.
- Preach the Word of God.* By Frederick M. Morris. Morehouse-Gorham, 1954, pp. 157. \$2.50.
- The Meaning of Holiness.* By Louis Lavelle. New York: Pantheon Books, 1954, pp. 113. \$2.75. (A study of holiness as exemplified in St. Francis, St. Teresa of Avila, St. John of the Cross and St. Francis de Sales)
- The Meditations of William of St. Thierry.* Translated by a religious of C. S. M. V. Harper & Brothers, 1954, pp. 108. \$1.50.
- The Revelations of Mechthild of Magdeburg (1210-1297), or The Flowing Light of the Godhead.* Translated by Lucy Menzies. Longmans, Green & Co., 1954, pp. 263. 18s.
- Prisoner for God.* By Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Macmillan, 1954, pp. 190. \$2.50.
- A Symphony of the Christian Year.* By Randolph Crump Miller. Seabury Press, 1954, pp. 230. \$3.25 ("How man's needs are met through the rhythmic variations of the message of the Christian year; how man discovers the redemptive power of God in this message").

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